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ABSTRACT 
The thesis makes a distinctive contnbution to the field of 
professional ethics; offering a more nuanced understanding of the 
role of a profession’s ethos in relation to its ethics. In so doing, it 
also offers a valuable insight into GP thinking at what proved to 
be a unique moment in the history of that branch of the medical 
profession. 
Using historical and empirical data, the thesis first traces the 
development of the medical profession’s ethos - Its belief in itself 
as a noble, superior profession, of special dignity and worth. It 
then shows the influence of that ethos in areas of professional 
decision-making that have had a particular impact on the 
provision of health care within the LJK over the past 50 years. 
Taking the profession’s ethos as a benchmark, the study explores 
the nature of the profession’s response to the creation, control 
and, in recent years, major reform of the NHS which reform 
introduced a new emphasis on management. The latter provides a 
case study that relates the theoretical material to an historical 
situation This includes a number of interviews with GPs that 
point to the beliefs and values influencing their decisions in 
relation to the reforms, as they affected general practice. 
The study concludes that, although a profession dependant on 
attracting clients may find it necessary to subscribe to a sa of 
ethical principles that draws on outside beliefs and values, it is 
the ethics derived from its own internal ethos that will take 
precedence in guiding everyday thinking and practice. 
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Introduction’ 
This research arose out of the changes made to the National 
Health Service in the late 1980s when the government introduced a 
new style of management into the service. This was a major reform 
that met strong opposition from key groups within the NHS led by 
the medical profession. Ethical concerns were central to the 
objections raised by these groups. The reforms were portrayed as a 
challenge to the ethical principles of professional practice. It was 
this emphasis that led me to consider the role of ethics in the modern 
medical profession. Specifically my aim was to critically assess the 
relationship between the principles of standard medical ethics and the 
everyday thinking and practice of medicine. I argue that the ethics of 
everyday practice and decision-making is based not so much on 
textbook principles as the profession’s own long established ethos. 
Although 1 briefly outline, for contextual reasons, the theories 
informing medical ethics, the focus of the study is the interplay 
between ethos and ethics. Ethos and ethics are key terms in this 
study Though these terms will be explored in depth in the following 
chapter, at this point I will offer a very brief standard definition of 
each to assist the reader in understanding the unfolding argument. 
Ethics is defined as: 
’ I have kept references to a ininimum in ihis section as all the points made will be 
expanded and fully referenced in the body of the thesis 
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a system of accepted beliefs which control behaviour, 
especially such a system based on morals (Cambridge 
Dictionary, 2000). 
And ethos as: 
the.. ..moral nature, the characteristic 'spirit' or 'tone' of an 
association, institution, society, culture or people 
(Merriam-Websters, 2000; Scruton, 1983, p. 157). 
Drawing out this subtle but significant relationship has the 
potential to make a valuable contribution to the field of medical 
ethics in particular and professional ethics in general. The strength 
of the study is its focus on the ethical hinterland: the ethical 
landscape often hidden behind the official, or formal, language of 
ethics professionals employ in public for discussion of such things as 
ethical dilemmas and hard cases. 
Exploring this territory offers a clearer understanding of 
behaviour, attitudes, and conduct that from the perspective of the 
outsider will otherwise be judged as unethical. Furthermore, 
recognising the influence of a profession's ethos on both its explicit, 
or formai, and implicit, or informal, ethics offers the potential for a 
firmer foundation on which to construct future codes of ethics. 
Thus, while the research will be of special interest to academics 
working in the field of medical ethics, in view of the growing interest 
in this subject, in both the public and private sector, the research has 
value to all involved in the teaching of professional ethics and 
devising of codes of ethics. 
The study sits within the discipline of professional ethics. It is 
not a sociological study but rather an exercise in interdisciplinary 
critical reflective thinking using a variety of sources and methods to 
illuminate a particular phenomenon, namely the relationship between 
ethos and ethics. Undertaking such an exploration involves crossing 
the disciplinary boundaries of history, sociology, anthropology as 
well as moral philosophy. This is no mere haphazard eclecticism but 
a valid approach to a subject that in its own right crosses the 
somewhat artificial boundaries of traditional academic disciplines 
(Lupton, 1994, p. 19). 
In this case, taking the broader inter-disciplinary view allows 
insights into the nature of the medical profession’s opposition to the 
management reforms. It also offers room for an explanation of why, 
when set against the ethical principles it espouses in its formal “ethics 
talk”, the attitudes and practices of the medical profession can appear 
to the lay world unethical 
The Medical Profession 
The medical profession operates in two distinct areas: 
community and hospital. Primary care is provided in the community 
by general practitioners with a team of other professionals including 
Community or District Nurses and Health Visitors. Secondary care 
takes place within the hospital setting under the control of various 
consultants each with their own team, or “firm”, of junior doctors 
plus a full range of support professionals and ancillary st&. GPs 
have always acted as the main gate-keepers to the secondary sector, 
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patients as a rule’ must be referred to a consultant by their GP. 
Despite this apparently key role community based medicine, or 
general practice, has historically been viewed within the medical 
hierarchy as less prestigious than acute hospital based medicine. A 
third area of practice is that of public health. It focuses on the health 
of populations as against individual patients. It, too, is provided from 
within the community by a small group of doctors. It is viewed by 
fellow professionals as the least prestigious of all the pathways open 
to doctors though it does offer some consultant-grade posts (Levitt 
et al, 1995, p. 171-72; Moran & Watkins, 1991). 
In 1989 general practitioners were invited, even encouraged, to  
take responsibility for the management of much of their Practice 
budget. This so-called fundholding scheme was a radical move that 
formed a central plank in the then government’s reform of the NHS. 
Traditionally the medical profession has distanced itself from a direct 
involvement in matters of finance within the NHS. Professional 
decisions have always been presented as based solely on “clinical 
need‘‘ without any reference to costs. Budget, or fund-, holding 
appeared to break down that barrier, making open and obvious the 
link between clinical decisions focused around patient need and 
management concerns focused around costs. Thus, the management 
reforms of the 1980s presented GPs with an opportunity and a 
challenge. 
’ Direct access can be gained through attendance at a hospital M E  department. 
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This window of opportunity and challenge was open for just one 
decade. It was closed by the new government following the general 
election of 1997. During that ten year period, however, GPs were 
faced with a choice: to maintain the profession’s distance from 
management and its concerns with finance or to accept the invitation 
to take more direct control of the budget. My research provides a 
unique opportunity to hear the voice of GPs as they faced what could 
be viewed either as a moral dilemma or as an innovative approach to 
the provision of health care. How did GPs respond? What 
considerations informed their decision? To explore these questions 1 
undertook interviews with GPs, both fund and non-fundholders. In 
order to gain a more detailed background picture I also interviewed 
some of the new NHS managers including a business manager, an 
audit manager and a practice manager. 
From the interview material came the realisation that something 
more was involved in the decision-making process than “patients best 
interests’’ that is the emphasis of the GMC’s Dufies ofa Doctor and 
derived from and closely allied to the now standard four principles 
identified with medical ethics. The principles of non-maleficence - 
parurn r7on nocere, which is usually translated as “first do no harm”; 
beneficence - to do good; justice - fairness, equity; and autonomy - 
patient self determination (seeGllon, 1988; Beauchamp & Childress, 
1994, 120m. Values that the doctors brought to bear on their 
decision seemed to reflect another, albeit related, perspective, a 
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different view, of what was “good’ or “right” in relation to 
professional practice. 
Jonsen (1990), a professor of medical history and ethics, in a 
hook based on a lecture he was invited to give to Harvard Medical 
School, provided the key to identi@ing and understanding this 
different perspective. He drew attention to a subtle, thus all too 
easily overlooked distinction, namely, that between medical ethics 
and the medicai profession’s ethos. 
This distinction was the key for the whole study and provided 
the central question for the interview data. Was the decision the GPs 
made informed more by the ethos of the profession or the more 
widely understood and publicly espoused medical ethics? Out of 
this came the core topic of the thesis: an exploration of the 
relationship between medical ethos and formal modem medical 
ethics. 
In order not only to understand the nature of the profession’s 
ethos but to ground the central hypothesis in a broader perspective, 1 
began by exploring the historical background to the development of 
medicine as a profession within the United Kingdom (UK). I then 
went on to look at the profession’s response to another seminal 
moment in its modern development, namely, the conception and 
creation of the NHS itself. These elements provided an essential 
context for the work. The historical research enabled me to develop 
a conceptual framework from within which to interpret the interview 
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data. I tested this theoretical material in the context of an historical 
case study, namely the response of the profession as a whole, and 
then GPs in particular, to the range of reforms introduced following 
what came to be known as the Griffith's report. 
The Sham of the Study 
The study draws on a combination of historical and empirical 
evidence. It is divided into two parts of equal weight. The first part, 
chapters one to four, looks at the construction and impact of the 
medical ethos through the development of the profession within the 
UK, and the influence of that ethos as seen in the profession's 
response to the creation of the NHS. It closes with an exploration 
of the relationship between two sets of values: those of medicine and 
those of management. The second part, chapters five to nine presents 
a case study, or paradigm example, based on the reforms to the NHS 
that followed the Griffiths report. This case study focuses on the 
position taken by the profession as a whole to the reforms and then 
the responses of GPs as individual doctors faced with decisions 
presented to them by the reforms. I chose this approach as it allows 
me to unpick and highlight the distinction between ethos-based 
thinking and practice, the informai implicit ethics, and the formal 
explicit ethics of the profession's public pronouncements. Thus, 1 am 
able to test the theoretical material, the hypothesis, in the context of 
a particular historical situation. 
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I show that in making its decisions on matters such as the 
creation of the NHS, management reform, and everyday practice, the 
medical profession acted according to the values and beliefs derived 
from its ethos even though it will often have presented its case, or 
defended its position, in terms of its more widely understood and 
acceptable ethics exemplified in recent decades in the four principles 
as described above. 
The point of the study is not, however, to suggest that medical 
ethics is a mere epiphenomenon, that the profession’s public 
pronouncements with its emphasis on ethical concerns, were or are 
just empty rhetoric. It is instead, to explore the argument that the 
stance of the profession was, and is, governed by more than a 
concern for publicly stated ethical principles. The aim of the research 
is to draw out and clarifi a distinction between ethics and ethos, 
particularly in the context of the apparent conflict between 
principalist ethics theory and the reality of everyday practice and 
decision-making 
In making this distinction I point to two versions or types of 
medical ethics The first is derived from “the ideal demanded by the 
public” (Loudon, 1986, p.272). It is typified in the increasingly 
familiar and widely discussed four principles (Gillon, 1988; 
Beauchamp and Childress, 1994). It has provided the basis for the 
published, and therefore public, guidance given to doctors by the 
GMC in its Duties of u doctor (GMC, 1995), and it figures 
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prominently in public debates on so-called ethical dilemmas, the 
“hard cases” that make the headlines The second is a type of virtue 
ethics, almost unspoken and unrecognised but arising from the heart 
of the profession itself and informing the doctors’ view of the world 
of professional thinking and practice, “the daily mundane tasks of a 
physician” (Magee, 2000), and for which I have derived the term 
“the implicit ethics of practice”. 
Modern principalist medical ethics has now become 
differentiated into several distinct branches, including physician- 
centred medical ethics; health care ethics for nurses and other health 
care providers; clinical ethics that focuses on hospital case decisions 
with the aid of diverse committees and consultants; and bioethics that 
includes general issues of reproduction, fair distribution of organs 
and other scarce life-saving resources, and protection of the 
biosphere (Ruddick, 1998), plus any variation on the above including 
those from a patient-centred perspective. In this thesis, however, the 
focus is on the two main types of ethics that 1 have defined and 
distinguished in the preceding paragraph. It is to these two types of 
ethics. and these alone, that I will be referring throughout the rest of 
the work. 
Finally, at this point it is appropriate to note that the institution 
of medicine as a social phenomenon has been the object of close 
academic scrutiny over many years. This has resulted in a vast body 
of literature in the fields of medical ethics, sociology, history, 
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anthropology, and related areas. It has been impossible to explore all 
this material. Readers will, nevertheless, find many standard texts 
referred to particularly in the historical material including those 
offering the “outsider” view, with work from North American 
historians Honigsbaum (1979, 1989) and Eckstein (1958). However, 
it is important to emphasise that a significant number of the texts I 
have selected have been written by doctors. This was a deliberate 
choice. I wanted to give considerable space to such doctor-produced 
material as a means of “looking over the shoulder” of those 
inhabiting the world of medicine in order to better understand the 
aspects of that world that are the focus of this study (Schwan, 1998, 
p.231; Geertz, 1983, p.S8), 
Part One of the thesis is made up of chapters one to four. 
Chapter one has two sections. In the first, I outline the overall 
research project. I explain how the project developed from a ves. 
early and ill-defined focus on the ethics of managers; to that of 
doctor-managers, and finally to that of the medical profession as a 
whole; as seen in the approach of the profession to major changes in 
health care provision In the second section I set out the 
methodology used. 
In chapter two, I begin by looking at the concepts central to the 
work, namely, ethos and ethics. After offering a fuller definition of 
both terms I move on to look at the place of each within the medical 
profession. There then follows a discussion on the role of myth and 
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a look at the place of myth in relation to medicine’s ethos and ethics, 
this in the context of one of the profession’s central myth stories, 
namely, the place of the Hippocratic Oath. Another core element in 
the creation of the profession’s ethos was its path to the status of a 
profession and I explore this part of the history The chapter 
concludes with a section on the values informing medicine’s ethos 
and its explicit and implicit ethics. 
Chapter three develops the historical emphasis by looking back 
to the creation of a national health service. The distinction between 
ethos and ethics is identified first, in the responses of the profession 
to the NHS and then traced over five decades, as the profession dealt 
with efforts by government to address the ever-present question of 
how the resource-hungry Service could and should be controlled or 
managed. The chapter ends at the point where management reforms, 
the second great challenge of modern times to the profession, are 
introduced. 
Chapter four explores the values of management and those of 
the medical profession. It analyses the assertion of an ethical conflict 
between the two sets of values by examining the medical profession’s 
actual relationship to the concepts most closely associated with this 
new style of management, namely, money and profit. It then look at 
the profession’s core value as set out in Duties ofa doctor (GMC, 
1995), namely, “patients’ best interests”, and set this alongside other 
interests that have a direct claim on professional practice. Two 
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further key concepts are then scrutinised, first clinical autonomy and 
second the value to patients of the doctor-patient relationship as it is 
has been traditionally understood by medical practitioners. 
Part Two comprises chapters five to nine. It begins with a brief 
summary ofthe main arguments up to this stage of the thesis. 
Chapter five introduces a case study that will then be followed 
through the rest of the work. It begins with the reforms following 
the report of Roy Griffiths, deputy chief executive of Sainsbury’s, a 
leading UK supermarket. Appointed by the government to find ways 
of making the NHS more efficient, Griîñths recommended the 
introduction of general management, including encouraging doctors 
to take on overt management responsibilities. The government 
accepted the recommendation and went on to introduce even more 
innovative reforms in the shape of the so-called “internal market” in 
line with the ideas of Aiain Enthoven. The chapter explains and 
explores all these changes in greater detail. It then looks in detail at 
the medical profession’s reaction to the changes, highlighting the 
contention that the reforms presented doctors with a possible ethical 
dilemma by requiring them to place the demands of good 
management alongside those of good patient care. 
Chapter six contains the core interview data This interview is 
the pivot for the rest of the interview data and is thus set out in full. 
It is preceded by a section describing the data-gathering and 
transcription process. 
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Chapter seven analyses the core interview, identikng and using 
thematic threads running through the data. These themes are the 
factors that influenced the GP’s decision to become a fundholder. 
The values and beliefs associated with the profession’s internal ethos 
are shown to have had a greater influence on thinking and decision- 
making than the principles of modem medical ethics. 
Chapter eight moves the analysis to the full range of interview 
material using the same main themes identified in chapter seven. 
This chapter is divided into two sections, the first look at the 
interviews from the rest of the fundholders and the second sets out 
the views of the non-fundhoiders. Through this data we hear 
opposing views to the fundholding element of the reforms. 
Chapter nine draws together the whole range of case study 
material, both interview and historical documentary, and discusses 
the findings. 
The Conclusion looks back over the project summarising the 
main arguments and looking at its strengths and weaknesses before 
suggesting further areas for study arising from the research. 
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Part One 
Chapter 1 
The Research Proiect 
This chapter has two main sections the first, focus on the 
development of the research topic, presenting an overview and 
background to the issues explored in the body of the work In the 
second, 1 set out the methodology and methods 
An Overview 
Medicine into ManaQement 
During the 1980s, government began a process of what Osborne 
(1 980, p 185), has called “responsibilisation”. Following the reforms 
of that period a new type of management was introduced to the NHS 
- general management. Under general management, the emphasis 
was placed on principles characterising the management of 
businesses in the private sector value for money, efficiency, and 
effectiveness Thus, the NHS manager was no longer to be an 
administrator guided almost solely by the interests of doctors but a 
proactive manager taking control and making decisions (Hunter, 
1992, p.558). 
Management became the new watchword of the NHS. General 
managers were introduced into the hospital setting where they were 
required to manage ”hospitals as businesses” (Osborne, 1980, p. 186). 
In the community, GPs were encouraged to become “fundholders”, 
taking responsibility for, or managing, their Practice budget. The 
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scheme involved allocating each fundholding Practice a budget from 
which they would be able to purchase, within specified limits, 
services they considered most appropriate to the needs of their 
patient population. 
In a study of young doctors’ core values, Allen (1997a), found 
hostility toward management on the part of doctors. While leaders of 
the profession identified its core values as commitment, caring, 
compassion, competence, integrity, spirit of enquiry, confidentiality, 
responsibility, and advocacy, managers were held to have ‘’very 
different aims and values”. There were “great differences in culture 
between managers and the medical profession” that created tensions 
between the two groups (pp. 1,3, 8). 
Thus, moves toward incorporating business management values 
into the practice of medicine presented doctors with a dilemma. 
More specifically a moral dilemma inasmuch as doctors are perceived 
to inhabit “a world of ethics”,7 in which the interests of patients are 
held to be paramount. Business and management, on other hand, are 
viewed as having as their prime consideration rather less noble ideals 
focused on costs, value for money, efficiency, and profit. From that 
perspective a clash of values was almost inevitable as the values 
relevant to good business practice were seen to be at odds with those 
This ber) phrase was used by the speaker in a Thought for the Da) broadcast 
(Rado 4, February 12th 1999) It was offered as a passing and nonantroversial 
conunent thai the speaker knew to be one with which the listeners could agree and 
identûv, as such it typfies the popular perception 
3 
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of good clinical practice (Dickenson, 1995; cf. Sheaff & West, 1997, 
pp. 189-206). 
A former chairman of the BMA highlighted what he saw as the 
particular moral dilemma facing one branch of the profession, 
namely, GPs, as they considered the fundholding option. In his view 
fundholding offered not only the opportunity to become directly 
involved in managing their budgets, but of “gaining advantage for 
their patients at the expense of those of their non-fundholding 
colleagues”. He asserted that “in the first entrepreneurial flush of 
enthusiasm” the early fundholders resolved this particular dilemma by 
ignoring “ethical considerations” in making their decision (Lee- 
Potter, 1997, p.16, emphasis added). The implication was that those 
GPs dissenting from the profession’s opposition to fundholding were 
acting not out of concern for overall patient well-being but for the 
apparently less honourable reason of putting their own patients first. 
In so doing they were acting unethically, However. this criticism 
appears to c0ntradic.t the GMC’c code of practice wherein the doctor 
is clearly told that their “primary duty is the care of your patients” 
(GMC, 1995 emphasis added).‘ The negative presentation of the 
action of fundholding GPs is one to which I will return later. 
However, it was appropriate to introduce it at this early stage. 
Although this quote comes from the GMC’s latem. at the time. directions to doctors 
it IS the long standmg accepted .first duty’ of the doctor 
4 
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Development of the Research Proiect 
Originally the intention of the research had been to find out how 
NHS managers resolved ethical problems. However, as I became 
more confident in my own understanding of the issues, the focus of 
interest moved from the ethics of managers to the relationship 
between modem medical ethics and a traditional medical ethos. This 
section sets out that movement. 
“Researcher-produced’ data (Reinharz, 1992), was a central 
element of the work. In the early months of the project, and after 
discussion with my supervisors, the consensus view was that the 
methodology should centre on focus-group interviews based around 
case studies with use of a so-called “Socratic dialogue”,’ in order to 
elicit the ethical reasoning process used by the individual interviewed 
and the moral principles that informed the decisions made. With this 
goal in mind, I began navigating a path to NHS managers. This 
proved less easy than had originally been thought, mainly because, as 
an “outsider”, I had no direct contact with the intended interview 
group. Two attempts to set up such interviews came to nothing. 
These efforts continued at the same time as my review of the field 
i Definedby Stout (1988, p.301-2) as in its “bad sense asking ‘Why do you believe 
that’?’ over and over again until the person you’re talking to either falls silent. gets 
confused, or gives up and utters what looks like a fundamental principle”. And as 
in its “ g d  sense a land of dialogue or reflective self-inventory in which one asks 
many different sorts of questions and eventually remembers what one has been 
committed to, without realising it, ail along”. The Society for the Furtherance of 
Critical Philosophy (SFCP. 1998). for whom the method is a central element in their 
deliberations and endeavours. Mines it as “a kind of dialogue conducted among 
people who t- to answer an important question on an equal footing, as peers, 
... without the benefit of any special knowledge”. 
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literature was in progress and, despite the setbacks, I was able to 
conduct interviews with four managers. Although these meetings 
were not, in the event, as central to the project as 1 had at first 
thought they might be, nevertheless, they offered insights that helped 
inform my thinking in this early exploratory stage of the research. 
The move away from the initial research topic began as 
increasing familiarity with the literature raised new questions in my 
mind. The process was also aided by lengthy and detailed discussion 
with fellow researchers. Through these discussions, added to the 
popular image of managers presented in the media at that time, for 
example, in the television programme Cumalty, it became apparent 
to me at least, that questions about managers and their sensitivity to 
ethical principles carried the assumption that in this new breed of 
N I S  managers, moral sensibilities were rather undeveloped; that 
they were unskilled in moral reasoning. Unlike doctors, a group with 
whom they would be compared, the managers were inclined to make 
decisions less from concern for patients and more from concern for a 
good financial outcome and/or their own career prospects. 
This perception was confirmed by two of the exploratory 
interviews I conducted early in the research programme. In the first, 
the pilot GP interview, the interviewee vividly portrayed the contrast 
between doctors and managers. This GP's View of managers was 
that they were only interested in money and status; they had no 
concern for patients or the NHS. The few who showed genuine 
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compassion were not going to get very far - “they are given a little 
office down the corridor and forgotten” - was his assessment of the 
climate in the reformed NHS. 
The second exploratory interview was with a high-ranlung 
former NHS manager who presented a similarly negative view of the 
new type of NHS manager. He had noted that prior to the reforms 
most managers who came into the NHS did so out of a sense of 
public duty. However, in his experience, that attitude of service was 
no longer present; the young, up-and-coming managers were merely 
interested in a good career path; there was little commitment or 
ethical awareness. His view was not uncommon as Brereton and 
Temple (1999), note in their study. They observed a tendency to 
“look hack to a golden age” when the emphasis had been on 
personal integrity and public service, whereas today the focus was 
seen to be on personal gain. 
Other research questions this perception. Thus, Sheaff and 
West’s (1995). research into the ethical awareness of the “new” type 
of NHS managers challenged the stereotype of the ethically more 
permissive private sector manager. Their findings refuted the idea 
that recruiting new managers with a private sector background 
equated to a relaxation of ethical standards. Quite the opposite was 
the case as those with an NHS background were found to be the 
“less ethically conservative” (p.201). 
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During this early period of the research, i had the opportunity to 
talk with four N H S  managers three were at the time of the 
interviews employed in management posts while the fourth, to whom 
i have already referred, although still involved in the field had moved 
out of direct management This opportunistic and very small sample 
has no statistical validity Nevertheless, talking to them enabled me 
to gain some impression of the modem NHS manager which in itself 
was interesting and useful I draw attention to the interviews as a 
record of the background information 1 gathered in the early days of 
the research. 
None of the managers had a medicai or nursing background. 
They were all in jobs created under the reforms. The youngest was a 
woman in her late twenties. She was the business manager for the 
surgical directorate in a large hospital, a post typifymg the new style 
of management in the NHS. During the course of an hour long 
discussion she expressed herself in terms no less caring and 
Compassionate than the GPs I later interviewed. There seemed to be 
a genuine interest in both the patients and staff of her department. 
The practice manager, a man in his late fifties, displayed an 
enthusiasm to achieve the best for “his” GPs and their patients. He 
was very proud that the Practice6 had managed to negotiate a deal 
Throughout this work I follow the convention of capitalising the word practice 
when it refers to the business to which an individuai doctor is, or group of doctors 
are, attached. 
6 
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with one of the consultants from an internationally renowned 
hospital. That consultant now came once a month to the patients, 
most of whom lived in widely scattered rural communities. Running 
a clinic at the local surgery had made receiving needed health care a 
great deal easier for many of their patients. Another of the 
interviews was with an audit manager, a women in her forties. She 
showed a strong commitment to the value of evidence based 
medicine and best practice, both for individual patients in improved 
outcomes and the Service as a whole in economic savings. Despite 
considerable obstacles she was committed to persuading GPs to look 
at their own treatment regimes for common conditions, compare the 
outcomes with other regimes and agree a protocol of best practices. 
All this information, from the literature, and my primary research 
findings and observations, in conjunction with my growing interest in 
the place of ethics in medicai practice, led to a reassessment of the 
research topic. There were now two directions in which the research 
could move. The first focusing on the management side, exploring 
the managers relationship to ethics possibly by using case studies in 
order to make a direct comparison of the way managers and doctors 
resolved a particular ethical dilemma. The second looking at the 
assumption that orthodox medicine is "a world of ethics". This latter 
approach would include exploring the distinction between 
management and medicine from the perspective of doctors who had 
become managers, specifically seeking to find what part the 
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principles of modem medical ethics had played in their decision to 
take on the management role Were the values that informed their 
thinking significantly different from those identified as typújmg the 
thinking of the modern NHS manager? By now it was the second of 
these two research paths that really roused my interest. Pursuing it 
would involve researcher-produced data from interviewing doctors- 
cum-managers. It was the research path down which I chose to go. 
Following further discussion with supervisors, I decided that the 
main researcher-produced data should come from interviewing GP 
fundholders. I was still at that time pursuing the idea of presenting 
the interviewees with case studies and eliciting the ethical principles 
that informed their decision in each instance. 
To this end I began to gather GP interview data. Thus, in the 
Spring of 1996, the first year of the research, alongside the very 
informai interviews with a range of non-medical NHS managers, 1 
took the opportunity to attend one of the many conferences held by 
the British Association of hledical Managers (BAMM). 
This latter was the only piece of observational research I was 
able to conduct. It was illuminating, inasmuch as it allowed me to 
hear medical managers talking among themselves about the problems 
and opportunities faced by doctors prepared to accept direct 
management responsibilities. They displayed considerable 
confidence in their ability to take on whatever management role was 
open to them, it was all well within their capabilities. ‘Research 
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shows that we are among the top 5% of the most intelligent people 
in the country”, was a comment made several times by one doctor- 
cum-manager in the course of her 30 minute presentation. I noted a 
determination not to let anyone else manage them, doctors must 
always lead whatever team had to be led. I heard the view expressed 
that management offered an interesting change of scene. After 20 or 
30 years in the same job, a few years as a manager provided a 
stimulating challenge; it stopped one getting bored. There was also a 
concern to remind each other of the patients who were at the heart of 
all their endeavours. Slides showing young children looking up from 
their hospital beds interspersed those depicting the work of the team 
managed by one speaker. A chief executive spoke of the gratitude 
patients expressed for the care they had received in his hospital. I 
was also able to note that only one speaker referred directly to an 
“ethical concern”. He raised the possibility that colleagues could 
view the doctor-cum-manager with suspicion and this would affect 
good working relations 
All the while I was gathering this data, my own research interest 
was developing to the point where I was unconvinced of the value of 
producing another piece of research on what Pincoffs has termed 
“quandary ethics’’ (quoted by Burrell & Hauenvas, 1981, p 79). By 
now I wanted to look beyond the current fashion for case study 
ethics with its emphasis on setting up a problem or dilemma and then 
identifymg particular ethical principles and theories involved in the 
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health care and medical decision-making.’ I had come to think that 
something was missing from this approach. My interest had moved 
to an exploration of what was going on below the surface of “ethics 
t a l k  and understanding more of the processes that had given and 
continue to give ethics such a prominent place in modern medical 
practice If the research was to have a purpose, it was, in my 
judgement, essential for wider questions about the setting in which 
the particular viewpoints and experiences belonged, to be given 
prominence in the overall project This was a seminal point in the 
development of the final research question. 
The Research Hypothesis 
The hypothesis I set out to test in this thesis is that while a 
profession dependent on attracting clients will subscribe to a set of 
ethical principles that draws on outside beliefs and values, its 
working ethic, that which governs the “millions of moments of truth’ 
(Ranson and Stewart, 1994, p. 275), of everyday practice, will 
always be derived from and based on its own internal ethos, one 
often quite distinct, but hidden, from the lay world. 
The research hypothesis developed over time as I explored the 
literature and heard the views of the GPs who agreed to be 
interviewed. Each of these two main influencing factors informed 
And that currently fill countless books and journals with titles such as 20 Common 
Problems - Ethics in .Medical (?are by Jeremy Sugarmann (1999) McCraw-Hill. 
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and directed my thinking. I will now set down some of  the texts that 
played a key part in this process. 
An important study undertaken by Glennerster et al (1994), into 
GP fundholding included findings directly relevant to the research; 
covering the first three years of the fundholding project. Glennerster 
and his team interviewed GPs across a number of  regions, they also 
sat in as observers on meetings including those at which Practices 
discussed whether or not to join the scheme. 
Glennerster’s team was interested to know why those who had 
joined the scheme in its third year of operation had not taken the 
opportunity to join at the outset. The reasons given during 
interviews were quite varied. The results showed direct reference to 
ethics as only one element in the thinking of  GPs deliberating on an 
issue fundamental to their future practice and to the care of their 
patients Some Practices had simply not met the original patient 
numbers criterion When that was reduced, they were eligible and so 
had opted into the scheme. Others mentioned uncertainty as to the 
scheme’s “political future”, the hostility of GP colleagues; the costs 
of implementing the changes; and satisfaction with the existing 
arrangements. 
Of particular interest were the findings discussed under the 
subheading ‘Ethical and political concerns’. There the study noted 
that: 
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About one quarter of the sample had had major ideological 
doubts about fundholding . . .  They thought it would produce a 
two-tier service and supporting it would be ethically unsound. 
There had been the fear that it would threaten the relationship 
with patients (1994, p.52). 
Notwithstanding the confusion apparent in this quote between 
ideology and ethics, the subheading draws attention to the what 
might be seen as a somewhat surprising fact, namely, that three 
quarters of those sampled revealed no major ethical concerns about 
fundholding. Of even more interest was the team’s observation that, 
over time all the problems, including the ethical uncertainties, “had 
gradually come to seem less important”. 
Several other studies raised very specific lines of thinking that 
came to play a major part in the development of the research 
hypothesis and an appropriate analytical framework for the research. 
Each clarified an element of the project and took it on to a next 
stage. 
Jonsen (1990). led me to a reconsideration of the influence of 
ethos on ethics in the context of medical thinking and practice and so 
provided the central focus for the research. He drew attention to an 
important difference between the concepts as follows: 
Ethics cannot be understood without ethos. All rules, 
principles, and virtues, while they may be stated in 
propositions and deñnitions, have a tone and color (sic) 
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different in different communities . . .  Ethical mies and values 
take on a certain shading in the light of the ethos b.62). 
Yet, Jonsen observed, the two terms, ethics and ethos, are used 
synonymously, a c.onflation that obscures the significant difference 
between them. Papers by Sheaffand West (1997), and Brereton and 
Temple (l999), in which the researchers discuss ‘The new public 
service ethos” demonstrate that Jonsen’s observation is still valid. In 
what would, otherwise, have been an excellent paper the authors do 
not trouble to define ethos but are content to let ethos and ethics 
stand as synonymous. Brereton and Temple offer a very brief 
definition but only in the form of a small quote (p.2) which they 
themselves do not consider necessary to highlight and develop. 
Without a clear definition that draws out the distinction as well as the 
fundamental link between ethos and ethics, the articles confuse 
instead of clarify these inter-related but distinct concepts. 
Another key text informing this research was the report of the 
Education Committee of the GMC (1993), on educating tomorrow’s 
doctors suggested that future education needed to address some of 
the attitudes it considered inappropriate but displayed by doctors 
currently in practice. These findings raised the question of a l i  
between the attitudes to which the report alluded and the traditional 
medical ethos. 
Fleischmann (1999), in her study of disease and discourse, 
explored the argument that doctors and patients do not share a 
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common language when talking about disease and illness. She noted 
“vocabulary was of little value if the conceptual world referred to is a 
mystery” (p.4). Thus, in her essay Fleischman looked “below the 
linguistic surface of the discourses of illness and disease” and 
attempted to “shed light on the meanings and metamessages tucked 
away in the recesses of their language” (p.5), This helped define the 
focus of my own study My research would look beyond or beneath 
the apparently shared language of medical ethics, as for exampie in 
the use of the four principles and such phrases as “patients’ best 
interests”, in order to understand how the concepts hidden in the 
much more fundamental and, to the lay world, almost mysterious 
ethos of medicine shed light on the meaning of that ethical language. 
Fieischmann noted that our everyday verbal transactions are 
assumed to be governed by what is termed in the field of linguistic 
pragmatics the ‘Co-operative Principle’. This is the general notion 
that language behaviour is a co-operative interaction and that 
speakers craíì their utterances so that the intended meanings can be 
properly understood, but “where this is not the case it is because 
other agendas have come into play” (p.28 from footnote 31). 
Doctors and non-doctors are assumed to share a common language 
when talking about medical ethics. In reality, this is often not the 
case. Is this because, knowingly or unknowingly, another agenda 
operates: one that conforms more to the ethos of the medical 
profession than to the principalist ethics that the patient and the 
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potential patient believe guide medical practice? This was the 
question that Fleischmann’s work raised in my mind. My research, 
though not following linguistic models, would focus on identifymg 
the wellspring of the profession’s own understanding of the language 
of medical ethics. 
Dopson (1996), drew attention to a particular inclination within 
the literature exploring the relationships between doctors and 
managers, namely, to do so in terms of the face-to-face relationships 
rather than seeing them as part of complex social structures involving 
differing power relationships. She therefore urged “future debates 
on the involvement of doctors in management.. to recognise the 
conflict of interests that exist on a social-structural level between 
doctors and managers” (Dopson, p.185-6; cf. Baeza et al, 1996, 
pp.129-131) This observation resonated with my own thinking and 
confirmed in me a determination to look beyond an inter-personal 
analysis and explore the nature of conflict at the level of the 
dominant structures and value-systems within a profession or 
organisation as a whole. 
The Research in the Liaht of Contemwraw Develooments 
S h e m n  has observed that 
when intolerable abuses of [patients’] tmct become public, 
damage control is usually initiated through renewed 
professional commitment to moral education and enforcing 
ethical standards (1992, p 86) 
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Just such a process has been set in train as the GMC tries to 
restore public confidence following revelations of unethical practices 
in several different health care settings that have come to tight in 
recent months Among them the htgh mortality rate of children 
operated upon by certain surgeons in the Bristol cardiac unit, the use 
in North Staffordshire of premature and young children for research 
into the effectiveness of a particular type of incubator' without 
parental consent, the policy in a Liverpool hospital of removing, for 
research, the organs of children when parents thought they were only 
consenting to  a standard post-mortem examination for determining 
the cause of death, and the routine denial of treatment to  older 
patients These are just some of the more highly publicised issues 
that have raised public concern as to the quali@ and ethics of 
professional medical practice 
A recent editorial in the BMJ set the GMC's efforts in the 
following context: 
When the public is not u1 a good position to judge the quality 
of service, the trauinig, qualifications, and codes of ethics and 
behaviour of a self-regulated profession have tradrtionally 
provided the desired protection However, these structural 
characteristics of a profession are no longer enough to reassure 
CNEP. a system that uses negative pressure rather than the positive pressure of 
standard incubators. Parents claim they were not told the system was experimental. 
Such experimental work requires specific consent. E3y apparently concealing the 
experimental nature of the equipment that special consent was not required. 
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a less deferential and better informed public.. Societies now 
expect evidence of the effectiveness of semces and of the 
continuing competence of individuai practitioners. The 
introduction of clinical governance. ..and revalidation9 has 
been the first step in meeting this expectation for health care in 
the bX . . . .  British medicine has come rather late to accepting 
revalidation. ... Recent high profile cases of professional 
miscondu ct....may have influenced the GMC's decision to 
embark on revalidation (BMJ 1999; pp. 11454). 
In noting that "British medicine has come rather late to  
accepting revalidation" the article recognises the natural 
conservatism that governs the profession's thinking. In many 
fundamental areas, for example self-regulation, clinical autonomy, 
informed consent, and even in the issue-centred approach to ethics 
and limited range of issues identified as requiring an ethical debate, 
or the creation and work of ethics committees, this conservatism 
springing tiom its ethos has meant that for medicine "the world of 
ethics" is not quite the same as that of patients and others. Doctors 
and the lay world have been speaking from different agendas whilst 
apparently using the same language. 
The UK government's document. 4 First Gloss Service. defines clinical governance 
as a "framework through whch NHS organisations are accountable for the qualiîy of 
clinical care" 
Revalidation: The GMC accepted that every fiye years ail doctors will have to submit 
evidence that they are practising in accordance with clearly defined guidelines. 
"Revalidation will be a proactive, inclusive programme. designed to demonstrate 
that the períormance of doctors is acceptable It will apply to ail doctors on the 
register. be conducted l d l y b y  peers and lay people, be monitored nationally by the 
G M C .  B.WJ 1999;319:1180-1183 (30) 
Y 
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Recognising this different perspective, understanding its origin 
and its influence on medical thinking and practice helps to explain 
what is otherwise seen, by even “sympathetic” doctor-watchers 
(Jonsen, 1990, p. S), as a serious ethical problem in the practice of 
modern medicine. It also makes clear that if society at large, that is 
to say the non-medical world, requires doctors to change their 
practice, to give up their claims to special moral principles, to apply 
their ethical principles in a new way or even to adopt a different set 
of such principles, this can only be achieved by changing that 
perspective This, in turn, calls for a change in the fundamental 
character or moral disposition, the ethos, ofthe profession. 
In this context it is instructive to note that even as the profession 
prepared itself to accept revalidation, the BMJ article to which 1 have 
already referred began by drawing attention to the importance of 
self-governance to the profession. “Professional self regulation is at 
the heart of the organisation and philosophy of medical care in the 
United Kingdom”. It then went on to advise that the process of 
revalidation “must be implemented with a light touch if it is to 
succ.eed” (BMJ, 1999). This phrase carries the suggestion that the 
profession is prepared to go  only so far in accommodating concerns 
of government and lay public 
To demand a change of thinking on any of the principles the 
profession considers fundamental to its philosophy without having 
first addressed the question of the ethos out of which those principles 
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arise and from which they acquire their moral justification is to invite 
passive or active resistance A more participatory, inclusive ethic 
cannot be imposed on a reluctant, unwilling profession It must be 
preceded by and arise from an ethos conducive to such a set of 
ethical principles, one that invites a more self-critical, questioning 
and open approach Appreciating the nature of the link between the 
profession’s ethos and its ethics means that all concerned are in a 
better position to address the apparent ethical shortfall between 
expectation and reality in such a way as to ensure what Fleischmann 
(1999), would term a “co-operative interaction’’ (p 28) In this 
context the research is both appropriate and timely 
Methodology and Methods 
The Research Perspective 
The research adopts a broadly constructivist-interpretivist 
perspective. Although the term can describe separate 
methodologies, they are also recognised as “sharing a common 
intellectual heritage” and ”disentangling” them is somewhat artificial 
(Schwandt, 199S, pp.222, 245). Within that broad framework, I 
take a position influenced by Geertz’s emphasis on human action as 
an hermeneutic phenomenon requiring interpretation (Geertz, 1973, 
1983). 
The focus is on knowledge as socially produced or constructed, 
arising from “complicated discursive practices”. Individuals and 
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groups create different versions of reality and ”truth’ (Schwandt, 
1998, p.236). Within the ‘out there’ real world humans, whether as 
individuals or groups, construct their own realities and their own 
interpretations of the common-to-all or universal reality. Thus, for 
example, whilst disease is a universal physical state, how it is 
perceived from the point of view of the individuais experiencing it or 
the medical profession involved in diagnosing and treating it are both 
constructions of that reality (Atkinson, 1995, p.23Q These realities 
often overlap hut equally many aspects of them are “closed” to the 
outsider and need interpretation. 
Such interpretation involves more than knowing the meaning of 
the words used to describe that reality. It must include an awareness 
of the context, including the historical context, within which those 
signs and signals are set and from which they originate. Scheff, in his 
study on microsociology (1990, p.8), draws attention to the 
amhiguous and complex system of signs and signals that make up 
human language. Nevertheless. accurately interpreting those signs 
and signals is essential to creating and maintaining positive social 
bonds within a society, including the bonds between doctor and 
doctor, doctor and patient, or the medical profession and the lay 
community. Misunderstanding or misinterpreting those signals can 
damage or even break those bonds. This makes describing and 
interpreting the reality of an ‘Other’ more than a matter of curiosity 
or passing interest. 
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Feminist Influence 
Although the research was at no stage consciously guided by 
specific feminist theory, I have found myself far more comfortable 
with many of the conventions characteristic of feminist research. 
A dual emphasis on a theoretical body of knowledge and a 
concern with how the knowledge might be used is typical of feminist 
research: 
much feminist research is connected to . . .  social policy 
questions . . .  Even when [it is] so-called basic research [the 
researcher] might conclude with suggestions about how 
readers can use the ñndings (Remharz, 1992, p. 251). 
My research stands firmly in the realm of what Reinharz calls “basic 
research”. Its emphasis is on producing a theoretical body of work 
that contributes to knowledge and as such it should not be seen as 
evaluative (Smith, 1975, pp 294-295) Having said that, however, I 
am also conscious of a hope that in contributing toward a more 
sophisticated understanding of the nature of the link between ethos 
and ethics the research will, in turn, move policy- and decision- 
makers away from efforts to impose from outside ethics incompatible 
with the internal validating ethos of the profession or organisation 
concerned. 
Recognition of the value of describing not onìy the product of 
the research but also the process itself is another aspect that some, 
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at least, of the early feminist researchers, defined as characterising 
their approach (Reinharz, 1992, p 21 5) It is now much more widely 
accepted that a full discussion of the process should form as much a 
part of the final work as a detailed analysis of the outcome 
Nevertheless, it is the example of other female and feminist 
researchers that I have followed in detailing my own process of 
research discovery 
I consciously decided to use the personal pronoun in the writing 
of certain sections including this chapter In presenting an account of 
the research process it seemed to me wholly inappropriate to suggest 
that this was anything other than a personal experience Thus, I 
determined not to follow the convention of using the third person 
singular a concention implying detached value-free, objectivity, the 
voice of truth unconnected with the feelings and experiences of the 
researcher involved (Reinharz, 1992, pp 215,231, 258) 
Researcher Bias 
The reflexive self is an integral part of the qualitative research 
process. The researcher cannot stand outside as an objective 
observer. Thus, the researcher needs to address and make clear her 
own biases in relation to the research project. the assumptions that 
have informed the work (see, for example, Huberman & Miles, 
1994, p439). Olesen (1994, p.l65), in her overview of feminist 
research believes that feminist researchers should reject the notion of 
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bias considering it "a misplaced term", preferring instead to see the 
attitudes and viewpoints usually defined as "bias", more as resources. 
Whatever position is taken, in the interests of transparency it is 
important to make clear the cultural self the researcher brings to a 
research project. 
Nevertheless, such openness is far from straightforward. The 
factors involved in the construction of those biases or resources are 
myriad and complex. Some are unknowable, for even as one 
attempts to reveal them, layers of what could almost be called 
"protective self-deception" keep them hidden from view. Others, 
however, are more easily recognised and can be acknowledged. 
In the case of this research it is relevant to mention that over the 
course of several decades, I have had the opportunity to observe at 
close hand the medical professionals' approach to what Grayling 
(1999), describes as that "potentially most sensitive encounter - the 
doctor-patient relationship". These observations, made in the 
context of the treatment of those with long-term, intractable 
conditions and/or terminal illnesses, suggested that what might be 
generally understood as ethical thinking and practice is not 
exceptionally well-developed in the medical mind. This might be 
identified as one of the factors playing a part in my decision to 
explore the relationship between medical ethics and medical practice 
and to understand not only how and why the myth of the medical 
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practitioner as ethical hero arose, but also in what sense orthodox 
medical thinking and practice should be seen as ethical. 
Methods 
This is a qualitative research project. I am seeking to interpret a 
particular phenomenon, namely, the nature of the relationship 
between the ethos of the medical profession and the principles of 
modem medical ethics that are understood to guide the profession’s 
thinking and practice. 
Qualitative research presents the researcher with a number of 
decisions in relation to the design of the project, Having chosen the 
research question, the researcher must decide how to answer it. This 
involves not only determining what type of data is required and how 
it should be gathered but also how best to analyse it What methods 
would be most appropriate? 
Coffey and Atkinson (1996), point out that it is an over 
simplification to assume each type of data must have its own 
distinctive style of analysis which cannot cross boundaries: “There is 
not such one-to-one correspondence” (p.20). It is more often a case 
of custom-building than taking a ready made design off the shelf. 
The “researcher-as-bricoleur“, selecting and piecing together, to find 
the most appropriate approach, or even inventing new methods and 
strategies (Denzin & Lincoln, 1998, p.3), is a more typical model. 
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Huberman and Miles (1994, p.431), suggest an important 
consideration in selecting the analytical framework is the relationship 
of the researcher to the research territory In situations where the 
researcher is working in unfamiliar territory it is more useful to adopt 
a loose inductive approach. 
Although the vast majority of the population has some contact 
with a GP at sometime or another, for most of us, the doctor 
operates in something of a closed world. That was true in my case 
despite the fact that all my previous post-graduate research has been 
medicine-based, in health economics and medical ethics. I was aware 
of my position as an outsider, not part of the group, someone 
looking in and trying to understand how and why members of that 
group had responded to significant changes in their society. 
Furthermore, this would be my first direct contact as a researcher 
with medical practitioners 
These factors and considerations made the research process 
more iterative than deductive, a case of proceeding by question and 
answer toward an understanding (Huberman & Miles, 1994, p.432). 
Thus, it follows a grounded-theory approach (Strauss & Corbin, 
1994, pp.273, 2760. 
The strong dialectic element of the overall methodology is 
apparent in the approach I took to the interviews as a whole. I saw 
each interview as an opportunity to actively extend my knowledge, 
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increase my understanding, and provide fresh insights into the place 
of both ethos and ethics in professional decision-making. 
The Secondarv Research" 
I was already familiar with many of the standard works on 
medical ethics and knew that the quite valid approach they took was 
not one 1 wanted to follow in this research. My aim was to 
understand more of what 1 can best describe as "the general moral 
atmosphere" that pervaded the profession. The early months were 
spent in secondary research building up a clearer picture of the issues 
which would, in turn, allow me to sharpen the focus of the research. 
I have already set out the key texts that informed the rest of the 
analysis providing the theoretical framework for the whole research. 
I then moved on to a close consideration of a range of historical 
data. Both that relating directly to the creation of the NHS and the 
development of the medical profession, focusing mainly on the UK 
and with a particular eye to the place of general practice within the 
profession. Most of this was secondary source data, written 
accounts by reputable historians of the period. However, I was also 
able to ccitisult primary sources for events relating to the more recent 
past. 
Using existing witten material in contrast IO primary data gathered by direct 10 
interview of respondents. 
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There were two reasons for undertaking historical research in 
this latter area. Riessman notes (p, 61), that "individuals' narratives 
are situated in particular interactions but also in social, cultural, and 
institutional discourses, which must be brought to bear to interpret 
them". The historical data would allow me to understand the social, 
cultural, and institutional discourse that was the context for the 
empirical material, the narrative data, that was to form the second 
main plank of the study. However, the historical material as a whole 
did more than provide a context for the empirical data. It also 
allowed me to trace the profession's ethos and to look for the 
impact of that ethos on the decisions and actions of the developing 
profession. Here again I was testing the validity of the theory The 
question I had to answer was, did the theoretical perspective I had 
developed provide a coherent interpretation of key events in that 
history? 
Using historical data is not without its problems; the most 
significant of which is that the data itself is an interpretation. The 
reader is looking at the events described through the eyes of an 
author or authors with all the biases (or resources) that informed the 
approach taken both in the selection of the material and the 
interpretative framework. To minimise the impact of such biases I 
followed the standard and obvious course of selecting a range of 
histories from respected researchers working in the mainstream of 
the field. I have also noted in this text any major interpretative 
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differences that had a direct relationship to my own account 
(Tuchman, 1994, p 3 1 SE) 
Interview Method 
1 leave the description of the interview sample to chapter six as 
a prelude to the interview data itself, at this point I want to 
concentrate on the interview methodology alone. 
Through the pilot interview, I was able to get a clearer picture 
of how the GP interviews should be conducted. Which approach 
would enable me to collect the material in which I was now 
interested? My aim was not to gather precise quantifiable pieces of 
data, but to  encourage the GPs to tell their own accounts of the 
fundholding decision; to hear and understand the factors and issues 
that had influenced each GP’s attitude and approach to that option. 
Thus, I decided not to pursue the case study approach but to use an 
open interview method to gather my primary data Using the pilot 
interview as a guide, I devised a loose interview schedule, a topic list 
around which a discussion could take place (see Appendices B & C ) .  
In terms of each interview, this flexibility let the interviewee develop 
a line of argument that seemed of particular importance to him or her 
and allowed me to clarify and check my understanding of points as 
they were made. Across the range of interviews, this open approach 
offered the freedom to follow new lines of questioning as my 
understanding of the issues developed over time. Had I selected a 
highly structured interview method such as the questionnaire, there 
41 
would have been no room for any such adjustments (Fontana & Frey, 
1994, pp.363-366). 
Another factor influencing my decision was consideration of the 
interview group itself, GPs are well used to taking the lead in the 
interview setting and if they felt too constrained by the style of 
interview they may well have brougbt our meeting to a speedy 
conclusion. Hence, I judged it inappropriate to use Socratic dialogue 
based around vignettes and case studies. That approach would not 
only have narrowed the focus of the interview but may well have 
antagonised the interviewees with what might be perceived as an 
interrogative manner, Besides which, despite the favourable light in 
which case studies are now viewed, they are not without their serious 
drawbacks, as even keen proponents of this method recognise. 
These drawbacks are significant enough, in my opinion, to call into 
question the validity of the conclusions arising from using the 
method as a basis for interview (Coope, 1996, Pattison et al, 1999). 
However, the chosen approach still did not permit the degree of 
flexibility I subsequently came to appreciate would have been 
desirable Only one of the interviews allowed me to hear the views 
of both the partners involved in their Practice’s fundholding decision. 
In the remainder of the interviews, I was able to speak to only one 
partner in Practices that comprised at least two partners. I was 
always asking the interviewee to look back on events that had 
occurred several years earlier, Every interview was, thus, a single 
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snap-shot of the events as recalled and reinterpreted with the benefit 
of hindsight by in most cases just one GP partner. Furthermore, 
there was no opportunity for further interviews. Even though the 
open style of interview allowed me to check my understanding of a 
particular point with the interviewee it was still a one-off, time 
limited interview. 
Had the interviews been intended to stand alone, such snap shots 
fiom a relatively small sample of respondents would have seriously 
undermined the validity of any substantial findings I attempted to 
draw ffom them. However, the research project was designed to 
obviate any such limitation. The interviews were constantly being 
informed by the wider historical analysis. Furthermore, it was my 
specific intention to build on each of the interviews so that questions 
raised hut left unanswered in one interview could he revisited, albeit 
with a new interviewee. Each interview was informed by the 
previous ones and thus, I gathered what proved to be a rich source 
of empirical data. 
Yonetheless, it would have been illuminating to have been able 
to gather data over time, possibly even from a Practice’s initial 
discussion on fundholding, right on into full involvement some years 
later. Thus, with my own benefit of hindsight 1 would have preferred 
a non-participant, observational approach; selecting two fundholding 
practices to observe and interview on several occasions; sitting in on 
the early discussions and debates as well as later fund meetings. 
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Having the opportunity to speak to all the partners and hearing their 
concerns or expectations first hand, would have undoubtedly 
provided a much more satisfying picture, one of considerable depth 
and breadth. But, it is highly unlikely that any GP practice would 
have granted me such access and, whilst the experience would have 
been intellectually stimulating, Glennerster’s (1 994), findings, where 
his team was able to gain such access, led me to conclude that such 
an approach would not have added fundamentally to these research 
findings. 
Hearincl the Story 
Herrnstein Smith defines narrative as “most minimally and most 
generally.. . .someone telling someone else that something happened” 
(quoted by Mishler, 1986, p. 148). All the doctors were invited to 
talk about how and why they made the decision they did regarding 
fundholding. Each of them recounted the events surrounding and 
subsequent to the decision from their perspeciive. The decision- 
process was at many points illustrated with particular stories. Thus, 
the interviews allowed me to construct a narrative of each Practice’s 
decision regarding fundholding. 
Quoting Hardy’s assertion that “we remember in narrative”, 
McIntyre observes “we always move towards placing a particular 
episode in the context of a set of narrative histories . . . .  It is because 
we all live out narrative in our lives and because we understand our 
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lives in terms of the narrative that we live out that the form of 
narrative is appropriate for understanding the actions of others" 
(McIntyre 1985, pp. 211-212). In arguing for the central role of 
narrative Burrell and Hauenvas suggest: "Our grammar displays the 
moral direction of our lives" (Burrell & Hauenvas, p.84). Medicine 
as a profession has been described as story-based (Goldberg, 1993, 
p.1) In telling the story of why they did or did not become 
fundholders, I believe the doctors concerned not only revealed 
something of their own moral character or spirit but also that of their 
profession. 
According to Riessman (1993, p.3), "traditional approaches to 
qualitative analysis often fracture these text". One researcher 
describes the process thus: 
As the process of winnowing the data begins, the emphasis 
becomes m e  of selecting one poignant exemplar after another 
as all ofthe significant "wheat" (i e., that data which is deemed 
significant or exemplary) gets separated from all of the non- 
significant "chaff' (i.e., that data which is determined to be 
non-significant or redundant). 
In order to minimise this problem he advises fellow researchers: 
to take great care to situate their data so readers can have an 
appreciation of "from whence the data came" and can begin to 
evaluate the meaning of the data in context (Hopper, 1986, 
p.199). 
51 
With this in mind, 1 was concerned to respect the integrity of the 
interview and interviewee, not to so deconstruct and reconstruct the 
data that the original material would be unrecognisable. Thus, after 
gathering all the interview data, I decided to set down one GP’s 
story of the fundholding experience in its entirety This is a guided 
narrative that has a considerable degree of analysis embedded within 
it. For that reason the transcript belongs in the body of the text 
rather than in an appendix. 
I considered an holistic analysis, involving looking at the whole 
account for interpretative themes and patterns, the most appropriate 
for this type of data (Riessman, 1993, p.3; Lieblich ei al, 1998, 
p 15). Presenting the core interview in such detail makes transparent 
the context from which the themes emerged in the original interview 
and thus gives the reader an opportunity to judge the validity of the 
analysis. Furthermore, it allows an opportunity to “hear” the 
interviewee’s story in its entirety. The data can be set above the 
background noise of “biases, prejudices, interests, values and 
viewpoints” that even the most scrupulous narrator cannot but help 
bring to their account of a narrative (Pattison, ef al, 1999 p.44; 
Fontana & Frey, 1994, p.372; cf. Collins, 1998). It also shows the 
informal and at many points almost conversational style of the 
interview. 
Apart From this one complete text, material from the other 
interviews appears in the same way as, for instance, Strong and 
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Robinson (1990), present their ethnographic studies of NHS 
management, and Allen (1997a), her research on core values of 
young doctors. Direct quotes are only used to illustrate an argument 
or central point. Setting this data alongside the core interview themes 
allowed me to test further the validity of the analysis. I could hear 
how the themes related to the views and experiences of both 
fundholding and non-fundholding GPs. Was the position of non- 
fundholders shown to be significantly different? If yes, that in itself 
would suggest a flaw in the research hypothesis. Equally, if the 
views of other fundholders showed a very different approach to the 
issues raised that again would question the research position. Thus, 
it was particularly important to note and discuss areas of divergence 
in order to determine the significance of their impact on the overall 
analysis. 
The whole process is quite subjective, Such a mass of data 
provides an almost endless set of possible lines of enquiry. It is up to 
the researcher to decide which particular line to pursue. Once that 
decision is made the researcher has then to decide how the data is to 
be presented and interpreted. All data is open to a range of possible 
interpretations but qualitative data even more so (Lieblich el al, 
1998, p.63), and especially, as in this case, when the research is 
aimed at identibng that which may not necessarily be well- 
understood by the decision-makers themselves. Such a degree of 
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freedom presents interpretative dangers For that reason it has to be 
rooted in a more substantial data base 
Beyond the range of views expressed in my interview data, I 
was also able to refer to that obtained by other researchers in the 
field, such as Glennerster el al (l994), Strong and Robinson (1990), 
Allen (1997a), Matthews and Bain (i998), and a range of other 
sources including a very moving autobiographical account by one GP 
who lived and worked in the East End of London (Widgery, 1992) 
This additional data set the views of my sample of GPs in the context 
of the wider medical world and enabled me to answer the question of 
whether the views and experiences I had heard expressed were ‘one- 
offs’ or of a piece with those of the generality of doctors 
Data Analvsis 
The interviews were, in the main, narratives Most of the GPs 
told the story of their experiences of facing and dealing with the 
option to become fundholders These were generally descriptive 
accounts but included their own feelings and attitudes toward 
fundholding both in relation to the issues it raised and the actions and 
ieactions of colleagues to their decision 
In order not to distract from the holistic emphasis of the study, 1 
decided not to undertake a “detailed description of linguistic features 
of spoken discourse” Nevertheless, narrative material requkes 
narrative analysis (Mishler, 1986, pp 3, 6 ,  7, 96) But this takes 
many analytical forms from formalistic-structuralism to the loosely 
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formulated 'almost intuitive' (Manning & Cullum-Swan, 1994, 
p.464f, Riessman 1993). The information I was seeking was 
embedded in the stories. The aim of the analysis was to identify and 
draw it out; to find fiom their accounts the factors that influenced 
each GPs decision. 
After each interview. I read through the interview record, 
usually a transcript but on occasions a w&en record, noting in the 
margin all the words, phrases, and longer accounts that suggested an 
influential factor. Once all the data was gathered, 1 went back over 
all the annotated texts looking for common influences that became 
the themes, or analytical categories. Such themes are ideas that figure 
"importantly and repeatedly" in analysis, unifymg the texts 
(Riessman, 1993 p. 67; Lieblich et al, 1998, pp.62-63; cf Hycner, 
1985). I was also looking out for non-standard responses as well as 
comparing the views of non-fundholders with those of fundhoiders. 
It was essential to consider their impact on the overall analysis. 
Although computer programs exist to help with qualitative 
analysis 1 chose not to use any of them. The amount of data, whilst 
considerable, was not so great as to be unmanageable for one person. 
I did not want to lose touch with the context of the data with which 1 
was working (Denscombe, 1998, p. 219). 
The themes were then set within the wider theoretical 
framework testing its validity as an interpretative tool. What did 
those themes reveal? Could the perspective shown in them be 
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coherently explained by the theory? Finally, did the interpretation 
validate the research hypothesis? 
A Transdisciplinaw Multi-method Amroach 
For long years the traditional research position was that of 
staying within one's own discipline, recognising "the disciplinary 
proprieties" (Campbell, 1987, p.230, footnote 28). This narrow 
approach has increasingly been rejected, in no small measure due to 
the infiuence of feminist research, and now much mainstream 
research operates in a climate of blurred disciplinary genres, 
adopting a transdisciplinary approach (Kincheloe & McLaren, 1994, 
p. 140; Reinharz, 1992, p.250). 
1LlcGee (ZOOO), argues strongly that even though using the 
transdisciplinary approach may not be as "marketable" as the 
traditional system of the single discipline, it is, nonetheless, essential 
when exploring medical ethics. In undertaking this research, I too, 
recognised the need for a transdisciplinary approach; crossing 
disciplinary boundaries in order to understand the complex of factors 
that have constructed modern medicine's relationship to ethics. 1 
wanted to look beyond the particular moral principles that guided an 
individual's response to a so-called ethical dilemma in order to 
understand the historical and socio-cultural context out of which the 
individual's approach developed and in which it is set. This has 
resulted in a far richer study. 
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Thus, as well as hearing views of individual doctors, both 
hndholders and non-hndholders, via direct interviews and searching 
relevant medical, and medically related, literature in order to find the 
medical profession's response, or rather responses, to fundholding, 
the transdisciplinary approach has freed me to explore the three main 
historical strands relevant to the study, namely, the development of 
medical ethos, the relationship of the medical profession and 
specifically that of the GP up to the 1980s reforms of the NHS; an 
exploration of parallels between values informing medical practice 
and those of business management. 
Taking this route established the research on a firm foundation 
of empirical and historical data. From that position, 1 was able to 
move on and look afresh at the ethics of the medical profession 
focusing on the relationship of the professional ethos to ethics 
The multi-disciplinary approach called for more than one 
research method As indicated by Coffey and Atkinson (1996, p.4), 
this is now a standard, widely accepted approach to gathering and 
analysing data, generating and testing theory. Once again, this is an 
approach to research if not pioneered then certainly nurtured and 
developed by feminist researchers. It remains characteristic of the 
feminist approach (Reinharz, 1992, p.243) As Reinharz notes' "the 
multi-method approach increases the likelihood that.. . ,researchers 
will understand what they are studying, and that they will be able to 
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persuade others of the veracity of their findings (Reinharz, 1992, 
p.201). 
Strenpths and Weaknesses 
The Interdisciplinaw ADprOaCh 
Using an interdisciplinary approach sets the research question in 
a broader framework, making visible more of the context in which 
the particular study fits, with the result that the multi-faceted nature 
of the research question is highlighted and understood. It provides 
the opportunity to approach the study from different perspectives, 
thereby enabling a more nuanced analysis than can be achieved by 
addressing the question from just one perspective (Lupton, 1994, 
p.19). This holism is the essence of qualitative research. It is also 
increasingly recognised as an essential approach to the study of 
medical ethics (McGee, 2000; cf. Monson, 1981). 
In the present study this approach has allowed the particular, in 
this case, the response of GPs to fundholding and the ethical conflict 
this was perceived to create, to enrich our understanding of the 
broader question, namely, that concerning the relationship between 
ethos and ethics in modern medicine. Drawing links between a 
contemporary situation and its wider context both past and present, 
and between the actions of the individual and the socio-cultural 
framework within which the individual operates, results in a clearer 
picture of the complex way in which ethics functions within modem 
medical practice (Reinharz, 1992, p. 197). 
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Lupton ( I  994, p 2), notes that while an interdisciplinary 
approach is "stimulating in its breadth" it can be difficult to know 
where to draw the boundaries. Similarly, Coffey and Atkinson (1996, 
p 14), endorse the value of a sensitive use of a combination of 
methods in order to draw out the complexities of a particular social 
situation and to produce a rich and variegated analysis Nevertheless, 
they warn against "a randomly eclectic approach" and the simplistic 
view that a "more authentic" picture emerges from using a variety of 
approaches. 
These cautions serve as a reminder of the need to select the 
range of methods with great care, a mish-mash of methods obscures 
the analysis and turns complexity into confusion 
The Open Interview 
In the open interview, that is to say the interview that has a more 
loosely structured framework than is the case with, for example, a 
survey questionnaire, the researcher may have no more than a few 
main themes in the form of a checklist around which to frame 
questions and where specific lines of questioning will often be 
directed by the unfolding interaction. 
Some of the strengths and weaknesses of this situation are fairly 
obvious. The interviewer has room for greater flexibility and can 
allow the interview to move off in an unforeseen but relevant and 
worthwhile direction; the interviewee can feel more relaxed, less 
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dominated by the presence of a tight interview schedule that is 
obviously controlling the interview, and therefore free to develop and 
expand on themes that they consider important or points they want 
to make. After discussing with supervisors and colleagues the 
particular demands of interviewing doctors - professionals skilled in 
dealing with, and controlling, the interview situation - I considered 
that it was important to create a non-threatening atmosphere that 
encouraged as free an exchange as possible, one that left the doctors 
feeling, as far as was practicable, in control of the situation, 
particularly the length of time of the interview. An open interview 
seemed the best way to achieve these results. 
I have already noted what could have been a weakness of the 
interviews conducted for this research, namely, that they involved 
only one interview with each interviewee. The single open interview 
offers the interviewee-as-narrators' interpretation of the events 
discussed and yet the decision regarding fundholding was taken by 
the whole Practice which must have included at least one other 
partner Each interview is one individual's interpretation of a 
decision-making process that involved the views, opinions, concerns, 
of possibly a number of other people This range of views, concerns, 
and opinions, some of which may well have been significantly 
different to those expressed by the intervieweeharrator, were then 
interpreted to the interviewer through that single interviewee's frame 
of reference. 
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It is important to stress that the interviews were not conducted with 
the aim of getting a factually accurate historical account. Rather, in 
the context of the research as a whole, the narratives were valuable 
for the insights they offered on the thinking of the individuals 
concerned, the GPs’ own perceptions of the often very difficult 
decision presented by the fundholding option. 
The Research Ethics 
The ethical issues most pertinent to this research project relate 
to the empirical material. It is on these that I focus. Furthermore, 
most of the section centres on the interviews with GPs. The other 
interview material, though useful, was gathered to provided 
background information rather than viable empirical evidence. 
Confidentialitv and Anonymity 
All those interviewed, including the managers, were guaranteed 
confidentiality and anonymity Thus, throughout the entire thesis I 
have made every effort to remove any information that might identify 
the respondents 
Power Relations: empowerinq the reswndents 
One of the issues that has raised considerable concern among 
researchers undertaking interviews is that of empowering the 
respondents Collins (1 998), quoting Oakely, describes the “model 
interview” as one where “a more or less aggressive interrogator 
‘grills’ their unfortunate captive” (1.6) Mishler notes that “in the 
61 
mainstream tradition the interviewee-interviewer relationship is 
marked by a striking asymmetry of power“ (Mishler, 1986, p.117). 
A major reason for this concern is that such an imbalance of power in 
favour of the interviewer prevents the interviewee expressing 
themselves in their own “voice”. Instead they are pushed in the 
direction of responding in ways that they perceive as acceptable to 
the interviewer. One element that is seen as imposing the 
interviewer’s authority over the interviewee is the interview schedule 
itself. The use of the schedule appears to give no room for the 
interviewee to move off in directions that are important to him,” and 
even if they have the courage to do so, the thinking is that the 
interviewer sees this as an unnecessary digression and will be anxious 
to bring the interview back to the interview schedule, back under her 
control (Mishler, 1986, p. 122, Reinharz, 1992, p.232). 
None of these concerns played a significant part in the interview 
data that 1 gathered. As .4tkinson (1995), points out oral skills are an 
essential part of the medical world. ‘Medical work is constantly 
produced and reproduced through narrative and other language 
skills. The competent practitioner is adept at describing his or her 
work and of persuading others to share opinions on the cases in 
question” (pp.90-91). Not only are doctors skilled in expressing 
themselves but also in controlling the interview situation (Atkinson, 
” I will use the pronoun ’him‘ when refcmng io interviewees as the majority of my 
interviews were with men. 
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1995, p.134, quoting Mishler & Clark, 1992). In discussing with 
more experienced researchers my intention to interview GPs the 
general opinion was that they were a particularly difficult interview 
group. Rather than an anxiety in terms of an imbalance of power 
favouring the interviewer, the concern was, if anything, in the other 
direction. The GPs were much more likely to intimidate the 
interviewer than vice versa. 
Nevertheless, I was concerned to ensure that the interview 
experience was unthreatening to both parties; i wanted to “engage” 
(Collins, 2000, L6), with the interviewees and had no desire to 
antagonise them or create an atmosphere of hostility. Thus, I 
determined to ensure that the GPs had as much freedom as possible 
to express themselves as they saw fit. By so doing I considered it 
much more likely that I would gather material of value to the overall 
research project This was a significant reason for adopting the topic 
interview schedule I have already described, a schedule 1 used only 
as a very general guide, rather than a text to which 1 had to adhere 
slavishly All the interviewees were aware of the schedule and its 
role in the interview. 
Another element of the power imbalance argument is that, as 
Mishler puts it, “researchers through their analyses and reports define 
the ‘meaning’ of responses and findings, whereas respondents have 
no opportunity to deploy interpretations of their words and 
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intentions. This way of doing research takes away from respondents 
their right to “name their world” (Mishler, 1986, p 122). 
Again, this concern was not one that I considered relevant to the 
research data gathered for this project. None of the GPs interviewed 
showed any anxiety with regard to the interview process, all were 
confident and competent in expressing their views. Only one showed 
any interest in seeing the final research product; none asked to see 
the transcription of the interview data let alone to be involved in the 
process of analysis and interpretation. I have no reason to believe 
that there was any concern on the pari of the GPs with “their right to 
‘name’ their wor ld .  That is not to say they were ignorant of the 
overall research project; each of them knew that their interview was 
one of several I was undertaking and that the interview material as a 
whole was part of the research data for a doctoral thesis; a project 
that would involve analysis and interpretation of the data they had, 
by agreeing to the interview, shown a willingness to supply. 
Summary 
The two strands of evidence presented in the study must be 
viewed as equally significant. They reinforce and balance each other. 
The interview data is given weight by being set in a verifiable 
historical context and the historico-cultural data is validated in the 
experiences of the GPs as the inheritors of that history and culture. 
The research design I chose provided a solid framework of 
historical data from which to explore the research question. The 
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empirical data allowed me to hear the concerns and interests of GPs 
as they faced the challenge of the changes wrought by the reforms 
Rather than any overt espousal of modern principalist medical ethics, 
the GPs concerns were expressed in terms of another set of values 
that seemed, for them, to carry moral weight Linking their views to 
the insights gained from the historical material led me to develop a 
theory that offered a coherent and persuasive interpretation of the 
relationship between the medical profession and medical ethics 
One last point that must be made is that the research process 
that I have described was more overlapping and circular than it 
appears when set down on paper It was not a case of putting each 
element in place before moving on to the next stage Many times I 
went back on myself, looking again a: something that I had thought 
complete, only to find that its contribution had fundamentally 
changed The process as a whole was dynamic and ongoing coming 
to final shape only at the very end 
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Chapter 2 
Ethos and Ethics 
Ethics has now taken centre stage in medicine, if not always 
within the profession itself at least in much of the debate about the 
practice of medicine conducted by interested onlookers However, 
as noted by Jonsen (1990, p 62), “ethics cannot be understood 
without ethos” Yet much of the recent emphasis has been on 
medicai ethics with discussion of the medicai ethos remaining 
inchoate, less well-developed Obviously the two terms are closely 
related but they are not synonymous This study focuses on the 
nuances of the words, drawing out distinctions and relationships that 
have often been overlooked. 
The Medical Ethos 
The medical profession values itself highly, and is so valued by 
others. Medicine is seen to be of “the greatest benefit to mankind’ 
(Porter, 1997). The practice of medicine is widely perceived to be a 
moral activity, “those who operate on the margins of human life and 
eternal destiny are regarded with a certain numinous awe, 
and. ..expected to uphold a high ideai of personal and professional 
commitment” (Whipp, 1997); “medical practice is morai practice” 
(Savalescu, 1995). Medical ethics, and particularly the widely 
approved “principalist ethic” (Aoudjit, 2000; cf. Gillon, 1988, 1995; 
Beauchamp and Childress, 1994), are seen as guiding the profession 
and its practitioners. Thus, according to the GMC’s code of conduct: 
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Patients must be able to trust doctors with their lives and well- 
being. TO justify that trust, .... as a doctor you must: make the 
care of your patient your first concem .... [An] essential 
element of this ... [is the] observance of professional ethical 
obligations (GMC,1995, inside cover and p.2). 
It is the assertion of this thesis that within the profession itself, 
however, it is the ethos, the fundamental morai character, 
disposition, or spirit, that actually informs and underpins everyday 
practice, including the profession’s response to or interpretation of 
the four principles. This traditional ethos provides the profession 
with its own sense of what constitutes the right or the good; what it 
believes about itself. It is the moral atmosphere or climate out of 
which the profession’s ethics arises and in which it is sustained. 
Whereas ethics is usually quite explicit, with a clear and precise 
language, ethos is much more implicit, closer to the “ancient tangle 
of practices, beliefs, judgements, and emotions” of Geertz’s 
description of common sense as quoted by Scheff (1990, p.138). 
This is not to suggest that ethos is the same as common sense, but it 
is interesting to note what Scheff points to as the “taken for granted’ 
and “goes without saying” character of common sense (p. 139). In 
the sense of its unspoken, perhaps even indefinable authority, ethos 
can helpfully he viewed as the moral “common sense” of a 
profession. Its influence is seen, not only in the way the profession 
interprets and applies the ethical principles it espouses, but also in the 
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response it makes to ethical values that those outside the profession 
may wish to impose 
In the next section I will set out to identity the established 
medical ethos. However, if we are to fully understand the impact of 
its traditional ethos on the profession, that “ancient tangle” of 
ideas, beliefs, and values must be unpicked and closely examined. 
This is most effectively achieved by looking at the place they hold in 
the attitudes and practices the profession’s young practitioners are 
encouraged to absorb; in the key historical developments of the 
profession; in the important myth stories the profession tells about 
itself, and in listening to its deliberations on matters of professional 
concern. These are the elements that will take up much of the 
remainder of this study. 
Identiíyinq the Medical Ethos 
Loudon (1986), identifies the mid 18th to mid 19th centuries as 
the period during which the main shape of the medical profession 
was established. During this time the profession: 
was profoundly affected by two [conflicting] considerations. 
First, there was the need to attract patients in order to survive; 
secondly, there was the need to follow the traditional codes of 
behaviour in order to perpetuate the higher status of the 
physician [over his ‘‘lesser’’ colleagues] (p.273). 
All the other aspects of the profession, including medical 
education. were “superimposed’ on a foundational structure, that 
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“had little to do with . . . .  the medical care of the population, but that 
had a great deal to do with the ideals of class and social position, and 
the growth of gentility” (ihid. p.273-4). 
Jonsen (1990), identifies within the profession what he calls 
“the ethos of nobility”. He writes of the “noblemen of modem 
medicine”, persons of account who_ in their own words? made 
medicine “a profession of cultivated gentlemen”, endowed with a 
strong sense of their own worth and dignity for whom the ethics of 
“nohlesse oblige” applied (pp. 64, 6 5 )  “Doctors”, in the words of 
one distinguished practitioner, “were largely held to be gentlemen to 
whom deference was due” (Shock, 1994). Under the guidance of 
such meno the profession found its distinctive moral tone or ethos: 
the conviction that it was a noble and exalted profession; superior, 
exclusivel scientific, and detached. This “ethos of nobility” arose 
from a finely developed sense of professional worth and dignity, and 
encouraged the development of values that, to the outsider at least. 
often translates in to arrogance and an excessive, even ruthless, 
defence of the privileges the profession has worked so hard to 
acquire (Jonsen, 1990. p.68). 
Social status. self-protection, advancing the interests of the 
profession as a whole, and safeguarding it from outsiders. all came to  
be highly regarded along with values of loyalty and secrecy. Finally, 
an inordinate respect was paid not only to the right of the individual 
practitioner to unquestioned freedom of practice, or clinical 
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autonomy, but the right of the profession to regulate itself - the 
defining characteristic and core tenet of the true profession 
(Freidson, 1970, p~ 137ff) Thus developed the model professional: 
the expert medical adviser self-regulating, uncritical, aloof. clinically 
autonomous, and infallible, deferred to by lesser colleagues and 
requiring unquestioning obedience &om patients “for their own 
good’ (Shape & Faden. 1998, p 232, cf, Davies, 1996a, p.6). 
Guided by this ethos. medicine sought and achieved a status and 
respect that it had hitherto lacked and which, despite the very 
different world scene in which it must now operate, it in large 
measure still enjoys. Thus, when the editor of the Lancet, a respected 
medical journal, presented a study of the modern role of the 
profession’s Royal Colleges, including interviews with all the College 
Presidents. he pointed out that these leaders receive knighthoods as a 
matter of course and lunch on a regular basis with high-ranking 
government ministers and officials. The Royal Colleges, whilst 
“often run along the lines of prestigious gentlemen’s’ clubs”. are 
powerful and wealthy institutions governing not only the medical 
profession but also many important areas of the iWS.  In the main 
they operate behind closed doors with their activities remaining 
beyond scrutiny by those outside the profession, “secrecy is the glue 
that binds the profession together” (Horton, 1998b). 
Other authors have pointed to further elements that have helped 
create and maintain the ethos of the medical profession: 
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As a high status profession it has a disproportionate intake 
from the public schools and as a result has been subjecî to the 
traditional uuthority values and relationships that tend to 
typif!y such establishments. Once entrenched in a well- 
established profession, such values and practices are difficult 
to displace since entry, training and promotion are largely 
controlled by the profession itself (Hadley & Forster 1983, 
p. 162, emphasis added). 
Davies identifies ail these attitudes and values as “celebrating 
and sustaining a masculinist vision’’ (Davies, 1996‘ pp.669-671). 
The traditional medical ethos - the belief in itself as a superior and 
noble profession - provides the moral tone for all its thinking and 
actions, It is the product of a society dominated by a middle-class, 
male world view concerned with status orderl controll and “proving 
one’s self’. 
Medical School and the Medical Ethos 
‘The training undertaken to qualify for entry mto the profession 
not only teaches the knowledge and technical skills required to 
practice competently but also the profession’s norms and values. 
This “hidden curriculum grounds a professional life world’ (Edgar, 
1995, p.151). Thus. it is in the medical school that students will be 
introduced to the traditional medical ethos as they become 
immersed in medicine’s own sub-culture. For centuries now the 
impressionable young man.. ., in the boisterous, jovial sporting 8,. 
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atmosphere of the aìì-male medical school with its student high-jinks 
and horse play, [has been] initiated into the brotherhood, acquiring 
the esprit de corps that helped doctors to present some kind of 
united front" (Porter, 1997' p 356) .  In this atmosphere, the often 
idealistic medical student begins the journey to becoming the 
stereotypical noble practitioner of a noble profession. 
Porter goes on to quote Dickens description of the medicai 
students of his day as "young gentleman who smoke in the streets by 
day, shelter and scream in the same by night, call waiters by their 
Christian names, and do various other acts and deeds of a facetious 
description". They carelessly joked at the dinner table about their 
dissecting activities. enjoying the discomfiture of their non-medical 
fellow diners as they referred to  their servings of meat as if they were 
parts of the body of a child (Pickwick Papers. quoted by Porter. 
1997. p. 357; cf Loudon, 1988, p 271îT. 
In recollecting his own medical school d a y  during the early 
1980s, one doctor's account reveals that the atmosphere of the 
medical world had changed very little from Dickens' time. For its 
powerful description of the way the modern medical student acquires 
the medical ethos. it is a passage worth quoting at some length: 
When I started at Cambridge University in 1981 the first 
patient I saw was a dead one. Without any attempt at moral 
guidance, we were encouraged to cut up our body into 
increasingly smaller pieces, roughly in line with the t e x t h k .  
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Some students fainted, a few juggled with kidneys or skipped 
with intestines. i practised spin passing with a heart One 
amusing man stuck a hose in one end of the gut and blasted the 
contents out of the other. How we all lau ghed.... Human 
dissection was a rite of passage, the one thing that separated us 
from other students.. ..in 1984, when I started clinical medicine 
in London, the similarities between medical school and public 
school were obvious. The Dean was head boy, the consultants 
were prefects and everyone else was a fag. The fags were 
finally free from the constraints of pink chits and lights out at 
10.30 p.m. and they went wild - hut in a very conservative 
way ....in private, anything went . . . .  Our japes were small by 
comparison to those of our predecessors, allegedly. (Hammond 
& Mosley, 1999 pp.8,9 emphasis added; cf. Sinclair, 1997, 
p 96**), 
There was no need of explicit moral guidance for the 
atmosphere of the dissecting room set an implicit moral tone. in 
medical school as well as learning technical skills the student 
absorbed the ethos of the profession they were training to enter: 
The most unportant rule of all was “‘what goes on tour, stays 
on tour”. You could do what you liked but you mustn’t drop 
your mates in it when you got back .... Like the Masons . . . .  we 
were bound by codes of loyalty and secrecy. Break them at 
l 2  This book came to my ancntion just as the thesis was about to be submitted A 
more recent account of medical training, it arase from an anthropological -ch 
project undertalong by the author, himself a medical doctor. 
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your peril. For those who played rugby, there was the 
unspoken promise that we would be looked after when it came 
to house-job applications We were just the sort of bioody 
good chaps that make jolly good doctors. Aiîhough I 
committed myself to rugby at my interview (it was virtually 
the only question I was asked), I soon lost faith in treading on 
people in the name of sport and gave up. Wah this died my 
one chance of a teaching hospital job, (Hammond & Mosley, 
1999, p.4; cf. Sinclair, 1997, p.lI2ff). 
In 1993, the Education Committee of the GMC (GMC, 1993), 
issued a report recommending changes in the method of training new 
doctors. These recommendations showed up further aspects of the 
ethos of medicine. The Committee expressed concern at the 
overload of factual material that formed the main component of the 
medical c.urriculum (lo).]‘ This, it noted, taxed the memory but not 
the intellect. It worked against independent thought and a 
questioning and seif-critical practice. Although long recognised as 
“calculated to obstruct the acquisition of sound knowledge and to 
too heavily favour the crammer and the grinder’’ little progress had 
been made in altering this traditional method of bringing on the next 
generation of medics. The GMC Committee found that despite 
“repeated exhortations” (1 i) and the recommendations of other 
’’ The Report is presented in numbered paragaphs and that is how I will reference 
it. 
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committees (for example. the Todd Report or Royal Commission on 
Medical Education in 1965-68) the emphasis in the curriculum 
remained largely unaltered. l4 Although the profession likes to 
consider “spirit of self-enquiry” one of its core values, the established 
medical curriculum has actively discouraged such a spirit; a finding 
confirmed by the BMA’s own research (Allen, 1997a, p.2). 
The research-based agenda of most doctors involved in medical 
teaching has been identified as a significant factor in the profession’s 
insistence on facts and technical skills. This emphasis can create a 
conflict with the more “innate” humanistic skills such as compassion, 
caring, and empathy (Good & Good, 1993_ p. 91-94), Yet, it is a 
lack of these humanitarian skills rather than of technical prowess that 
lies at the heart of many of the stories of “complaint and failure filling 
modern medical journals’’ (Matthew & Bain. 1998, p.7) 
In its recommendations, the Committee Report (GMC. 1993): 
focused on a number of aspects that it had identified as detrimental 
to doctor education. “There is a persisting drive towards an 
unrealistic degree of completeness in the curriculum” (17). Here is 
reinforced the medical profession’s ideal of doctor as unquestioned 
expert The doctor knows best, his advice is to be respected and 
f~ l lowed . ’~  This is recognised as unrealistic in light of the increasing 
Or rather, curricula for cach medical school has vigorously maintained autonomy 
in devising its own cumculum. 
l i  Witness the well-understood and ofi-used phrase to describe medicai advice. 
namely, “Doctor’s order”. The clear implication is that this advice is not to be 
14 
ignored. 
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complexity of medical science, yet the profession appears unable to 
let go of the illusion of the all-knowing doctor. 
Closely allied to  this finding the Committee also called for 
doctors to be taught “appropriate attitudes” (38) including, respect 
for patients and colleagues, a willingness to submit to audit,“ peer- 
review of their practice, and the ability to cope with uncertainty 
(40.3). These, it considered as important as the more traditional 
knowledge and skills associated with the practice of medicine and set 
out in the Medical Act 1983. In the view of the Committee the time 
had come to include these positive attitudes in the curriculum 
In making its recommendation, the Committee showed a 
recognition of a traditional emphasis that encouraged doctors to hide 
uncertainty, guard their clinical autonomy, and pay no more than 
perfunctory attention to the views of patients and “lesser” 
colleagues. These characteristic attitudes, core elements of the 
medical ethos. have long been passed onto the next generation of 
practitioners ofìen indirectly, even unconsciously. in the example set 
by teachers and other superiors, as well as more openly in the 
curricula of the various medical schools. 
The audit manager I interviewed spoke of the grcat duficulty of persuading GPs 
to agree to be audited The process called for a considerable amount of tact and 
reassurance. GPs were highly sensitivc about submitting their practice to outside 
scrutiny. Many simply refused to agree to the process. For an informative study of 
the attitude of doctors in generai toward audit and peer review see Black ¿+ 
Thompson, 1994. 
I 6  
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whilst doctors will admit to these failings they are inclined to 
dismiss them as of the past; “In the past doctors abused patients trust 
by being less than honest or grunted at patients and sent them off 
with a bottle of pills” (Matthews & Bain. 1998, p.36). However. this 
approach is somewhat disingenuous and in itself shows that the 
attitudes criticised are still not being fully addressed by the profession 
at the level of everyday practice. Many patients continue to find this 
dishonesty and lack of respect as prevalent today. In his report, the 
chairman of the Bristol Royal Infrmary Inquiry, Professor Ian 
Kennedy, described the doctors involved as displaying “a type of 
professional arrogance: an arrogance born of indifference” in their 
dealings with the parents of sick and dying children. He observed 
that the doctors concerned “acted with good intentions as they s w  
it” (Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry, emphasis added). The phrase 
“as they saw it” summarises the role and influence of the medical 
ethos. The doctors concerned acted according to what they saw as 
good and right. Theirs was the implicit ethics of practice guided by 
and arising out of their ethos: and through which they learnt how to 
see and judge situations. 
The very same attitude is revealed in the actions and 
justifications for those actions offered by doctors involved in the 
removal of organs from bodies of deceased children without parental 
consent. Whereas parents saw the secrecy and false assurances 
offered by the practitioners as arrogant and unethical the doctors 
themselves had a very different perspective. Thus: Professor James 
Lowe, a leader in the Royal College of Pathologists, explained the 
policy of concealing the common practice of removing organs as “an 
attempt to avoid distress” to the fmilies concerned. “I don’t think 
anyone has been consciously arrogant” he is quoted as saying 
(Goodchild, 2000’ emphasis added). 
Anecdotal evidence gathered by me during the course of this 
research suggests that those in the junior professions such as nursing 
who regularly work alongside doctors, particularly in the hospital 
setting, stili recognise the description of the arrogant practitioner 
These attitudes and traits are in the process of changing, 
however, it will be many years before the changes filter through to 
the upper echelons, or driving seat, of the profession. Thus. the 
ethos of the paternalistic middle-class, middle-aged. white male still 
largely dominates teaching and practice within the profession. The 
characteristic moral spirit of the profession, the conviction of its 
elevated status, is transmitted in medical schools to the next 
generation of doctors. perhaps unconsciously. by the noblemen of 
medicine, the “old boys” who are still very much part of the 
profession, It is still true to say: “Every medical society and medical 
school knows them” (Jonsen, 1990, p.68). 
Women and The Medical Ethos 
Porter suggests that a “modest breach“ has been made in what 
he calls “the chummy, clubby male medical wor ld  by the admittance 
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of women to medical school. That chummy, clubby world of the 
medical establishment did not make it easy for women to achieve 
admittance. Digby (19991, looking at 98 years of general practice up 
to 1948 noted the “strong opposition of medical faculties” to women 
entering medical school. Although in the wider social world there 
was noticeable support for women as doctors, the profession itself 
was less positive in its response and “concessions on the entry of 
women to  professional bodies and elite medical institutions came 
very slowly”. In Britain the first breakthrough came in 1879 but it 
took until half way through the twentieth century before the “last 
citadel” fell to women (pp.29, 55. 156; cf. Witz. 1992, p.830. 
Even today with women making up more than 50% of the 
students entering medical school the breach they have made on the 
traditional medicai ethos, both in the medical schools and beyond, 
has been no more than modest. Just how modest is shown in the 
results of research of a cohort of medical students undertaken in the 
late 1980s. Referring to this study, Allen (l997b), notes that women 
students were treated differently from their male colleagues in being 
subjected to negative and discriminatory remarks that undermined 
their confidence, leaving them feeling insecure and uncertain as to 
their abilities and their place in the medical profession. She 
concludes that such treatment is “a real indictment of a system that 
does not recognise or develop the abilities of such .... exceptionally 
talented young women” (p.25). 
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After qualifying, a disproportionately large number of women 
remain in the lower ranks of the medical profession. Even in GP 
practice where it might be thought that men and women were on a 
more level playing field, research undertaken by Chambers and 
Campbell (Doctor, 1999a), showed that women GPs tended to be 
less senior than their male colleagues; held fewer posts outside the 
Practice and were only half as likely as their male colleagues to sit on 
medico-political committees. Within the Practice, male doctors were 
more likely to be responsible for minor surgery, computers, Practice 
finance, and annual reports; whereas female doctors, often against 
their personal preference, handled more than their fair share of the 
obstetrics, gynaecology, family planning, child health and counselling 
sessions. "Women GPs do a disproportionate amount of women's 
health work and men have a disproportionate amount of traditionally 
masculine roles" (p.36). The article notes that the results confirm the 
findings of other similar research 
Women have been, and in large measure still are, viewed as part 
of the invisible supporting cast whose job is to maintain the siuîus 
YUO rather then question it (Davies, 1996, pp.668-671). Historically, 
any contribution from women beyond this traditional role met with 
strong resistance (Witz, 1992, p 73ff). This attitude is still evident 
within the profession, hence, the impact that women can have on the 
medical ethos, the moral tone that colours all its perceptions, whilst 
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greater than it once was, continues to be limited (Smith, 1987, 
pp.17,18,25). 
Black Humour and t h e  Medical Ethos 
The black humour that is common among practitioners’’ is, as 
the earlier examples show, part and parcel of medical school life. It 
is closely related to and springs from a central element of the medical 
ethos, namely, professional detachment (Collier et al, 1995, p.413). 
The argument is that such humour provides doctors with an 
acceptable defence against the emotionally draining experience of 
dealing with the sick and dying on a day-to-day basis; it enables the 
doctor to  cope better with the needs of the patient (Sinclair, 1997, 
pp.287-288). 
Time for counselling, or even de-briefing after an intensive 
period of witnessing the suffering of one’s fellow humans; procedures 
that are common for other professionals dealing with emotionally 
demanding situations; are scorned among medical practitioners as 
self-indulgent and “soft”. For the doctor, humour‘ and particularly 
black humour, is the accepted and acceptable way of handling the 
enormity of the suffering they witness.” 
A popular example in the medical press is the regnlar Tony Copperfield column in 
the journal Doctor. 
Hale (1997. p.34). describes a range of other coping mechanisms including denial 
of stress, ‘acting out’, that is “any action that helps avoid something which is 
painful. though the action itself maybe harmful“. He cites “getting pisseä as a 
common action among medical students. I would sugest that black humour is 
another common exampie of acting out. 
I- 
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However, anecdotal evidence suggests that such humour, and 
similar coping mechanisms, rather than helping doctors cope 
humanely with their patients can damage both doctor and patient 
(Hale, 1977, p33) At worst the humour might be a sign of, or 
cover for, gross incompetence, hut at every level it can lead doctors 
to a hard-heartedness, and even an inhumanity, in their dealings with 
the sick, including the unconscious and the dying (Lamer, 1999, 
pp 35,38, Hammond & Mosley, 1999, pp 39-41) l9 
Ethics and the Medical Ethos 
Studies undertaken by American researchers (Self & Baldwin, 
1993) indicate that ethics does not seem to fare well in this kind of 
environment. The aim of their research was to assess the moral 
reasoning of medical students in the first and last of their four years 
in medical school They found that over this period the normal and 
expected increase in moral reasoning did not occur The researchers 
concluded that the students' "educational experience served to inhibit 
their moral reasoning ability, rather than facilitating it" (p 154) The 
researchers also noted that over the four years the students displayed 
"a significant reduction in moral reasoning variance" as determined 
A wry  recent example came to my attention during discussion of the implications 
of the Shipman case, M o r  Shipman was convicted of murdering a number of his 
elderly female patients. One method he used to dispose of potentially damning 
evidence was to advise relativcs to crcmate the deceased. This procedure requires the 
cremation certificates be counter-signed by a second doctor. Discussing this 
procedure one GP noted that doctors see this routine matter as an easy money-eamer 
and refer to it as "cash for ash. 
I 9  
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on a weighted average score, thus indicating “a strong socialising 
factor of medical experience” ( i  58). 
The thrust of this research is to emphasise that ethos and ethics 
are inextricably linked. Ethos refers to the moral atmosphere or 
moral climate in which ethical thinking and practice develops; the 
moral tone that colours the profession’s perceptions and responses, 
This leads to the question, what kind of ethics does the ethos of 
medicine identified in this section create? Furthermore, in light of 
demands from the wider society for medicine to endorse particular 
ethical principles, what impact does the medical ethos have on the 
application of those principles to everyday practice? I now move 
onto a full exploration of these central questions. 
Vhat does 
Ethics in Medicine 
What do we mean when we talk about ethics? he 
concept convey? At its simplest, ethics is defined as “ideas about 
what is right and what is wrong and how we can tell the difference”. 
However, such a simple definition does not take the analysis very far 
for no sooner have terms such as “right” and “wrong” been 
introduced than we have already entered a veritable minefield of 
meanings Although it might be thought that questions of right and 
wrong admit of only one clear answer in practice, “ethics is 
complicated because our morality is an odd mixture of received 
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tradition and personal opinion’’ (Robinson & Garratt, 1996, p.5; cf. 
Parker, 1998, pp. 1,2), 
Moral principles, belief in some universal value such as “rights” 
or ‘Sustice”, are taken to be the foundation of ethics (Goldman, 
1980, p 1). However, any such universal value is not a moral 
absolute givenz0 but is itself a value judgement. The reflective 
process must clarify and question the values that are the foundation 
of its ethics. ‘Morality is not to be discovered but made: we have to 
decide what moral views to adopt, what moral stands to take”. In 
this statement Mackie (1977, p.106), rejects the existence of 
something “out there” called morality. Whereas once this assertion 
would have met with widespread resistance and seen as heretical, 
nowadays, at least in Western thinking, it is commonly accepted that 
there is no absolute authority who decides whether something is 
moral or ethical and something else immoral or unethical. There are 
no:v a range of moral frameworks each privileging a particular core 
value or group of such values (cf Warnock, 1998). 
In relation to medical ethics, Grayling argues that the element 
that justifies the use of the word “ethics” is the centrality of a 
relationship: “Medical ethics is appropriately called ethics.. . because 
it concerns everything about a relationship - the relationship between 
2” Not all would agree. those with a strong religious conviction, for example, may 
view the values underpinning their belief as God-given absolutes rather than mere 
cultural constructs. Such is not a widespread view in Western moral philosophy. 
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doctor and patient - which can be especially sensitive’’ (Grayling, 
1999). Medical ethics is most often discussed within three traditional 
moral frameworks: deontology, utilitarianism, and casuistry, A 
fourth, virtue ethics, the oldest normative tradition in Western 
society, is once again receiving more attention (Beauchamp & 
Childress, 1994; Gauthier, 1997, p.339; Battin, 1990, pp5-7). 
Deantolow 
This moral theory, arising from the work of Immanuel Kant 
(Kant, 1783, 1785), focuses on the inherent rightness of an action as 
against the consequences of the action. Those who adhere to this 
theory emphasise the duty to do that which is right irrespective of the 
outcome. A fundamental principle in Kantian thinking is that of 
treating every person as an end and never only as a means. This 
principle highlights the moral duty to treat every individual with the 
respect and dignity to which they are entitled 
Many of the key elements in the GMC’s code of conduct for 
doctors appear to recognise this principle. They place on doctors the 
duty to treat their patients with respect and dignity, recognising their 
intrinsic worth, and requiring their care to be the doctor’s primary 
concern (GMC, 1995). 
Another important aspect of the deontologicai approach, 
particularly as espoused by Kant, is that it focuses on resolving 
ethical questions by reasoning around key established moral 
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principles. This emphasis has had a considerable influence on the 
formal teaching of medical ethics within the UK (Boyd, 1987, p.86). 
Utilitarianism 
In the field of public policy- and decision-making the guiding 
ethical theory is usually some form of utilitarianism. 
Utilitarianism, a moral theory usually credited to Jeremy 
Bentham (i823), is generally recognised within the field as one 
particular moral theory within the broader consequentialist, or 
teleological, school of moral thinking.*’ No moral principle is applied 
rigidly, but always in such a way as to achieve what has been 
determined within the moral framework as the best outcome. In the 
case of utilitarianism itself that outcome is the maximising of utility, 
happiness or pleasure, with the emphasis on the utility of society at 
large rather than that ofjust a few individuals (Haryr, 1994 p,  1). As 
Goodin explains: 
when our actions will affect various people in various different 
ways, it is the characteristically utilitarian conclusion that the 
right action is that which maximises utility summed 
impersonally across all those affected by that acti on.... That is 
tile standard that public policy-makers are to use when making 
collective choices impinging on the community as a whole” 
(Goodui, 1993 p.245). 
*’ There are those, for example Elizabeth Anscombe, who argue that utilitarianism 
is not always and oniy consequentialist. However, this is a minority view and need 
not concern us in this analysis. 
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Today utilitarianism takes many forms. The essential 
characteristic feature, a focus on calculating utility, aiming for the 
greatest happiness or good in moral decisions, is common to all. 
However, the other essential principles for determining how that 
utility be defined and the overall calculation made, differ markedly. 
Every new formulation is an attempt to correct a weakness or 
imbalance in the existing versions of the theory (Haryr, 1994, p.46). 
Thus, Haryr in his recent study of the subject not only looks at the 
development of modem utilitarianism but then attempts to correct 
what he sees as a widespread misunderstanding of contemporaq 
utilitarianism. In Haryr's view this misunderstanding has made it 
impossible to reconcile utilitarian theory with the demands of justice. 
In addressing these issues he, in turn, develops his particular version 
of liberal utilitarianism (pp.83;104-127). In light of his special 
interest in medical ethics Haryr's analysis is significant 
However, in relation to ethics in medicine the GMC's guidance 
to doctors on good medical practice makes only one reference to a 
utilitarian principle. In section 3 it is stated: "In providing care you 
must . . . .p  ay due regard to efficacy and the use of resources" (GMC, 
1995, p.3). Clearly it is up to the doctor to determine what "due 
regard" actually means in the context of their primary obligation to 
the individual patient and the responsibility "to give priority to the 
investigation and treatment of patients solely on the basis of clinical 
need" (p.9). 
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Despite this apparent lack of enthusiasm for the utilitarian 
position by a leading body within the profession, in the thinking of 
many involved in issues of health care rationing, an increasingly 
problematic area within publicly funded health care provision, 
utilitarianism must be given a far higher priority in the relevant 
decision-making process. Within the utilitarian framework a public 
policy for the provision of health care must be formulated not on the 
principle of the individual patients and their good alone, but rather on 
the needs of the society as a whole, the aggregate, that which is best 
for the group (Mooney, 1992, p.86ff). The NHS was founded on the 
principle of collectivism - a utilitarian ethics - whereas medical 
practice is by tradition highly individualistic. This, as will be seen in 
the interview data, has presented doctors with an ethical dilemma. 
Casuistry 
This is the fore-runner of the modern case study approach 
(Amas, 1991, p 26) It is a system of aniving at ethical answers to 
moral dilemmas by focusing on the particular circumstances arising in 
each case, rather than a precise set of principles applicable to all 
cases 
Casuistry acquired a negative reputation during the Reformation 
when it was popularly characterised as a system designed more for 
finding a series of rules for the evasion of obvious moral duties than 
for finding and pursuing the right course Hence, the definition of 
casuistry as quoted from the Oxford English Dictionary (lonsen & 
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Toulmin, p.238): “a quibbling, evasive way of dealing with difficult 
cases of duty; sophistry” 
However, it is now increasingly recognised that the casuistic 
approach is relevant to the resolution of difficult cases arising in, for 
example, medicine where it is often not possible to arrive at definite 
ail-encompassing conclusions. In such circumstances casuistry 
enables: 
the analysis of moral issues, using procedures of reasoning 
based on paradigms and analogies, leading to the formulation 
of expert opinions about the existence and stringency of 
particular moral obligations, framed in terms of rules or 
maxims that are general but not universal or invariable, since 
they hold good with certainty only in the typical conditions of 
the agent and circumstances of action (ihid. p. 257). 
The casuistic method allows the identification of a range of 
possibilities where no single, clear, and specific answer to an ethical 
problem is available. As Preston observes “casuistry involves 
recognising the ambiguities of choice” (Preston, 1991, p.94). 
By its use of case studies taken from real-life, it enables students 
to apprcciate fully the ambiguities and complexities that face the 
modern medicai practitioner. Indeed, Arras, a Fellow of the Hastings 
Center (sic) and Professor of Bioethics, argues that it is only when 
real case studies are used that the casuistic method is effective. He 
advises “make them long, richly detailed, messy, and comprehensive” 
89 
(Arras, 1991, p.49). Hypothetical cases, still often seen in textbooks 
and anthologies, cannot reflect the degree of complexity, uncertainty 
and ambiguity encountered in the real world. 
However, the argument that one of the great strengths of the 
casuistic method is that it is theory-free, not tied down to any 
particular theoretical framework, and therefore able to allow the 
student to work from practice to  principles, is quite erroneous. 
Some set of principles always inform a line of ethical thinking, “once 
unveiled these principles will turn out to be heavily theory-laden”. It 
cannot be otherwise, for casuistry is an “engine of thought that must 
receive direction from values, concepts and theories outside of itself’ 
(ibid. p.41, italics original). 
Principles left implicit in the form of, for example, an 
unrecognised and unquestioned world view or habit of thinking, will 
nevertheless have an influence not only on the way an issue is 
resolved but even, and perhaps more importantly, on the way the 
issue is understood and addressed The resulting deliberations and 
decisions may simply reinforce the established preconceptions of the 
dominant voice in the decision-making process (ibid. pp.38-39). This 
again emphasises the importance of recognising and understanding 
the influence of the medical ethos on medical ethics both in thinking 
and practice. 
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Virtue 
Traditional virtue ethics focuses on the development of the agent 
as a virtuous person; a person of moral character. “The character of 
the actor is potentially the wellspring of the act” (Whetstone, 1998 
p. 187; Slote, 1997, p. 177). Thus, a good doctor is a virtuous doctor; 
a doctor of moral character. This tradition has its roots in the 
thinking of Aristotle, who defined virtue as that which is undertaken 
“at the right time, on the right occasion, towards the right people, for 
the right purpose and in the right manner” (Aristotle, 1106b 20). Ail 
ethics was virtue ethics. Within the past few decades there has been a 
revived interest in virtue ethics with the work of modem Aristotelian 
philosophers such as Anscombe (1958), and MacIntyre. Maclntyre 
emphasises the importance of community for the development of the 
virtuous character (hlaclntyre, 1985, pp. 155,156). Ethical thinkins 
can never simply be external, a mere “add-on” issue-based bioethics 
brought in to deal with particular situations identified as ethical 
dilemmas, but must be internal, the result of a habit of ethical 
behaviour acquired and developed from the moral tone, or ethos, 
within a c.ommunity (cf. Simmons, 1997 p.144fQ 
Historically medical oaths and codes are strongly virtue-based 
focusing as they do on the character of the physician (Ruddick, 
1998). The “implicit ethics of practice” that I discuss in this thesis is 
a form of virtue ethics. The pervading moral spirit, or ethos, of the 
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profession creates in practitioners attitudes, behaviours, and habits of 
thinking that within the profession are “accepted as “good”” (Loewy, 
1997, p.347ff). Loewy objects to the new emphasis on virtue ethics, 
arguing that it moves the focus of ethics away from solving problems 
and towards forming character. But this thesis explores the idea 
that via its ethos a profession explicitly aims to form the professional 
character with its professional “virtues” (ibid. p.348) 
Having defined what is meant by the ethos of medicine, and 
highlighting the range of theories of ethics common in discussion of 
medical ethics, it is now time to unpick the another element that has 
played a major part in creating the ethos 
The Role of MythZz 
Positive Role 
Jonsen describes the world of medicine as one “in which the 
ideas and beliefs formed by myth and tradition are.. . .more powerfully 
present than the pallid propositions of philosophical ethics” (Jonsen, 
1990, p.4). Another writer on medicine and theology has 
categorised the belief that doctors put patients interests above all 
others as one of “mankind’s basic religious and familial myths” 
(Szasz, 1988, p 2). Myth has an important place in medicine and it is 
appropriate at this point to spend a short while looking at that place. 
22 In Banhes’ .bfyfth»/ugies myth is defined as a socially constructed reality which is 
passed off as ”natural”. This, suggests Tony NcNeil of Ihe University of Sunderland, 
is close to Eggleton’s definition of ideology as a bxiy of beliefs and representations 
that sustain and legitimate current power relationships (Eagleton: 1991 pp.S-6). 
Thus he argues that ‘myth’ and ideology’ work in very similar ways. 
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It is well recognised that there is a powerful link between ethics 
and myths. Thus, Wiener argues that without myth-creating, society 
loses its focus and “the ethical systems, representing internalised 
transpositions of these myths” lose their hold (1978, pp.20,27). 
In her account of the development of ethical thinking Midgley 
draws another link. She refers to ‘‘a series of powerful myths” filling 
the gap between the reality of moral thinking and the questions of 
when and how our ability to think morally arose. She then goes on 
to explain the way myths work: 
Myths are not lies, nor need be they taken as literally true. 
They are symbolic stories which play a crucial role in our 
imagination and intellectual life by expressing the patterns that 
underlie our thought (Midgley. 1994 p 109). 
Myths “catalyze, organize and orientate man’s endeavours and 
his relations to society” (Wiener, 1978, p.25). In Feyerabend’s 
phrase they are, “the poetic imagination, which grasps human life as 
a whole and gives it meaning” (Feyerabend, 1987, p 21; cf. 
Nussbaum, 1986, p.213) Explaining Plato’s concept of the 
“magnificent myth’ Wiener notes that: 
society depends on the magnificent myth... for creation of 
societal cohesion and commitment, and for acceptance of those 
constraints upon the freedom of the individuai without which 
society cannot exist and progress (Wiener, 1978, p.162). 
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Myths are thus far more than mere fanciful illusions; the naive 
stories of our primitive ancestors. They represent symbolic systems 
that are an essential element in the making of a society. As 
Nussbaum emphasises, myth-stories may not be literally, historically 
true but they can express metaphorically a deeper tmth. The notion 
that myth can be ousted by facts, reason, and logic is itself a naive 
illusion (Nussbaum, 1986, p.209; Wiener, 1978, p. 170; Midgley, 
1994, p.1 1723). Standing between and beyond the mere story and the 
scientific, objective24 explanation of how the world operates, 
mythology interprets our world with its use of powerful and familiar 
images concerned with kinship and status. In the words of Solomon 
(1993, p.l51), it “interprets and selects, edits and personifies, 
aggrandizes (sic) and dramatizes (sic), our Reality and gives it 
meaning”. Failure to recognise the potency of the myth and, 
therefore, its role in the modem world, prevents us gaining a full 
understanding of the way social structures and the ethical systems 
that govern their operation are created and maintained. 
Thcrc is the suggestion of some conhion as to the meaning of the concept 
‘myth in Midgley‘s analysis . On the one hand she sets out the role of myth as 
follows “Myths are not lies . . they are symbolic stories which play a crucial role in 
our imaginative and intellectual life by expressing the patterns that underlie our 
thought” (Midgley. 1994, pp.109, 117). At other times she appears to fall into the 
ppuiar misconceptions. Thus. she contrasts myth with “genuine scientific evidence 
and principles” and “genuine biological theory” (Midgley. 1991, p.5). The 
implication is that now we have the genuine scientific biological facts the “emotive 
symbolism“ of the myths can be discarded 
24 Regarding objectivitv the following comment subtly draws out the relationship 
beween ohjectiviîy and myth: “The notion of objectiviîy ... even nominating it as an 
ideai is clearly founded on the belief that things are separable into the real and the 
fabricated and that it is possible to see the real with an eye innocent of symbols or 
interests” (Durham & Rothenbuhler, p. 15). 
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Neaative Role 
This positive view of myth sees its function as directing, 
energising, and motivating a community. “Goal-myths originate the 
vital needs of nations or other social groupings”, Wiener also notes 
that, “while couched in mythical symbolism, they still have their roots 
in specific contemporary political, economic, social and 
psychological needs and wants” (Wiener, 1978, p.50). This link 
means that myth can also play a more invidious role in establishing a 
world view. Here the myth arises from a highly selective version of 
“the facts” and beyond that outright falsifications. Through such 
myths one section of society can be presented as in some significant 
way superior to another and therefore morally justified in exercising 
control over those groups it views as inferior. 
Watts (1997), offers an interesting example of the way that 
negative myths can operate in the field of medicine. During the age 
of European and North American imperialism the myth of 
Development along with the pseudo-scientific doctrine of Social 
Darwinism was used to justify the exploitation of the “new” 
territories In this context Watts notes that: 
Coming out of the scramble for Africa, the scramble for 
China, and the conquest of Spam’s old empire. by the USA 
was the new discipline of Tropical Medicine. From its very 
onset tropical medicine was thus an “instrument of empire” 
intended to enable the white “races“ to live in, or at the very 
least exploit, all areas of the globe. [Mer all] Europeans were 
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at the very summit of the evolutionary chain and.. . they should, 
by right, dominate ali other humankind (Watts, p.xiii). 
What part these elements, in both their positive and negative 
forms, have played in constructing the medical profession’s ethos and 
the ethics identified with it, is the focus of the next section. 
Myth, Ethos, and Ethics 
The Hippocratic Oath 
Over the years, the medical profession has built a powerful 
coalition between itself and the people, “where the concerns voiced 
by the.. .profession are virtually identical to  those expressed by the 
general public” (Harrison el al, 1992, p. 102). This concord has been 
formed, in part, because of the widespread perception among the 
populace of medicine as an inherently ethical profession. Everyone 
“knows” that doctors are bound by The Hippocratic Oath and are, 
therefore, trustworthy. Doctors themselves are certainly not averse 
to reminding the public of their Hippocratic pedigree A Regius 
Professor of Medicine has observed that: “The famous Hippocratic 
Oath., ..still offers an ethical framework for those few doctors who 
are familiar with it” (Weatherall, 1995, p.28; cf, Lee-Potter, p. 12325). 
Lee-Potter describes a “sinister” document produced by Trent Regional Health 
Authority in which the following statement occurs ‘if a self-governing trust values 
teamwork - it needs to confront the obstructive and the prima donna when all else 
has failed to persuade individuals to sign up to a corporate philosophy’. Lee-Potter 
then notes: “My response to this was: ‘1 think we have a corporate philosophy in 
medicine and that it has something to do with ffippocrafes”’ (emphasis added). 
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It will be instructive to take a closer look at that well known 
code of conduct for doctors. Whilst the popular imagination might 
see each new doctor standing before an august body of her or his 
peers and repeating the Hippocratic Oath before being allowed to go 
forth and practise, the reality is rather less significant as witnessed by 
Sinclair, when a second year medical student. Toward the end of 
the introductory lecture, after many of the senior members of the 
faculty had departed, first year students were invited to repeat the 
oath: 
A small transparency of the Nppocratic Oath was then 
projected on the screen, so small it was nearly illegible from 
the back of the [lechire] theatre. This was recited slowly, at 
first, everyone tried to follow and read it aloud, but gradually 
the new students gave up, leaving only the planted claque of 
second years (1997, p.99). 
While it is from this ancient Oath that modem medical ethics 
finds one of its four principles, namely, purum noti itocere or first do 
no harm, in its few specific injunctions, the Oath is at variance with 
significant elements of standard modern medical thought and 
practice. Those bound by the Oath specifically promise: “I will not 
give a fatal draught to anyone who asked”. Today the advised 
ethical position on euthanasia is much less clear as Beauchamp and 
Childress’s textbook on bioethics shows. It offers the argument that: 
“merciful physician interventions in the form of voluntaq active 
euthanasia are not inherently wrong or incompatible with the role of 
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a health professional” (1994, p.227). In like manner, the Oath 
requires doctors to  promise: “neither will I give a woman means to 
procure an abortion”. Today abortion is a widely accepted, even 
common, medical procedure (Garcia, 1997, p.161). 
One element of the oath, that involving the correct attitude 
toward colleagues, and particularly seniors, although eschewed by 
the modem GMC’s code of practice is still very important in 
governing the relationship between professionals. The Hippocratic 
Oath emphasised that respect was due from the apprentice physician 
towards his  teacher. Thus: “I will pay the same respect to my master 
in the Science as to my parents”. This emphasis codified the strong 
collegiate bonds between the “brotherhood’ of doctors and led to the 
notion of “closing ranks’’ to protect a colleague from outside 
criticism (Strong and Robinson, 1990, p.35) That emphasis has 
continued down through the centuries. Percival’s Medical Efhics 
written in 1 803 “concerned itself mainly with intra-professional 
demarcation or medicai etiquette rather than standards of moral 
behaviour by doctor towards patient” (Digby, 1994, p.59). Although 
the current code of conduct for doctors tells them that they must put 
the welfare of their patients above the interests of colleagues, “a 
doctor must act quickly to  protect patients from risk if you have 
good reason to believe that you or a colleague may not be Fit to 
practise” (GMC, 1995), the Hippocratic emphasis continues to 
underpin the day to day reality of the doctor-doctor relationship. As 
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one doctor, now the editor of the Lancei, recalls from his medical 
training in the early 1980s: 
Doctors leam to keep other doctors’ mistakes secret from 
almost the first day they amve in medical school. It is part of 
what being a profession is ali about (Horton, 1998). 
A considerable body of anecdotal evidence exists to show that 
when colleagues have reason to suspect that the clinical practice of a 
fellow practitioner is faulty, and even potentially dangerous, there is 
a marked reluctance to  expose this situation. Not only is an 
understanding “blind eye” turned to doctors who are simply 
incompetent but also to those with serious drug or drink problems 
and evidence suggests that 1 in 15 doctors have such problems.26 
Even when a doctor is brought before the GMC the procedures, 
according to one lay observer, seem more designed to  cover up the 
“misconduct” than to protect patients from harm (Robinson, 1988, 
pp.37,41). Hammond (I  997), quotes recent research suggesting 
that. “the G h K  is six times more likely to discipline an ethnic 
minority doctor than a white doctor”. He then notes: “This is not 
due to a persecution of ethnic minority doctors, but rather because 
white doctors are far more likely to get away with misconduct”. 
26 Information from a broadcast on Independent Television, February 9th 1998. 
The programme also suggested that among the pressures that drive doctors to these 
addictions is the moral/eihical conflict arising from the expectations they h o w  the 
public have of them and the reality of what they are able to deliver. 
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Thus, the Oath seems to present modem medicine with , 
something of a dilemma. On the one hand “the Hippocratic 
tradition . . . .  has turned out to be a limited and generally unreliable 
basis for medical ethics” (Beauchamp & Childress 1994, p.25), yet 
doctors themselves adhere in practice to one of the least helpful 
principles, that of loyalty to colleagues. Furthermore, even though 
Beauchamp and Childress note the Oath’s limited value they still 
choose to point back to it as indicating a distinguisbed pedigree. 
Thus, “an obligation of non-maleficence and.. , .of beneficence are 
both expressed in the Oath” and “requirements of confidentiality 
appear as early as the Hippocratic oath” (Beauchamp & Chddress, 
1994, pp.189.418). Finally, to the patient the Hippocratic Oath is 
the ultimate indication of the doctors’ professional rectitude; the 
paradigm of medical ethics. Efforts to resolve the dilemma by 
“restating” the Hippocratic Oath have not had the same mythological 
impact on public or professional consciousness as the original. 
Ethics in the Medical Curriculum 
Beyond talk of the Oath, until the last 15 years or so, ethics was 
not considered important enough to have a place in the cumculum 
of most medical schools. ten Have (1988), points out that before the 
1960s, ethics was not often discussed in the medical literature and 
that it is only since the end of the 1970s that the importance of 
analysing moral dilemmas in health care practice has become 
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recognised. Even that assessment might be somewhat optimistic as 
the Reith Lecturer speaking in 1980 observed: 
We should . . .  expect that doctors have some educational 
groundmg in ethical analysis. To suggest this .... crucial point 
is to invite scorn. ‘There is no room in the curriculum.’ My 
response is that . . . .  ethics must be a central course (Kennedy, 
1983, p.97). 
In the assessment of one senior medical tutor, medical ethics has 
only come of age in “recent years” in terms of its inclusion in 
standard medical curricula (Goldie, 2000, p. 109) 
Although this situation is now changing, the change is gradual 
and then only for younger doctors and those currently in training. In 
an address to the Office of Health Economics given by Professor 
David Sackett on the subject of evidence-based medicine, the 
Professor began by explaining that he was neither a student of ethics 
nor health economics and that his “knowledge in these areas is 
mundane”. The ethical principles guiding his decision-making arose 
“through an iterative process” habing been defined retrospectively 
“rather than prospectively as a starting point for determining my 
values; (Sackett, 1996, p.3).” 
’^ A few jears ago, I was one of a group of MA students invited to meet and talk io a 
consultant in the field of in vifro fertilisation (IVF). All the audience were 
preparing dissertations on some aspect of medicai ethics. IVF was a subject that, in 
our view. raised a number of ethical concerns and we were eager to hear the 
consultant’s view on these issues. However, just before the meeting we were 
advised not to ask “ethical” questions. The consultant. a young man, had told the 
Course Director that he would not be comfortable with such matters and was only 
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Even doctors who have gone through the recently introduced 
ethics training are still apparently ill at ease with the idea of 
“exploring the tensions and conflicts between ethical principles and 
suggesting ways of resolving them” (Kennedy, 1983, p.97). Thus, 
Grundstein-Amado (1993), found, in a study that included SO% 
doctors, that clinical-ethical “decisions were made in a narrow, 
habitual manner, through the elimination of the most significant and 
demanding elements of the process”. And, whilst fifth year 
undergraduates in the medicai school of the University of Sydney 
responded positively to their medicai ethics teaching programme, “a 
number complain[ed] that simple answers to common problems 
[were] not provided”. This, despite the fact that the teaching 
programme had been designed to ‘‘raise awareness of the complex 
nature of decision-making and to encourage students to determine 
their own moral viewpoints to common controversial issues (Hays & 
Rlolodysky, 1993, p.40) 2R 
These findings call attention to a paradox that requires further 
investigation. For many years the profession did not consider ethics 
important enough to merit inclusion in the medicai schools’ curricula 
and even now that it has been included doctors still appear to be 
uncomfortable with the responsibility of identifymg, let alone 
prepared to speak on his specific subject. to describe and discuss the technical 
details of the various IVF options 
Although one üK ethicist observes that in her personal experience of teachmg 
medical ethics to nurses they did “not cxpect philosophy io give them answers: 
merely to teach them to ask the right questions” (Dickenson, 1989, p.109). 
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resolving, ethical tensions within the clinical setting Yet, at the 
same time the profession presents itself as, and is widely perceived to 
be, firmly set on the high moral ground, under-girded by clear ethical 
principles Understanding the nature of the link between the medical 
ethos and medicai ethics, encapsulated today in the four principles, 
resolves that paradox 
Freidson ( 1  970), notes that the so-called “consulting 
profession”, those dependent on “popularity with laymen (szc))) 
(p 73), have to offer reassurance to their prospective clients The 
“cosmetic” (p 83) of a code of ethics is a centrai element in attracting 
and reassuring their target groups (p 186) In his history of the 
medical profession Bullough describes how the role of ethics was 
developed as medicine worked to gain status as a respected 
profession 
Beyond the Ethical Dilemma 
The practice of medicine involves an exercise of power. 
Kennedy, in a study that focused on the power of the professional, 
observed that “the monopoly power to conñrm or deny the presence 
of illness rests with the doctor” (Kennedy, 1983, p.7-9). Linked to 
this power “there are a certain set of roles and privileges that we 
have come to conceptualise as inherently linked to the 
doctor.. , .They. . .  .give the orders, They are.. .in charge” (Lantos, 
1997, p.6). 
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Bullough sets out the steps by which the modern, orthodox, 
medical profession came to its position of pre-eminence (Bullough, 
1966). In so doing he makes clear the link between knowledge, 
power, and ethics. .Mer noting the modem passion for pursuing 
professional status, he observes that: “The group which has oíìen 
served as the norm by which ali other professional groups are judged 
is that of medicine” (p.3). There then follows an absorbing account 
of how medicine developed as a profession. One aspect identified as 
essential to this development was the emergence of the university 
and the successful move to exclusive university accreditation for 
medical training. 
According to a leading member of the profession, the system in 
Europe that required the attainment of a university degree served as 
a protection to the public. “The granting of licences was developed 
as a device to distinguish (properly educated and qualified 
practitioners) from, non-professionals” (Hoffenberg, 1987, p.4). 
However, a university education did much more than protect 
patients; it protected and enhanced the status of the individual 
practitioner and the developing medical profession as a whole. Thus, 
it “prepared the graduate to move in genteel society; a medical 
education at Edinburgh, Oxford, or Cambridge opened doors to the 
wealthy patient” but at the same time reassured those wealthy 
patients “that the practitioner had no overriding pecuniary interest in 
their treatments”. Furthermore, “an appearance of gentility tended to 
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reinforce medical authority” (Digby, 1994, p.59). And “the more the 
university dominated the ñeld, the more clearly medicine maintained 
its professional grip” (Bullough, 1966, p. 109). Freidson (1970, 
p.51) states that “university training gave physicians and surgeons a 
stronger political position for persuading the state to subordinate to 
them such competitors as apothecaries, grocers, and barbers, not to 
speak of allowing them to prosecute the irregular practitioners”. It 
was, and continues to be, for the profession itself to determine who 
is an “irregular practitioner”. 
Medicine had achieved the status and attendant power of a 
profession by circumscribing what constituted medical knowledge 
and then closing off that knowledge to all but those educated within 
the university. Now arose the need for a code of ethics: 
A code of ethics is an important device for persuading the 
general public to believe that members of an occupation are 
ethical (Freidson 1970, p.186). 
Bullough points to  the two different roles such codes had to 
perform requiring that they be couched in somewhat contradictory 
terms: 
By definition a profession has to have some sort of ethic, the 
rules of the game which each practitioner attempts to 
follow. .,To persuade the public to accept these exclusionary 
tactics of the university trained practitioner, the need for 
regulation had to be couched in terns of ideals (what Bullough 
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had earlier termed “pious sounding statements” p.4), but to 
gain the support of the would-be professional it was necessary 
to emphasise sdfinierest..  . .The result was a growth in medical 
deontology, a growth which coincided with institutionalisation 
(Bullough, 1966, p.93, emphasis added). 
Tadd, in his look at professional codes of ethics, asked what 
function is a code of ethics meant to  perform and whose benefit is it 
meant to serve? In reply he quoted Richard Hull: “the practice of 
generating codes as self-regulating devices can be seen,. . .as devices 
for insuluting u profession uguirist umuunteú incursions by affected 
parties or groups who may dissent with some of the historically or 
currently favored (sic) features and traditions of that profession” 
(Tadd 1994, p.16, emphasis added). Such codes are the means of 
persuading the general public of the probity of members of the 
profession, or more generally of justifying whatever the profession 
considers it necessary to justi@ in order to maintain its position, 
particularly its autonomy, that is to say its freedom to “give orders to 
all and take orders from none” (Freidson, 1970, pp.186,70; 
Bullough, 1966, p.93). 
However, to maintain their exclusive rights to  practice, medical 
practitioners had to  seek “support from the state”; from kings and 
popes; the power bases of the day. “A profession attains and 
maintains its position by virtue of the protection and patronage of 
some elite segment of society which has been persuaded that there is 
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some special value in its work’ (Freidson 1970, pp.47, 72). Foucault 
(1973), asserts that in due course the state found its own use for the 
profession as one of its “soft” control systems for maintaining an 
orderly population. The “clinical gaze” became another element in 
the State’s “panoptic system of surveillance” (pp195-228). Through 
the intensification of medical power, the State was able to exercise 
what Armstrong describes as a “politico-medical hold on the 
population” (Armstrong, 1983. p. 147). Thus, medicine and the state 
formed a mutually beneficial partnership; the medical profession 
using its power to help maintain public order; the state using its 
power to bolster and sanction with law the profession’s exclusivity 
By entering into this partnership medicine was also submitting itself 
to the control of the state. Autonomy was not absolute but limited by 
the political power to which it owed its existence (Freidson, 1970, 
pp.23ff, 369). 
Williams and Calnan (1996, p.8), consider the Foucauldian 
perspective too simplistic due to its failure to take account of 
evidence of opposition, criticism, and resistance to medicine among 
the lay populace, at least within the contemporaq era. Whether or 
not the lay populace is less passive and docile than it once was is 
somewhat irrelevant, although Armstrong (1983), certainly considers 
that submission to control under the clinical gaze was evident well 
into the mid-twentieth century at least. Szasz (1988), presents strong 
evidence in support of this Mew particularly in the case of psychiatric 
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medicine. "Medicine does not merely operate in conjunction with the 
state; in modem industrial societies, medicine is actually a part of the 
state - it is a sort of state religion . . .  The state supports and 
legitimizes (sic) medicine, and medicine in turn supports and 
legitimizes (sic) the state" (p. 146). Foucault's contention that the 
state saw medicine, the medical gaze, as a suitable method of 
population control and surveillance is valid. The medical profession 
was and continues to be offered protection and legitimacy by the 
state and in return the state sought and seeks to use the profession in 
its public control structures. A mutually beneficial arrangement (cf. 
Allsop, 1995, p.16-17). 
In her analysis of the impact of professionalism on nursing, 
Salvage (1985), offers the following assessment: 
The assumption that professionalism means excellence is often 
used to justify the profession's position of supenonty They 
say they are protecting the public by controlling recruitment 
and training ... A critical look at the occupations usually defined 
as true professions, such as medicine,.. reveal some worrying 
facts. For example, the reasons for restricting entry to the 
profession often seems to spring, not so much from a concern 
for public welfare, as a desire to stop others muscling in on a 
profitable job . . . .  The attempt to win recognition and the 
attendant material benefits for a select group inevitably 
excludes others and insisting on strict control of entry and 
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education and therefore knowledge denies it to others, not least 
the patients themselves (Salvage, 1985, pp 89,95). 
Perhaps the less than noble motives identified by Salvage and 
illustrated in Bullough’s history of medicine’s journey to status of 
senior profession, offers an explaaation for the durabiliîy of the 
outdated Hippocratic Oath. The Oath and the beliefs surrounding it 
are an essential part of the profession’s mythology, a story that has 
been passed down to generations of doctors and patients. It plays its 
part in softening the sharper edges of the “reality” of medical 
practice thereby enabling practitioner and patient to play their 
respective roles in the equally myth-imbued doctor-patient 
relationship. Trust in the doctor is still a vital element in that 
relationship (Little & Fearnside, 1997). No one wants to give 
themselves to the care of a greedy, manipulative professional, rather 
they want to believe that the doctor in front of them is part of an 
honourable profession, rooted in a centuries-old ethics of care and 
commitment to the well-being of their patients. 
Digby (l999), describes this conflict between myth and reality in 
her account of the difficult path GPs of the 19th century had to tread. 
General practice was an uncertain profession, survival could be a 
struggle so it required of the GP “distinctive entrepreneurial and 
organizational (sic) skills”, However, too open a display of such 
business skills resulted in “criticism and a loss of prestige’’ and hence 
income. The myth of the family doctor was already established and 
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the public expected those “mythologized’ lsic) creatures to display 
“the steadfast virtues of professional dedication and disinterested 
concern for patients” (pp 97,100) The Hippocratic Oath is the 
epitome of that faith and medicine is, understandably, happy to let it 
be so 
However, whilst faith and myths have a vital part to play in 
validating and maintaining the social order, including perhaps the 
relationship between doctor and patient, “they can”, as Pattison 
points out, “if ~rnexumined and zrricrificized, act ideologically to 
impede reflection and inhtbit emancipation and fundamental change” 
(Pattison, 1997, p.53,  emphasis added). In this study a critical 
examination of the myths of the medical profession has led to a more 
informed understanding of its ethos. Without such an understanding 
the changes currently being called for from the medical profession 
will be less likely to achieve their intended goal. 
Linked to the myth behind the ethos are the values informing 
both ethos and the ethics arising from or interpreted by the ethos. 
Values in Ethos and Ethics 
”Values” are central in any ethical framework, they also lie at 
the heart of the medicai profession’s ethos. The nature of their 
contribution to ethos and ethics, both explicit and implicit, will now 
be explored. 
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The term values falls into two very distinct areas of use. In 
economics the meaning is clear and precise. Thus, “value in use” 
refers to the pleasure a commodity actually generates for its owner 
while ‘%alue in exchange” means the quantity of other commodities a 
commodity can be swapped for, most commoniy the amount of 
money the consumer is prepared to pay in order to purchase the 
desired commodity (Bannock et al, 1987 p. 415; cf. Cole, 1995, 
p.127,130). 
However, it is values in the context 3f objects judged to be 
worthy of human pursuit that makes the term relevant to this study 
of the relationship between ethos and ethics. Hence ideals, motives, 
sentiments, and actions can all be considered to have value. But in 
all these instances the values must be linked to an individual or 
group; they are always someone’s values. Within this realm such 
judgements can be either in terms of obligation and what ought to be 
done, or of worth, goodness or intrinsic desirability (Scruton, 1983, 
p.483; Ladd, 1983 p.378). 
Despite the seeming clarity of  this general definition, the word is 
nevertheless, used so broadly, and even carelessly. that in Scruton’s 
phrase, “it generates more questions than it answers”. Thus, even in 
what has, rightly in my opinion, been described as a classic work on 
professional ethics (Battin, 1990, p.271), the author refers to “the 
fundamental values and norms of each profession” (Goldman, 1980, 
p.24). He thus uses these two words interchangeably thereby 
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suggesting that values are synonymous with norms. But just two 
paragraphs later he appears to use “interests” as a synonym for 
values. Even when he moves on to discuss a theory of value he does 
not consider it necessary to clarifi precisely what he means by the 
word. Of course, it is reasonable to assume from the context that 
Goldman is not using the word in the economic sense. But beyond 
that it is not clear exactly what he means by values. The reader is left 
to glean the meaning from the range of uses throughout the work 
and this can lead to some confusion. 
Goldman appears to assume that his readers will know what the 
word values means And perhaps, in the context of the subject 
matter, he is right so to do. On the other hand, he may simply have 
fallen into the common trap of believing that as it is a word we ail 
use many times it must be well understood, Little’s observation on 
the word “trust” is equally applicable to “values”: “it is one of those 
words whose meaning seems so transparent to us that we never 
notice that it means different things in different contexts and dinerent 
mouths” (Little ef al, 1997). In the case of values this is a misplaced 
confidence, for whilst the word may be widely used, its meaning 
appears to be poorly understood. 
The amorphous character of values has been commented upon 
as follows: “the notion of value and values can happily slip, 
chameleon-like, between users and utterances, delighting all and 
offending none because most people do not take the trouble to think 
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about what it actually means in their own lives or those of others” 
(Pattison, 1998). In fact, it is this very catholicity and all- 
inclusiveness that has given the liberal model of ethics its appeal. 
Within this framework “almost anything the people want can be 
counted as a value” (Ladd, 1983 p.378). 
While certain values such as truth-telling can rightly be viewed, 
almost without question, as moral principles, many other values are 
no more than the interests and prejudices of a particular group. If 
the group involved has considerable influence and power within a 
particular society, those values may even become the ethical 
standards required of the wider society over which the dominant 
group holds sway The values of one section of a society are taken to 
be the values of the society as a whole (Szasz, 1988, p.3). Thus, 
Sherwin, along with many feminist writers, see medical ethics as an 
extension of the values of a male-dominated society. In her study of 
traditional medical ethics Sherwin calls them, “blatantly misogynist 
values’’ (Sherwin, 1992, p.43), that have worked against the best 
interests of women and other oppressed groups. 
This perspective meant that the health problems experienced by 
women were believed to be the result of some fundamental 
imperfection, some weakness, of the female body and mind. Thus, 
for the treatment of the ultimate female illness, hysteria, doctors 
recommended suffocating the hysterical woman, beating her across 
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the body and face with wet towels, and finally shaming her into 
repose with ridicule (Ehrenreich & English, 1979, p.125) 
Even the Porters, while rejecting much of the feminist 
interpretation as overly pessimistic, recognise that some of the 
treatments doctors considered appropriate for women were 
“appallingly sadistic” (Porter & Porter, 1989, pp. 175,179-180). 
Women still find the attitude created by these negative images of 
their health needs pervading much of the health care they receive 
(Holmes, 1992, pp.1-8; cf. Sherwin, 1992; Lupton, 1994, p132- 
138).29 Specifically in the field of medical ethics the particular issues 
defined as “ethical dilemmas”, the way the questions are addressed, 
and the particular solutions offered, although “clothed in a cloak of 
neutrality” tend to focus on masculine values of power, status, and 
authority thereby excluding from the debate the experiences, 
perspectives, and values of women (Warren, 1992, p.33-35). 
For that reason Bowden (1997, p~2), after condemning ‘?he 
morally repugnant biases produced by a tradition that persistently 
favours interests associated with men at the expense of those 
characteristically ascribed to women”, is moved to devise a code of 
ethics that, she believes, takes full account of and reflects the values 
and interests ofwomen (cf Grimshaw, 1993, p.4919 
29 Beloved Image’ in Nelle Morton’s The Journev Is Home. Boston, Beawn 
Press, offers a challenging, sometimes men dishubing. account of the impact of 
negative female imagery on both male and female atútudes and thinking and one 
group of women‘s efforts to alter that negative imagery 
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A powerful g o u p  such as the medical profession may also 
demand and be granted the right to a set of values that conîlict with 
those imposed on or accepted by the wider society. This is the 
element of medical ethics explored by Goldman. 
What he calls Strong Role Differentiation involves a profession 
claiming special rights with regard to “what would otherwise be 
morally overriding”. Professions may demand either that their own 
values “be weighted more heavily than they would be against other 
principles in other contexts” or that they must be allowed a unique 
set of ethical principles. The values central to the profession have to 
be given special or overriding consideration “in situations in which 
they might not appear Overriding fiom the viewpoint of normal moral 
perception” (Goldman, 1980, pp.2,3). 
In the case of the medical profession, this approach is 
epitomised in the claim by doctors to their right to withhold the truth 
from patients Information is viewed by the doctor not as the 
patient’s right but as an element in the doctors treatment programme. 
Therefore it is the doctor who decides what and how much of such 
information a patient should be given. 
Bok (1989, p.226), identifies what are to the medical mind three 
essential justifications for their position on truth-telling. All hinge on 
the principle of “patient’s best interests” as defined by the doctor 
alone. That principle is the profession’s “overriding” moral value. 
Thus, they argue that: i) truthfulness is impossible, doctors can be 
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wrong so why burden patients with mformation that may prove to be 
inaccurate; i¡) patients themselves do not want to hear bad news; ¡i) 
the information may harm patients. 
Har~is (1994), considers justification on the basis of “doing no 
harm” a doubtful principle (p.208). Bok (1989), is prepared to 
accept as valid the profession’s arguments in a “few carefully 
delineated cases” but considers that a general inclination to deceive 
or lie to patients undermines the trust that the cared for must have in 
their carers (p.241). Goldman goes further and rejects completely the 
justification offered by the profession for deceiving patients 
Despite the concerns and protests raised by, among others, 
moral philosophers and patients themselves, the medical profession 
maintains its right to override “the viewpoint of normal moral 
perception” in order to fulfil what it presents as a primu.fucie duty, 
that of deciding what is in the best interest of patients, including 
how much information should be given concerning diagnosis and 
prognosis.’” 
”’ In “Tell me the Truth. Doctor“ a “Hean of the Matter’’ programme broadcast on 
7th February 199?. a consultant cardiologist Jane Somerville described her rights as 
a &or in thrs area ”Just as part of my training is to decide what is the right 
operation ... another part of my training is to decide what ptient(s1 can accept being 
told ...If for instance s o m e w  is a simple person (a judgement she as a consultant 
cardiologist felt competent to make), I don’t think they want io hear ail the 
di íñdt ies  and all the technical details. That‘s a right I’ve taken - to judge that I 
mustn’t tell them. If you have a very intelligent person who’s tqing to plan their 
life., .then you must tell that person a bit more”. (See transcript of broadcast Tell 
me the Truth, Doctor. 1993. BBC Broadcasting Snpport Services, London). The 
programme explored what was back in IYY3. seen as a growing trend away from 
medicai secrecy and towards more openness, more telluig. “giving patients much 
greater autonomy, much more choice over what happens to them”. It was suggested 
that medicai paternalism was a thing of the past nith the new generation of doctors 
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Two further aspects of this element of the medical character are 
doctors lack of communication skills and the closely related inability 
to cope with uncertainty (Katz, 1988). Both are singled out for 
mention in the GMC’s report on educating tomorrow’s doctors’ and 
the profession is urged to improve doctors abilities in these areas. 
Analysing her own experience of coping with iUness 
Fleischmann recalled that: “One participant in the naming debate 
candidly stated: “why not be honest with the patient and tell him we 
don’t know”?’ She commented: “One can only admire this 
physician’s willingness to be up front with the patients regarding the 
state of the art of prognosis” (Fleischmann, 1999. p. 19). 
Whilst an ability to talk openly and honestly with patients may 
be recognised as an essential skill in modem health care, in everyday 
practice the honesty which many patients and lay people would 
consider an essential part of the doctors ethics was and is still much 
rarer than outsiders might assume or theorists might wish. Within the 
ethos of the practising medical community it has not been viewed as 
a matter of y e a t  importance, as noted above “dishonesty” is viewed 
as ethical inasmuch as it is designed to protect patients from undue 
much more willing to work wifh patients. Howwer. such is the conservative nature 
of the medical profession that seven years later David Gilkn, Fellow at the m i c e  
for hb l ic  Management wrote in an article in the Guardian of 26th Jan 2000, that 
doctors were just discovering that “at an individuai level l a n g  patients take more 
control of their OWR health probJems can lead IO better outcomes”. He quoted the 
response of local GP and HA representative Dr Brian Fisher, to a half day seminar 
on patient involvement: “li was remarkable. For the first time. patients were saying 
what they though1 worked. And professionals listened”. 
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anxiety and thus, conforms to the doctor’s ethical obligation to do no 
ham. At another level it is also designed to protect the reputation 
and standing of doctors; they would not wish their patients to 
consider them less than fully knowledgeable about all matters relating 
to disease and treatment of disease - thus their unwillingness to admit 
uncertainty maintains the myth ofthe expert doctor. 
Summary 
Despite initial reluctance within the profession to include ethics 
in their curriculum, modern medical ethics, with its emphasis on 
patients best interests and the four principles, is now a firmly 
established academic subject. There are standard texts, numerous 
journals, and several university departments devoted to the minutiae 
of the subject. The four principles have become well known and 
widely discussed. On the other hand, ethos remains virtually a lost 
concept - subsumed by its now fashionable cousin, ethics. Thus, 
discussion of the nature of the medical ethos and its influence over 
the application of the ethical principles to every day practice and 
decision-making is overlooked. Yet, whilst the teaching of ethics has 
now moved into the mainstream of medical education it is the ethos 
taught in, or rather absorbed from, the “hidden curriculum” that 
continues to influence the profession’s attitudes and actions (Goldie, 
2000, p.117; Edgar, 1995, p.151). The aim of this chapter has been 
to pull ethos out of the shadows and, by looking at the central myths 
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and key values of the medical profession, begin to explore its quiet 
but telling contribution to the everyday application of medical ethics 
The next chapter looks at the profession’s ethos in action I 
explore the history behind both the opposition of the general 
practitioner arm of the medical profession to the creation of the NHS 
and the attitude of the profession as a whole to the management and 
control of the Service. 
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Chapter 3 
Battle for the NHS: Altruism and Self-interest 
There are numerous histories of the NHS. The historical 
material for this chapter has been drawn &om a wide range of 
standard texts including Abel-Smith (1979), Eckstein (1958), Klein 
(1995), T d n s ,  (1996), Pater (1981), Webster (1988, 1996, 1999), 
and Bemdge (1999). 
In 1948 the National Health Service came into existence and the 
medical profession strongly opposed this development. In 1989, 
steps were taken to reform the Senice with the aim of making it 
more efficient. These reforms were again met with opposition from 
the medical profession. In both cases the profession presented its 
opposition in terms of ethical principles, in particular its obligation 
to protect the interests of patients (Webster, 1999, Berridge, 1998; 
Allsop, 1995; Klein 1995, Lee-Potter, 1997) 
Jonsen íiY9oj, highlights self-interest and altruism as one of the 
central paradoxes of modern medical practice. The perspective of 
this study translates that paradox into the difference between, on the 
one hand, the values endorsed by the old well established ethos and, 
on the other, the principles of new medical ethics. Thus, the 
profession stimulates “all the intensity of self-interest” while at the 
same time on every public and ceremonial occasion proclaiming the 
altruistic ideal (pp. 12, 13).  
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This paradox is much in evidence in the events leading up to the 
creation of the NHS Viewed through the lens of the distinction 
between ethos and ethics, the objections the profession raised are 
seen as informed more by the established professional ethos than the 
modern medical ethics This is made even clearer with an analysis of 
the dissent that arose in the ranks of the profession as the various 
factions began to question the motivation of those t a h g  a c o n t r q  
position and cast doubt on “opponents” claims to be acting ethically, 
that is to say, always in the best interests oftheir patients 
In this chapter, I re-examine the actions of the medicai 
profession, and its own justification of those actions, as they relate to 
the creation and subsequent control of the NHS The words and 
actions are analysed in terns of both the profession’s motivating 
ethos and public ethics In the following chapters the analysis is 
applied to the responses of the profession to later developments and 
reforms 
The Heaith of the Nation 
The seeds of a national health service were sown in the early 
years of the century long before the debate proper began in the early 
1940s. Ailsop (1995), includes in her discussion of health policy and 
the NHS an extract from a paper written in 1901 It expresses 
considerable alarm that throughout the population the majority were 
physically unñt to fight in the armed services In Manchester only 
one in three “men willing to bear arms” had achieved even the 
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moderate standards of muscular power and chest measurement 
required by the army. As for the rest, the two in three, they were 
‘birtually invalids” (p.285). If the State did not begin to work to 
improve and maintain the health of its fighting population then the 
survival of the nation as a whole was threatened, Not only was it 
necessary for the State to build a viable fighting, and in later years 
working, force, but also to protect its future population by improving 
the health of women and children. The outbreak of the Second 
World War, when health care had to be organised on a national scale, 
gave new impetus to the determination of government to tackle the 
nation’s health needs (cf Abei-Smith, 1979, chapter i). 
The principle of equality was basic. It arosc not so much from 
any strongly held ethical conviction but rather from the pragmatic 
realisation that if the service was to deal with the nations’ health 
problems, it would need to address the widespread inequalities in 
health care provision that had arisen under the previous chaotic and 
fragmented arrangements. The legacy of the past had resufted in far 
better provision in the South and towns than in the North and 
country (Allsop, 1995, p.66). 
Alongside equality, two other principles, namely, 
comprehensiveness and universality were fundamental to the new 
health care system. These had been identified by Beveridge as key 
elements in his 1941 paper ‘Heads of a Scheme’; they re-appeared in 
his final Report of 1942 (Timmins, 1996, p.20; Allsop, 1995, pp.294- 
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5; Eckstein, 1958), and then formed an important part of the 1944 
White Paper A NcrfionalHralth Service (Ailsop, 1995, pp.289-91). 
Looking at the principles underpinning the NHS, one ethicist has 
observed that they have gained prominence with the passing years as 
the mythology of the NHS has developed and “vague sentiment” has 
softened the harsher reality behind the political and professional 
jockeying involved in the making of the NHS. (Seedhouse, 1994, 
p.14, 15). It was pragmatism rather than ethical principles that 
dictated the creation of the NHS. As Bevendge himself made clear, a 
healthy population made good economic sense: “disease and 
accidents must be paid for . . in lessened power of production and in 
idleness’’ (Cmnd 6404, 1942, quoted by Ailsop, 1995, p.294). The 
same pragmatism determined the shape of the original structure. The 
government saw the need for a system that could provide equal, 
universal, and comprehensive health care. 
The National Health Insurance Act of 1946 went into effect in 
1948 allowing evevone to obtain free medical attention from any 
doctor participating in the national health service (Eckstein, 1958). 
Thus, for the new health care system to provide the envisaged level 
of cover it required the support of the medical profession. What 
values informed that profession’s response? 
The Medical Ethos and the NHS 
In company with probably all other large organisations the N H S  
has many faces and performs many functions. It is a monolithic 
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structure, a vast bureaucratic organisation designed, according to the 
relevant Acts of Parliament (1946, 1947) to secure improvements in 
the prevention, diagnosis, and treatment of disease. Prior to its 
arrival health care provision within the LIK comprised an assortment 
of hospitals funded, often inadequately, from a range of sources, with 
general practitioner services available oniy to the wage earning 
population and paid for out of flat-rate contributions from a variety 
of associations such as trade unions (Kelly & Glover, 1996; Levitt et 
a/, 1995; Klein, 1995). Replacing this complex mix, the new 
structure could not but be huge and somewhat unwieldy. However, 
the NHS must also be recognised as an assortment of discreet and 
distinct communities, each with their own culture and “language”, 
apparently bound together by a common goal but often, in fact, in 
conílict with each other (Fox, 1993, p.59). This clash of 
communities was apparent virtually from the very outset as powerful 
interest groups, and particularly “a profoundly suspicious body of 
doctors”, sought to protect their interests within the developing 
service (Timmins, 1996, p. 112). 
Thus, although there was widespread agreement that some kind 
of national health service was inevitable, the ñnal product only 
emerged after many wrangles and heated debates between, and 
within, the main parties involved. In some cases the result of these 
battles was a long-term breakdown in relationships between erstwhile 
colleagues as has been the case with the Royal Colleges and the 
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BMA, During the course of the debate, the presidents of the Royal 
College’s were termed traitors and “quislings” by their BMA 
colleagues and the Minister of Health, Aneurin Bevan, condemned as 
“an evil” a right GPs were fighting to preserve, namely, the buying 
and selling of GP Practices. Thus, the end result of ail the battles was 
not so much a happy consensus but a rather bitter compromise 
(Klein, 1995, pp.2-6; Timmins, 1996, pp.l19,125; cf. Webster, 1988; 
Pater, 1981; Honigsbaum, 1989). 
The Medical Profession’s Aqenda 
Lee-Potter in his overview of the early years of the NHS 
describes from the medical profession’s viewpoint the lengthy and 
detailed discussions that took piace before the 1945 general election 
between the BMA. representing mainly the interest of general 
practitioners, and the coalition government. The aim of the 
discussions was to try and íind agreement on the best way to achieve 
a national health service provision. However, once the Labour Party 
had gained its overwhelming victory in June of 1945, discussion and 
negotiation ended h4r Bevan, the newly appointed Minister of 
Health, was now a man with a mission who saw the National Health 
Service as his epitaph. He would brook no opposition no matter 
from whence it came and thus in March 1946 the relevant Bill was 
introduced, passing into law in November of that year. At this point, 
“the BMA exploded and “all-out war” developed between it and the 
government. The battle continued to rage right up until the NHS was 
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actually introduced (Klein, 1995, chap. 1 ;  Timmins, 1996, p. 11 9; Lee 
Potter, 1997, p.27). The issue that nearly sank the whole scheme 
before it got otf the ground revolved around remuneration for GPs, 
although, as is so often the case, there were a number of other 
complicating factors intertwined about this central problem. 
Nevertheless, the question of pay was the focus of the GPs, and 
hence BMA’s, opposition. 
The GPs Place in the Medical Profession 
In order to better understand the reaction of GPs to these 
proposals this section offers a brief outline of the development of the 
general practitioner in the medicai hierarchy For this material, I 
have drawn on standard histories of general practice (cf. Digby, 
i 999; Loudon, 1986; Honigsbaum. 1979). 
In contrast to their physician colleagues who were traditionally 
members of the upper class, the roots of generai practice were very 
much in the lower stratum of acceptable society. It “canied the 
stigma of trade” having arisen from grocers who had evolved into 
apothecaries, “wretch[es] vending poisons” (Loudon, 1986, p~ 173; 
Porter, 1997 p.194) The training was a limited apprenticeship that 
qualified those who completed it only in the dispensing of drugs. 
This reinforced their lowly position in the eyes of professional 
doctors for “the extent to which a doctor freed himself from 
dispensing became the hallmark of professional status” 
(Honingsbaum, 1979 p.2; Loudon, 1986, p.22ff) Not only did the 
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physicians write their prescriptions in Latin, the mark of the 
classically educated gentleman, hut once written they passed it down 
for the apothecaries to dispense. This was so important to physicians 
that even when the Apothecaries Bill of 18 I5  sought to enhance the 
status of the lowly band, the College of Physicians insisted on 
maintaining their right "to compel the 'apothecary' to compound and 
dispense the prescriptions of a physician, whether he wished to or 
not" (Loudon, 1986, pp.20,160). 
The medical elite's position on the upper rungs of the 
developing professional ladder was defended at all costs. Thus, the 
"degraded position of the general practitioner" was due to the self- 
interested actions of the Colleges of Physicians and Surgeons "vhose 
impenetrable opposition was based on naked self interest. Neither the 
medical care of the population as a whole, nor the position of the 
mass of general practitioners concerned the Colleges when they 
considered the supposed threat to their autonomy" (Loudon, 1986, 
p. 188). 
Physicians, and later surgeons, were also in a position to restrict 
their practice to those they liked to consider their social peers, the 
upper classes, leaving the mass of the population to the care of the 
apothecaries, by now developing into something resembling the 
modem GP. In due course, to meet the growing demand that their 
care should include surgical procedures it became necessary for the 
apothecary to acquire skills in this developing science. But even the 
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double qualification of apothecary-surgeon did little to enhance their 
prestige in the elite medical circle. Indeed, developments in medical 
science overtook the embryo “general practitioner” (entitled since 
1858 to be named as such on the Medical Register). More and more 
health care came to be provided in hospitals presided over by 
physicians and surgeons as specialists. They now found it to their 
benefit to offer treatment in those hospitals to the common masses, 
the general practitioners traditional patient population (Lawrence, 
1986, p. 15). Thus, began what has been described as “a terrible gulf 
between hospital doctor and community doctor” (quoted by 
Honingsbaum, 1979, p.2). 
At every turn the GPs saw themselves marginalised by the elite 
medical practitioners, Even the GMC, set up as part of the 1858 
Medical Act, was perceived to be serving the interests of the elite 
over those of GPs. “Although the Presidents of the Council did not 
think that GPs’ interests were neglected, representatives of the BMA 
disagreed’ (Digby, 1999, pp.39,49). 
Although, for periods up to the early years of the last century 
GPs were able to establish a foothold in the hospital sector, it was 
never more than a concession to meet the needs of a particular set of 
circumstances. For example, during the 1920s when the voluntary 
hospital sector was in deep financial crisis, consultants had found it 
expedient to allow GPs to share some hospital facilities. Once the 
crisis was passed, however, their attitude reverted to the more usual 
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hostility Surgeons “were outraged at the inroads GPs had made on 
their speciality” and “made a scathing attack on GPs who had 
strayed’ into their territory Among the consultants only physicians 
held back because they still had to rely on the GP to bear some of the 
day to day workload, such as convalescent care, that would 
otherwise fall on them (Honingsbaum, 1979, p.141). Even this 
accommodation only lasted a few more years and then physicians too 
sought to limit the areas in which GPs could be employed. By the 
1930s GPs were restricted to working in cottage and so-called home 
hospitals leaving the treatment of serious conditions to the specialists 
in the well-equipped hospitals. 
In a chapter entitled ‘Consultants Reject GPs’ Honingsbaum 
(1979, p.301@, shows how, instead of breaking down the traditional 
divisions between elements of the profession, the creation of NHS 
exacerbated them. Although hospitals were critically short of 
doctors and GPs were available to make up the shortage, consultants 
were determined to keep them out at every level of hospital practice. 
Thus, they worked to close the cottage hospitals and even to prevent 
“conscientious UPS” from visiting any of their patients admitted to 
hospital. For various reasons, the primary one accordmg to 
Honingsbaum, being financial, GPs in hospitals were considered a 
menace. Relations grew more distant and cold with the two branches 
of the profession now divided by “an antiseptic barrier” 
(Honingsbaum, 1979, p.302). 
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This intra-professional hostility forced general practice into a 
poor second place compared with hospital based medi~ine.~’ An 
editorial in the Lancet (1950), expressed the situation of general 
practice in these words: 
The Generai Practitioner sees himself being elbowed out of 
hospital, finds himself more isolated from his colleagues in 
specialist and consulting practice 
The core values of autonomy and self-regulation, arising directly 
out of the profession’s ethos, took on a particular form in the general 
practitioner arm of the profession. From their somewhat marginalised 
place GPs came to see their “independent contractor status as a 
means to defend their professional autonomy” (Lewis, 1997). Thus, 
that independence became their own core principle to be defended at 
all costs 
During the run-up to the creation of the NHS it was this 
principie that GPs fought to protect They were increasingly wary of 
efforts to restrict and control them. In their view, at several 
important points the proposed NHS was designed to do just that, so 
they opposed the new service. 
” In a lecture he gaye in January. 2001 Sir Donald Inine, President of the GMC 
spoke of this &vision and described the relationship behveen consultant and GP in 
these words: “The greatly expanded bo<- of consultants was riding high, as they 
were held in awe by patients and. as a group. saw themselves as the elite of 
medicine .... By contrast general praeíice only survived because of the State’s 
statutoq duty to pmlde primary medicai care, and there were serious misgivings 
about its quality and safety It was regarded by specialists as the dustbin of medinne 
where. as Lord Moran, the President of the Royal College of Physicians of London 
said doctors go who haye ’fallen off the consultant ladder’. General practitioners 
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GPs and the NHS 
The GPs’ first area of concern was the proposal that they 
should be paid a salary They feared that if, as the government 
appeared to want, they became salaried employees they would 
merely be c i d  servants under government control. Although 
Bevan’s actual proposal on GP remuneration involved a mixture of 
salary and capitation fees, the BMA saw this as the slippery slope 
leading ultimately to full-time salaried status for ali GPs employed in 
the new Health Centres. This fear was by no means groundless 
inasmuch as Bevan himself had said that he looked forward to 
establishing a full-time salaried service in due course; furthermore, 
since 1934 such a system of payment had been official Labour Party 
policy for all doctors and not just GPs, and the policy had still been 
part of Labour’s plans as late as 1943. 
Other aspects of Bevan’s plans for GPs were equally distressing 
to the profession. Particularly so his intention to control the entry of 
new GPs into areas already well served with GPs, these were usually 
the prosperous ones, plus his aim of preventing doctors from buying 
and selling Practices, To help sugar this latter unpalatable pill, Bevan 
offered the GPs $66 million ili compensation for their losses. The 
other major concern, the so-called “100 per cent issue” that arose 
from the government’s intention to offer 100 per cent health care 
had no vocational training ~ it was not thought necessa-. General practice had no 
I3 1 
coverage under the NHS thereby ending private practice, had been 
resolved before this final round of battles. Although the service 
would be fully comprehensive, covering the whole population, some 
concessions had been won allowing GPs the right to private practice 
alongside their NHS work. 
A Divided Reswnse 
Several elements of the medical profession’s negotiations and 
manoeuvrings are worthy of note in light of that profession’s 
insistence on its over-arching ethical credentials. Looking back on 
those events, one hospital consultant and former chairman of the 
BMA presents the situation as follows: 
the medical profession’s opposition.. .reflected the absolute 
nature of a doctor’s comnutment to an individual 
patient.. .Whenever doctors are face to face with sick patients, 
duiy, ethics and honour demand that no constraint be placed 
upon them by an employer, government or anyone else. They 
must do the best that can be done - even to the extent that it is 
to the doctor’s own detriment . . . .An atíack on professional 
values was detected m [the NHS] Act (Lee-Potter, 1997, 
pp.28,29 emphasis added). 
Here in unequivocal terms, the medical profession is presented 
as having taken a united and, more importantly, an ethical stand on 
the battle line. It was ready to oppose at every turn a scheme that it 
impact upon the culture of medicine” (Lancet, 2001, 358, 1808-11 
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saw as a threat to its professional integrity and, therefore, to the 
well-being of patients Its action was firmly based on the core 
principle of medical ethics, standing in defence of patient’s best 
interests even to its own detriment. This representation is, however, 
open to question. 
Opposition to the specific proposals was by no means universal 
in the profession. Various groups and specialities reacted differently 
to the proposals depending on whether they saw them as enhancing 
or threatening their own particular interests. Hence, once the 
presidents of the Royal Colleges had gained for consultants the 
concession of continuing private practice in NHS “pay-beds”, and 
peer controlled merit awards to top-up basic salaries (an arrangement 
that Bevan summed up in his now famous phrase: “I stuffed their 
mouths with g o l d  (Timmins, 1996, p. 1 Is), they were generally 
supportive of the NHS, so much so that they have been termed its 
midwife. 
On the other hand the BMA, dominated at that time by general 
practitioners, was, for reasons already discussed above, strongly 
opposed almost to the last moment. However, even here the 
opposition was rather specialised. Most GPs were not in a position 
to give up their time to attend meetings, participate in the debate, 
and influence the decisions; this was an option for the affluent few, 
or as Lloyd George had described them on an earlier occasion, “swell 
doctors”, those, in fact, who might be seen as having most to lose 
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from the creation of a comprehensive national health service. 
However, despite desperate efforts from some quarters for the BMA 
to continue its opposition, just a few weeks before the NHS formally 
came into existence, the doctors gave their approval and promised to 
work to make the service a success. 
Notwithstanding these words of support, there is evidence of an 
underlying antipathy to the NHS by leading voices in the medical 
profession long after its birth in 1948. Hence Timmins reports that it 
was not until the mid-1980s that the BMA threw its weight 
unreservedly behind the Service. Prior to that, the Association’s 
support had been half-hearted as evidenced by the fact that even in 
the late 1970s in a paper submitted to the Royal Commission, it had 
argued in favour of refinancing and privatising the system (Timmins, 
1996, p.412). Klein notes, with some surprise, that by 1958 a Gallup 
survey of doctors revealed that “two-thirds of the medical profession 
declared that - &ven a chance to go back ten years to decide whether 
or not the NHS should he started - they would support the creation 
of the service’’ (Klein, 1995, p.29), this cannot be given much weight 
in light of the fact that the details of the survey are missing and the 
profession’s ambivalence is thoroughly documented. 
All in all, the picture that emerges is of’ a profession deeply 
concerned with matters relating to its own well-being. I have already 
mentioned the fight Bevan had to persuade GPs to give up what he 
saw as the “evil” practice of buying and selling patients; Enoch 
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Powell, when Minister of Health in the early 60s commented that all 
doctors ever wanted to talk about was money; Ken Clarke, during 
his encounters with the medical profession castigated them for 
“nervously feeling for their wallets” every time they heard the word 
reform Even the profession itself admitted that its objections to the 
creation of the NHS “could be attributed to concerns over pay; 
Klein reports that many of the civil servants who had had to deal 
with the medical profession in the run-up to the establishment of the 
NHS were left feeling shell-shocked by the encounters. Such was the 
impact of facing doctors in defence of their “rights” that, even 
decades later, civil-servants were reluctant to go through a similar 
experience of doctors’ representatives pounding the table with their 
fists and shouting in unison (Timmins, 1996. pp.467-8, Klein, 1995, 
~ p . 3 8 ~ 4 9 )  
Nevertheless, it is only right to observe that, while the medical 
profession itself appears as selfish as almost all other professions, 
many individuai doctors became prac.titioners for noble reasons, 
genuinely desirous of helping their fellow humans without thought of 
personal gain. Even prior to the NHS when fees were a major, 
sometimes sole, source of income for doctors, GPs practising in the 
poorest industrialised areas, themselves by no means well-off, were 
still known to waive the fees of their even poorer patients (Timmins, 
1996, pp.107-8; Lee-Potter, 1997, p.23; see also Lantos, 1997, 
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pp.19,20). One GP recalls “Some we just didn’t bill because we 
knew they couldn’t pay”. 
Notwithstanding such individual altruism, however, payment for 
service was the only guarantee of receiving medical care; for many it 
was simply beyond their means and they went without. There was a 
vast unmet need for health care that only the arrival of the NHS 
showed up. (Timmins, 1996, p.131). Against this background, the 
opposition of the medical profession seems difficult to understand in 
terms of principalist ethics, and particularly when it is remembered 
that the structure the BMA opposed was, in fact, remarkably similar 
to one the Association had itself outlined, and its membership 
accepted in 1942. The opposition was arising not from clearly 
defined interests and objectives based on “duty, ethics, and honour”, 
but from the complex intra-medical political manoeuvrings, as each 
section of the profession sought to protect its domain and promote 
its interests (Klein, 1995, p.22). 
Despite the pragmatism underlying the inception and creation of 
the SeMce, it is interesting to note that Bevan himself sought to 
present the NHS to the nation in undeniably “moral” terms: health 
care provided for all free at the point of delivery on the basis of need, 
would create a society that was “more wholesome, . .  serene, and 
spiritually healthier” (quoted in Ailsop, 1995, p.28). Set against the 
background of the rather bloody war he was having to wage with the 
medical profession, who saw the project in rather less glowing terms, 
136 
his use of such high-sounding and moral language was well thought 
out. The message seemed to be: “what decent person, let alone a 
health care profession, could oppose such an honourable 
undertaking?” With the “enemy” occupying this moral high ground 
the argument was difficult for the medical profession to refute. 
Eventually they were pacified by the concessions and gave their 
support 
Controllina the NHS 
1948-1 969 
Despite all the early opposition, the NHS has undoubtedly 
become one of Britain’s great institutions, and one that everyone 
with an interest in health care, from professional to politician, must 
be seen to support The public posturing has always been to pay lip- 
service to the NHS. Even Margaret Thatcher, once described as an 
“Iron Lady”, was forced to change her position and publicly pledge 
her allegiance to this service in the now famous, albeit somewhat 
inaccurately reponed, phrase “the NHS is safe in our hands”. 
Webster (1994), notes her actual words as “the National Health 
Service is safe with us” (p.117). But whatever their level of publicly 
voiced support, all governments saw the service as costly and in need 
of control However, control of the NHS was something the medical 
profession saw as its prerogative. 
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Reform of the NHS in one form or another has usually been high 
on the agenda of any and ail governments, no matter their particular 
political hue, with the focus often on the need to improve the 
management of the system. Once the new service had begun to 
operate, Bevan quickly realised the folly of Beveridge’s belief that 
the pool of sickness and disease would shrink as the nation’s health 
needs were addressed. The idea that the population would grow 
healthier, and that as a consequence the cost of the NHS would 
diminish, was soon shown to be naive. Before 1948 was over Bevan 
was having to revise upwards the projected costs for 1948/49 fsom 
€176 million to E225 million. At that time the Minister of Health 
made direct reference to the need to obtain “full value for money”. 
However, he noted that achieving value for money would depend on 
the successful administration of the Service including, as he 
specifically mentioned, eradicating abuse by professionals as well as 
the public (Klein, 1995, p.30). 
Among the compromises necessary in order to bnng the NHS 
into existence was that of its overall structure. Although originally 
the intention had been for a fully integrated service provided locally 
under one overall administrative unit, this idea did not meet with the 
approval ofthe BMA Its response was outrage. GPs were used to 
operating as independent businesses, along the lines of the small 
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shopkeeper, while the majority of hospitals, including the twenty 
English teaching hospitals, were owned and run by voluntary bodies. 
The hospitals operated by local authorities were viewed by 
professional and patient alike as little more than dumping grounds, 
having oíten arisen alongside workhouses and, therefore, carrying 
the stigma attached to those dreaded institutions. Against this 
background, the idea of bringing the whole service under the control 
of local government, making doctors in particular ‘‘mere’’ c i d  
servants, was anathema. In discussing the options for the 
development of health services, Sir Arthur McNalty, then Chief 
Medical Officer, had, in his paper of September 1939, recognised 
that both the nationalisation of hospitals and the development of 
local authority services would be bitterly opposed by the majority of 
the medical profession However, he suggested that of the two 
unwelcome options, doctors would prefer national to local authority 
control. 
The result of the final compromise was not a unified but a 
tripartite structure formulated along existing lines. Local authorities 
were given responsibility for environmental and community health 
services such as child welfare clinics, midwives, health education and 
the like; GPs, dentists? opticians, and pharmacists continued to 
operate as independent practitioners administered, but not managed, 
by executive councils; hospitals services were now administered by 
completely new bodies, regional boards and hospital management 
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committees, with teaching hospitals, the elite of the system, given 
special status and being organised by boards of governors directly 
linked to, and financed straight from, the Ministry of Health. Thus, 
the exalted position of the hospital doctor and particularly the 
consultant was not only preserved but enhanced (Ham, 1992, pp.15- 
17; Levitt eta/ ,  1995, pp.5-7). 
Although the compromise structure covered up the problem of 
controlling the NHS, there was the clear recognition by the political 
masters, as evidenced by Bevan’s own comments in December 1948, 
that the service needed to move íùrther down the road from simply 
being administered to being actively managed with some scrutiny of, 
and hence a degree of control over, health care professionals. It was 
not a suggestion likely to be met with the co-operation of the 
doctors, particularly hospital consultants. Despite their opposition, 
the issue was to re-emerge time and again over the next decades 
reaching its climax in the events of the 1980s. In the meantime, far 
from submitting to what they saw as “outside” control the medical 
profession effectively hijacked the decision-making machinery. 
Allsop lists professional autonomy among the founding principles of 
the NHS. Whether or not this was an overtly stated original 
principle it was in the end, “centrai to the structure and decision 
making in the NHS’ (Allsop, 1995, pp.29,30). On the back of this 
principie, doctors were free to define issues as “medical” and thereby 
place their hands on all the significant levers of control. 
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Clearly, the institutionalised medical voice within NHS 
authorq provided doctors with an opportunrty to medicalise 
management: to deñne issues in terms which would ensure that 
they would represent legttimate, expert auihonties, (Klein, 
1995, pp.51,52). 
The idea that non-medicai personnel should have the major 
decision-malung voice within the health service was abhorrent to the 
medicai profession; decision-making lay outside the management, or 
rather administrative team Consultants claimed the right to total 
freedom in defining needs within their specialism. committing capital 
and revenue expenditure without any significant outside scrutiny. 
This freedom extended well beyond the care of individual patients 
and into the realms of resource allocation and political decision- 
making to the extent that the individual consultant’s clinical freedom 
substantially subverted the priorities determined by the deliberations 
of the body constituted to make those decisions, namely, the health 
authority (Ausop, 1995, pp.I1,312-3). The doctors saw the 
managers, or more accurately administrators, role as supporting and 
assisting the medicai profession in the carrying out its vital and life- 
saving duties (Hamson, 1992, pp.30-55). Any other approach would 
undermine clinical autonomy and could not be tolerated. 
Despite the opposition of the medical profession to outside 
interference, all governments continued to seek ways of more 
effectively managing the system. A plethora of reports were 
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commissioned from 1953 onwards. The first of such, the Guillebaud 
Report, was set up to look at the workings of the NHS during its 
first seven years and in particular to enquire into the costs of running 
the NHS. The Treasury was getting rather concerned at the rising 
costs to the Exchequer of maintaining the service. In any event 
Guillebaud advised more rather than less spending, including a E30m 
capital expenditure programme, and confirmed what Bevan had 
already recognised, namely, that far from being self-limiting the cost 
of the NHS would continue to rise (Timmins, 1996, p.206). 
In assessing the service, the Guillebaud committee also looked at 
the tripartite structure of the NHS, but whilst recognising the 
deficiencies in the system the majority opinion thought organisational 
change impractical at that time. However one member, Sir John 
Maude, a civil servant involved in the formation of the MIS, directly 
attacked the tripartite arrangement with its administrative divorce of 
general and hospital medicine and the consequent overlaps, gaps, and 
confusion this caused. Furthermore, he saw the potential for general 
practice, as well as preventive and social medicine, to slip further 
into the background as hospital medicine took the dominant position 
in the service (Allsop, 1995, p.41). 
Although several reports following Guillebaud pointed out the 
problems inherent in the fragmented organisation of the NHS, it was 
to be twenty years before consideration was given to a major 
restructuring. In the meantime the concerns expressed by Maude 
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were shown to be well-founded. Hospital services, and particularly 
the acute sector, continued to dominate provision of health care. 
Within this context, hospital consultants remained free to provide 
treatment and care for patients according to their independent 
professional judgement, unaccountable to the NHS authorities for 
their clinical and, by extension, spending decisions. The result was 
that the pattern of provision was shaped not by the centre but by the 
periphery and, more significantly, by the strongest elements of the 
periphery, those consultants able to exert the greatest influence. 
These inevitably represented the most prestigious speciaiisms in the 
acute sector such as surgery. Long-stay, chronic services were soon 
classified as the “Cindereiias ‘‘ of the NHS. Neither the doctors 
involved nor their patients were in a position to make themselves 
heard when it came to clamouring for resources. They were simply 
drowned out by the voices of their more powerful colleagues. As 
one Minister of Health observed: “doctors can be remarkably 
selective in choosing the ills they regard worthy of treatment . . . .  No 
one can see better than doctors the.. . .  shortcomings of the service. I 
am not aware that there has been steady, powerful, informed medicai 
pressure to remedy [those] shortcomings” (Klein, 1995, p.73). From 
the great heights of the favoured acute hospital sector the activities 
of community and particularly public health practitioners were 
viewed with some disdain. Many years later, and despite numerous 
143 
efforts to improve their standing, Griffiths termed this sector the 
health service’s “poor relation”. 
Furthermore, initiatives to encourage doctors to take a more 
direct interest in the cost implications of their clinical decisions (for 
example, Priorities and ‘Cogwheel’, see Godber, 1967), did not meet 
with great success. That is not to say. however, that doctors were 
unaware of the resource issues. Very soon after the inception of the 
N H S  they realised that they were now part of a system for rationing 
scarce resources (Klein, 1995, p.36). 
The problems of lack of integration, inefficient use of resources, 
and poor provision for certain patient groups were recognised as part 
and parcel of the same weakness: the system of administrative 
control of the NHS,  in other words, the tripartite structure. By the 
late 196Os, hospital services in Endand and Wales were organised 
under 15 regional hospital boards, 36 boards of governors, 336 
hospital management committees; 134 executive councils 
administered generai practitioners, and 175 local health authorities 
were running community services. The time had come to abandon 
the caution of Guillebaud and attempt a re-structuring. 
In its report of 1962, the Pomtt Committee had recommended 
the formation of area boards under which the other elements would 
be unified. This recommendation, coming as it did from the medical 
profession itself, indicated the extent of the disillusionment with the 
tripartite system for it had originally only come into being in response 
144 
to pressure from that same profession (Levitt et al, 1995, pp.10-Il; 
Allsop, 1995, pp.48, 42; Klein, 1995, p.82). Six years later the 
Labour government, under Kenneth Robinson as Minister of Health, 
published its first Green Paper asking for responses to the proposal 
that health services should be unified under forty or fifty area health 
boards. It was, furthermore, recognised that the ideal arrangement 
would be for health services to be transferred to local government. 
However, knowing the opposition of the medical profession to local 
authority control, the political decision was made not to even include 
this item on the agenda for discussion. 
1969-1 979 
Over the next five years the proposed reorganisation slowly took 
shape The process taking place against a rather confused political 
background, inasmuch as it began under a Labour government with 
the first Green Paper, followed in 1970 by the second Green Paper, 
produced under Richard Crossman as Secretary of State for the 
Department of Health and Social Security It then moved under the 
control of a key Conservative secretary of state. Sir Keith Joseph, 
who published his proposals in 1971 and steered through the White 
Paper and the relevant legislation Finally, in 1974 the reorganisation 
itself took place But in the meantime, the Labour party had been 
returned to power and so the new Secretary of State found herself 
implementing a reorganisation devised by her Conservative 
predecessor 
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Although there had been widespread agreement on the need for 
reform and, apparently, on the general shape of that reform, in the 
end the Conservatives had rejected many of the previous 
administration’s proposals. Consequently, although the 
reorganisation went ahead as planned, by July 1975, Barbara Castle 
set out her own proposals for further, relatively minor, changes. 
However, the reorganisation of 1974 stood as a milestone in NHS 
history. In place of the 700 different authorities involved in running 
the NHS, there were 15 regional health authorities, 90 area health 
authorities usually covering the same geographical area as the local 
authorities, and department district management teams. The great 
teaching hospitais lost their special status, despite loud protests from 
the Royal Colleges, and Community Health Councils were 
established with the aim of giving the consumer some influence over 
the provision and planning of services. 
Both these developments were indicative of a change in attitude 
that was gaining pace even then. Nevertheless, the dominant voice 
was still that of the medical profession and although the protest over 
teaching hospitals was ignored, mainly because the influence of the 
elite consultant group linked to these hospitals had been watered 
down by the expansion in the number of consultants now based in 
the district general hospitals, the views of the profession in general 
were heard and responded to. Hence, although the central aim of the 
1974 reorganisation was unification of the NHS, because this did not 
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accord with the wishes of sections of the medicai profession, it didn’t 
actually happen. General practitioners remained as independent 
businesses under essentially independent family practitioner 
committees. Furthermore, as well as managing their own 
professions’, a representative from the main professions sat on the 
management team of each of the three tiers of administration: 
district, area and region. 
The aim was to create consensus management; at every level, 
every interest was built into the formai structure of the organisation 
thus the enormous power of the medical profession would be diluted 
and a common purpose would guide the decision-making. However, 
in practice this was an illusion. Although doctors might be prepared 
to sit on these bodies, ostensibly as part of a team, the profession as 
a whole simply refused to be managed. The great reorganisation had 
not altered one fundamental aspect of the NHS; it continued to be “a 
giant state organisation controlled simultaneously by Whitehall and 
thirty thousand doctors” (Strong & Robinson, 1990, pp. 18- 20) 
Alongside the reorganisation another battle was in progress 
within the NHS. It was actually being fought on two different, albeit 
closely related issues: the abolition of NHS pay beds, and consultants 
contracts. The pay beds issue had come to the fore as a Labour 
manifesto pledge; the dispute over contracts had been inherited from 
Keith Joseph’s time. Barbara Castle recalls that her negotiations with 
consultants to separate private practice from the NHS by phasing out 
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pay beds were "complicated by the fact that the consultants were 
pressing for a new contract to cover their services with the NHS". 
She then notes that "they were in an ugly mood" and %ere very near 
to downing tools" (Castle, 1993, p.481). 
The medical profession was, indeed, bristling with anger. The 
resulting confrontation was "the most bitter political struggle since 
the inception ofthe NHS (Klein, 1995, pp,106,110). On both sides 
the battle was presented as a moral crusade. The politicians, for 
whom pay beds had not been an issue over many years, suddenly re- 
discovered it as a fundamental principle. Social justice demanded that 
the traders be driven out of the temple of the NHS. The consultants 
were equally determined to present their position as a defence of 
their independence and thus the only safeguard of patients best 
interests, in reality, both groups were motivated as much by self- 
interest as anything more honourable. Unrest in the NHS unions 
over pay beds, comprising less than one percent of the total number 
of NHS beds; led the politicians to calculate that the policy of doing 
nothing would on this occasion be more politically expensive than 
actually addressing the problem They decided to act (Timmins, 
1996, pp.331-335, Klein, 1995, pp.107-8). The consultants also 
made a political calculation and decided that defence of their 
independence, itself a rather fragile symbol inasmuch as most were 
well and truly dependent on the NHS for the major part of their 
income, was, nevertheless, so vital that they would have to take 
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industrial action. Very soon junior doctors and GPs were making 
their own threatening noises. In December 1974 the medical 
profession flexed and then used its industrial muscle. 
In her account of this fraught time, Barbara Castle recalls that 
one aspect she found most interesting about the battle with the 
consultants was that they had no desire to get rid of the NHS, it was 
their bread and butter, but it was simply that on top of the butter 
‘they wanted a liberal serving of private practice jam”. The 
independence for which they were fighting, as she saw it, was 
freedom to give priority to their private patients while allowing their 
NHS patients to wait for treatment (Castle, 1993, p.483). The 
consultants’ chief negotiator, Anthony Grabham, made clear that 
although his instincts lay with the NHS, his desire to protect the 
interests of doctors was stronger. He was, therefore, determined to 
safeguard private practice. 
The long, acrimonious, confrontation finally came to an end. 
Behind the back of the Secretary of State, with whom the consultants 
refused to continue negotiating having, in the words of Lord 
Goodman chief mediator in the dispute, “developed a positively 
insensate hatred’, the Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, was persuaded 
to meet the doctors. “Punch-dmnk with economic problems. ... 
Harold.. , .was ready to sue for peace with any vested interest’’ (ibid. 
p.484). After further to-ings and fro-ings an exhausted compromise 
was reached. The immediate result was the formal recognition by 
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the Government that doctors should continue private practice 
alongside their NHS work with the majority of pay beds only phased 
out gradually. 
If this immediate outcome was a victory for the consultants the 
longer term legacy was, in the opinion of many observers as well as 
those closely involved in the dispute, far less positive for the 
profession as a whole. Its moral authority had taken a severe knock. 
The oft repeated claim that doctors put patients interests above 
everything else, even to their own detriment, was shown to be false. 
Doctors had used naked coercion, had been prepared to harm ‘?heir“ 
patients, in order to pursue their own objectives. Although many 
individual doctors had been horrified at the actions of their 
profession, and following the events just described membership of 
the BMA dropped sharply, the fact remained that the medicai 
profession had pursued its claim as ruthlessly as any other group. 
Thus, while Klein reassuringly claims that the consensus survived this 
experience, battered but essentially intact, perhaps Timmins’s 
suggestion that the seed for the end of consensus had been sown, 
would appear to be more accurate (Klein, 1995, p. 112; Timmins, 
1996, p.340). A new political administration was waiting in the 
wings, one that dismissed conciliation and compromise as, in the 
words of its leader Margaret Thatcher, “government by ‘bendy 
toys”’. Among these politicians, the determination and the power 
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demonstrated by the medical profession’s trade union raised serious 
questions. 
One of the aims of the 1974 reorganisation had been the more 
effective management of the service. And yet, as already noted, 
doctors remained stubbornly resistant to any external management, 
In practice all formal organisational arrangements had been designed 
specifically to leave doctors free from day to day management. So 
although they were involved in the decision-making process as 
members of the team, the profession itself was rarely the subject of 
the decisions the team made (Harrison ef a/,  1992, pp.23,24; 
Harrison, 1988). One regional director described NHS management 
at that time as ‘>just a talk-shop, a devilish waste of money. Nobody 
took on the clinicians” (Strong & Robinson, 1990, p.66). However, 
as the seventies drew to a close the idea that the most powerful 
group within the NHS, namely, clinicians, should remain outside 
effective management control was increasingly perceived to be 
detrimental to the well-being of the service as a whole. In the new 
political climate created by the Thatcher administration the notion 
was about to be vigorously challenged. 
1979-1 993 
During the 1980s the Government introduced a series of radical 
changes in the way public services as a whole were managed. The 
term “new public management” has been applied to these changes 
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(Hood, 1991). The main characteristics of this type of public 
management were: 
hands-on professional management; 
explicit standards and measures of performance; 
output controls; 
decentralisation; 
competition and mixed provision; 
private sector based models of management; 
emphasis on economy in resources. 
(Talbot, 1994, pp. 1,2). 
After setting out these criteria, Talbot goes on to quote the 
Head of the Home Civil Service Sir Robin Butler’s re-assurance, that 
alongside these changes there is also an “agenda for continuity” with 
the need to strengthen the traditional ethical values of fairness, 
probity and equity in public service, “the essential values and ethics 
that make our system work”. The language used in relation to the 
changes that were about to take place within the NHS, even in the 
titles of many of the government papers, reveals a similar effort to 
maintain the myth of guiding ethics and building on underlying moral 
values. 
Inheriting as it did a Royal Commission report on the NHS the 
new Conservative government carried out a not insignificant but, in 
the light of what was to come, relatively minor reorganisation in 
1982. This removed the middle tier of the NHS structure, namely, 
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the area health authorities. During this period, doctors won a further 
round in their ongoing and protracted negotiations with government. 
The issue of consultants’ contracts was finally settled very much in 
the doctors’ favour with increased opportunities to top up their NHS 
salaries through private practice. There was also an interesting little 
concession granted to GPs: they were now allowed to employ their 
wives as secretaries and assistants. All previous ministers had refused 
this arrangement considering it too open to abuse. Such 
developments must have given the medical profession at least, 
grounds for cautious optimism as it contemplated the future. If such 
was the case the optimism soon disappeared and the profession 
found itself embroiled in the fiercest battle it had ever had to wage. 
Although Kelly and Glover reject the notion that the changes 
that occurred in the NHS during the 1980s were revolutionary in 
nature and Webster documents a long-standing animosity toward the 
NHS felt by virtually all Conservative administrations (Webster, 
1997, p.54ff: Kelly & Glover, 1996, p.29), many other analysts have 
described much of what happened during those years in terms of a 
revolution. Harrison and Wood (1998) discuss the periods of change 
i have described, as a movement away from what they term the 
blueprint approach with its policy/action dichotomy to ‘Yhe bright 
idea” approach that begins with a sketchy outline with specific 
action developed on the hoof once the bright idea has become policy. 
The creation of the NHS falls firmly into the first category whereas, 
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as the authors make clear, the Griffiths and related reforms are most 
decidedly in the second. The proposals and the policies arising from 
them have been called “the assault on the old ways”, “a huge and 
perhaps irrevocable change”, “radical”, and “a major new direction” 
(Strong & Robinson, 1990, pp.S,27; Levitt et aí, 1995, pp.24, 31), 
and Harrison et al, (1992) identi% the creation of general manager 
posts and the emphasis on sanctions and incentives as performance 
motivators as “crucial potential breaks with the past”. In setting out 
the details of the unfolding drama both Klein and Timmins cannot 
but help convey the sense of something revolutionary happening 
within the Welfare System as a whole and the NHS in particular 
(Klein, 1995, p.176K Timmins, 1996, p.453fl) 
The first hint of the practical application of the new 
managerialism to the NHS was spelled out in a series of White 
Papers bearing titles that seemed designed to chime in with the core 
ethical principle of health care providers, namely that care of patients 
is the prime consideration. Thus, I’utients First (DHSS, 1979), 
although written before the period of major reform, advocated a 
simplification and streamlining of management by the removal of the 
Area tier. Following the Gnffiths Report (1983), ‘bhich marked the 
beginning of the NHS’s managerial revolution” (Klein, 1995, p. 13 i), 
the Government sent out Circular HC (84) 13 @HSS 1984), 
informing Health Authorities of the Secretary of State’s intention to 
appoint General Managers. The aim was more effective decision- 
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making through “tighter control and less ambiguity of purpose” 
(Levitt et al, 1995, p,24). Then came Workzngfor Patients (DOH 
1989), which took the Griffiths reforms a stage further with the 
creation of the internal market The purchaser and provider roles 
were to be separated with health care providers, both hospitals and 
community services, becoming autonomous trusts competing with 
each other to sell their services to the health authority purchasers; 
general practitioners, above a certain size, would also be given 
control of their own budget out of which they would purchase 
services for their patients. Other reforms set out in this paper 
involved strengthening lines of accountability. giving managers 
greater control over consultants, with consultants’ contracts 
negotiated at local level between Trust and consultant, and managers 
having more say in merit awards paid to consultants; furthermore, 
medical audit was to be extended throughout the NHS 
Despite the revolutionary nature of these changes, by 1993, 
further efforts to simplify the higher levels of NHS management 
structure were underway. Managing the New NHS (1993), outlined 
further reforms: merging DHAs and FHCAs, abolishing RHAs in 
England, and streamlining NHSME All these changes met a 
powemil response from the medical profession as will be discussed 
in the next chapter. 
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Summary 
This chapter has explored the attitude and approach of the 
leaders of the medical profession to the creation and management of 
the NHS. The intention was to uncover the interests and concerns 
that fuelled the profession’s responses. Setting the actions of various 
factions within medicine alongside those of the related political 
intrigues has been illuminating. 
The political decisions were the product of the tensions between 
that which was ideologically desirable, economically possible, and 
politically expedient. Medicine claimed, and claims still, a different 
approach to its decision-making: “medicine is a profession 
which . . . .  marches to a different drummer than most other 
occupations” bound by the demands of duty, ethics, and honour 
(Lee-Potter, 1997, pp.28,29). But this chapter has shown that this is 
another part of the profession‘s mythology that helps to maintain its 
prestige and status in the eyes of the general public. It is not 
grounded in the reality of their actual record particularly when that 
record deals with threats, real or imagined, to the profession’s 
position and power. Thus, the profession’s response was true to its 
ethos with each section working to protect their own interests and 
the profession as a whole manoeuvring to establish effective control 
over whatever structures were put in place to manage the Service. 
It might be argued that the profession’s response to these events 
was untypical and exceptional because it genuinely feared, in the 
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first instance, that the NHS was an institution that was going to 
undermine health care in the UK and, in the second, that government 
was about to dismantle the Service it had over the intervening 
decades come to love This argument deserves further examination, 
so this part of the study will end by exploring in closer detail day to 
day values typically linked to management to  see how comfortably 
they sit under the umbrella of the medical ethos 
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Chapter 4 
Values in Conflict? 
Be a physician. Faustus, heap up gold, 
And be eterna'd for some wondrous cure 
Marlove, I k t o r  haustus. Act 1, Sc I, line 14 
Doctors have aiways got this sense of their 
own importance and seií importance and how 
wonderful they are and now they control the 
money as well. 
A reluctant fundholder, 1996 
This chapter will compare and contrast some of the key values in 
medicine and health care management. It will then move on to look 
at areas of perceived conflict between medicine and management 
and at the impact of such conflict on those who took on the dual 
responsibilities of management and practitioner 
Medicine and Business 
"Medicine is a noble profession but a damn bad business". 
Perhaps in that phrase (quoted by Lee-Potter, 1997, title page), Sir 
Humphrey Rolleston draws attention to what many will see as the 
real difference between medicine and business management 
While within, for example, academic circles, it may be 
recognised that management per se is not synonymous with business, 
traditionally, management and business are closely allied as indicated 
by the fact that management ethics is generally thought of as a 
business subject (Snell, 1993, p.xi). Management is linked to 
business and business is about money and specifically the making of 
profit. Medicine should not be seen as concerned with interests of 
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business. Amongst medical staff, Fisher and Best (1995), found a 
“very negative attitude” toward the business management role 
(p.48). Digby noted that “’the economic history of medicine is a 
strangely neglected field; relatively little is known as yet about ... the 
business side of medical practice”, and suggested “one reason for this 
may have been the emphasis given by an older tradition of medical 
historiography to a history of great men, clinical advances, and 
notable institutions’’ (Digby, 1994, p. i).  Thus, part of the mythology 
of medicine is that it stands above such base interests as money, Yet 
the NHS Reforms appeared to force onto the Service and its 
dominant profession, medicine, this interlinked trio of management, 
business, and money. 
Around the core objective of running a successful business 
Drucker (1988. p.27f), has identified seven functions of management. 
They centre on having clear objectives, devising practices and 
standards for meeting those objectives, and making all involved 
accountable for their practice in relation to those objectives. These 
functions are based on standards suited to running commercial 
enterprises such as the supermarket and the factory. In this context, 
management was the intimate and obvious bedfellow of business and 
there was a strong resistance, both within the profession and among 
the wider population, to that type of management operating so 
intimately within the NHS and especially the practice of medicine. 
This chapter begins by analysing the validity of this concern. 
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From empathy to economics 
For centuries the family was the first line of defence against 
illness; care of the sick and much of the healing, the domain of 
women. “The art of healing was linked to the tasks and the spirit of 
motherhood; it combined wisdom and nurturance, tenderness and 
skill” “The family was natural source of care for the sick, and within 
the family such care fell to women”. “Women practised medicine as a 
domestic art” (Ehrenreich & English, 1979 p.30; Nelson & Nelson, 
1995, p.6; Witz, 1992, p.77). In time, as communities grew and 
became more structured such ministrations were supplemented by 
the help of a person particularly skilled in dealing with sickness, for 
example the wise-woman or, more significantly, the shaman (Porter, 
1997, pp.30-33) but also noble women and wives of clergy who have 
been described as ‘the unofficial doctors of the village’ (Witz, 1992, 
p.77). 
Thus. ‘kith settlement and literacy conditions were ripe for the 
development of medicine as a belief-system and an occupation” 
(Porter, 1997, p.33). An occupation is pursued, certainly in part, for 
some financial return, as Plato observed of the charges made by 
physicians of his time: “Unless pay is added to it there would be no 
benefit to the craftsman, and consequently he would be unwilling to 
go to the trouble of taking care of the troubles of others” (Plato). In 
due course medical practitioners sought, and even fought to be more 
than an a mere occupation. They wanted to become a profession. 
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This whole movement took medicine away from a women- 
centred provision of care within the home to a man-dominated 
medical profession and made it a business, a commodity to  be bought 
and sold: 
The historical antagonist of the female lay healer was the male 
professional,. . . A  profession is.. . . .defined by its exclusiveness, 
and has been since the professions of medicine and law first 
took form in medteval Europe . . . .  While the female lay healer 
operated within a network of information-sharing and mutual 
support, the male professional hoarded up his knowledge as a 
kind of property, to be dispensed to wealthy patrons or sold on 
the market as a commodity His goal was not to spread the 
skills of healing, but to concentrate them within the elite 
interest group which the profession came to represent.., 
Medicine in  the nineteenth c e n t i q  wa.r bring drown into the 
morkefpkic~,  brcrimrng - as were needles, or ribbons, or salt 
already - n thing to hr bought ond wid (Ehrenreich & 
English, 19979, p 30, emphasis added) 
It can be protested that this picture is based on the North 
American situation where medicine is historically far more 
commercially oriented. In Britain the development was motivated 
less by avarice and more by altruism. If this is the case, it is only so 
up to  a point.j4 It was the European, and particularly the British, 
In their study. Ehrenreich and English argue that the means by which American 
"regular" doctors achimed their exclusive professional status were mainly economic 
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model of the prestigious medical professional. and specifically the 
University trained physician, as against the mere surgeon and 
apothecary, that made a powerful impression on American medical 
students fortunate enough to be able to spend a few years of their 
medical studies in Britain and Europe. Thus, it was that the young 
Benjamin Rush, who in time was to become “the America 
Hippocrates”, found in Europe “his status as a medical graduate gave 
him access to the cream of London and Parisian salon society”. 
Once Rush and his medical student colleagues, had glimpsed, albeit 
briefly, the heights to which the profession of medicine could aspire 
they, unsurprisingly, urged their fellow practitioners t o  adopt the 
European model (Porter, 1997, p.266; Ehrenreich & English, 1979, 
pp.37, 38). 
Witz ( I  992, pp.77-79), identifies the general movement toward 
a more market based provision of medical services as one of the key 
developments in the demise of the female medicai practitioner. 
Lawrence (1996), in her study of voluntary hospitals and medical 
teaching in eighteenth century London, observed that : 
and indeed very different from some of the methods used in Bntain and the rest of 
Europe There. they contend the developing medical profession took full advantage 
of the witch hunts to remove “the great mass of female healers”. “The witch trials 
established the male physician on a moral and intellectual plane vastly above the 
female healer. It placed on the side of God and Law. a professional on a par with 
lawyers and theologians, while it placed her on the side of darkness. evil and magic” 
(pp.34. 35). This assessment is disputed Although the ability to cure or heal was 
taken as the sign of a witch, Porter states that “there is little evidence .... that female 
healers were charged with witchcraft”. He notes, however, that upwards of 5MM) 
victims, mainly women. were tortured and executed during the witch-craze (Porter. 
1997, pp.128. 130). 
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the catch-all operations of supply, demand, and market price. . .  
apply just as well to the "medical market-piace". People 
bought and sold medical goods, from drugs to books and 
medicai services, from a local woman's nursing care, to an 
elite physician's advice or a practitioner's course of lectures, 
as cash commodities b.6). 
Noting, furthermore, that throughout the entire period covered 
by her study, women only appear as patients, the relatives or kends  
of patients, or marginal servants, she comments: 
Public hospital medicine thus contrasted overtly with pnvate 
domestic medicine, in a way that reinforced the dominant piace 
of male pradrtioners as those in charge . , . of what happened to 
the sick and mjured but also of how that appeared in the 
medical literature b.28). 
Alongside these changes to  a public profession Lawrence found 
a range of coexisting values and motives in the medical practitioners 
of the eighteenth century (La\vrence 1996, p.36). By donating their 
medical services to the newly developing charitable institution 
practitioners gained professional and social status as well as cash 
benefits (Digby, 1994, p.4). Nevertheless, alongside the self-interest 
there was also altruism, a care for the patients motivated by genuine 
concern Likewise, hospital organisers wanted their institutions run 
like businesses, accruing immediate and long-term social profits, with 
efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability; yet these goals were 
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pursued in the context of ensuring that the poor and needy received 
care and shelter under their roof, 
Freidson, in reporting various studies into the reasons for 
present day students taking up medicine, found a similar mix of 
motives and values, some altruistic, some more avaricious. Service 
orientation was important to a number of those interviewed. Many 
individuals took up medicine out of a deep concern for the well- 
being of their fellow humans and an unquestionable desire to help 
those who suffer. The “opportunity to be helpful to others” and 
“being of service” were among the values espoused by many aspiring 
medical students. However, those same studies also noted that public 
service values were not as widespread among the students as might 
be popularly imagined, and other values, described as “more 
characierisiic of the businessman” were also well represented, 
including the desire to achieve status and a high financial return 
(Freidson, 1970, pp. 172-178 emphasis added). Thus, the practice of 
medicine as a profession combines a number of contrasting, even 
conflicting values. 
A Place for Profit? 
Although the NHS removes the direct exchange of money 
between consumer and provider, the notion that health care in the 
UK is untainted by contact with money or, even worse, profit, is 
quite erroneous. Many consultants, alongside their NHS work, run a 
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business, a private practice for profit. Even within the NHS, as I 
have already noted, private pay beds were a concession granted to 
consultants in order to gain their support for the Service and one 
they fought to protect. No part of Duties (?fa Ihctor. described by 
Lee-Potter as the GMC’s “ethical bible” (Lee-Potter, 1997, p.29), or 
BMA codes of conduct, forbids doctors from making money out of 
selling their skills. Profit itself is not immoral, nor is it professionally 
unethical, otherwise how could any doctor in any situation practice 
for profit without the GMC taking action? Yet doctors have 
traditionally sought to hide this motivation for practice. 
Writing of general practice in the mid- 1800s Digby ( 1999), 
comments: 
Business sentiments . . .  were the bottom line for survival in 
generai practice. But the gentlemanly pretensions of the 
Brbish medical profession meant that those were seldom 
articulated; elevated medical ideais were seen as respectable 
aims, but mercenary realities as shameful, even dishonourable 
objectives b.95) 
The situation is no different today. At the heart of the NHS are 
GPs, the gate-keepers to the service. Yet GPs operate as private 
businesses, the “small shopkeepers” of healthcare within the UK 
(Seedhouse, 1994, p.20; Kelin, 1995, p.202). Good business 
practices, especially balancing the books and remaining solvent, are 
important. Thus, far from considering business values as inherently 
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antagonistic to the NHS values, GPs have fought hard to protect 
their status as independent small businesses. In their view, patient 
welfare was tied into protecting this status. GPs’ saw their 
independence as the only way to maintain their clinical freedom and 
prevent excessive State interference, thereby protecting patients’ 
interests. 
Indicative of the importance of sound business practice to GPs, 
is the content ofjournais such as Medecorzomics. In any copy picked 
at random there will be articles offering very practical business 
advice on topics such on good management practice. How to 
control practice costs, where to get the best insurance deals, Internet 
Banking, and columns devoted to answering questions on personal 
and Practice finance are all suitable issues to address to its general 
practitioner readership (a typical example Medeconomics vol. 20. no. 
11). 
One GP interviewed for a medical advice television programme 
explained the situation of the GP Practice very clearly as follows: “A 
Practice has to be a business; you have to balance the books, We are 
small business men and the money we take home is what is left after 
we have paid the expenses” (Moss, 1998). 
An article in Pulse (Winchester, 1998), showed that 
consideration of the financial implications of failure to meet 
government set targets on immunisation and screening is common 
among GPs. Alongside discussion of other areas of concern 
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following an, at that time, recent “screening scare” it reported 
Richard Winder, deputy national co-ordinator of the screening 
programme, as saying “he did not expect the scares to threaten GP 
target pay”. The report continued by pointing out that “the latest 
data available . . . .  showed 90% of GPs were achieving the higher 
target payment for 80% coverage. “We will be . . . .  working hard to  
avoid any drop in uptake which is currently running at around 85 per 
cent”. 
In similar vein, a Scottish GP commented adversely on the very 
different financial inducements offered to  their English GP 
colleagues. Scottish GPs were not given payment for ‘flu 
vaccinations nor did they have the freedom to make a profit on the 
purchase of the vaccination. In her view, this anomaly should be 
changed as “this would encourage GPs to ensure that the at risk 
populations were vaccinated’ (Doctor. 1999b, p. 1 i 1 ). 
The Royal College of General Practitioners, in its guidance to 
GPs on the subject of removing patients from GP lists (RCGP), 
advises its members that although it would not normally be 
justifiable, patients who “refuses cervical screening, declines the 
immunising of the children, and does not comply with therapeutic or 
other health advice” can be removed from the GP’s list. 
Commenting on the fact that some parents have been removed 
from a doctors list because they refused to vaccinate their children 
Dr Moss (i998), candidly observed: “I’m sure patients are removed 
i 61 
From doctor’s lists in some cases because of financial reasons . . . .  i n  my 
Practice we have three doctors and for us, if we hit all our targets, 
[vaccinating 90% of child patients] we can make about 15000 
[pounds], if we do it perfectly. That’s not to be sneezed at”. In other 
words, the need to balance the books can, on occasion, influence the 
doctor’s relationship with the patient. 
This admission contrasts with the explanation offered by a 
spokesman for the BMA when asked to comment on the RCGP’s 
guidance. He explained that as the doctor-patient relationship is 
voluntarily entered into on the basis of trust, more akin to a 
fnendship, the refusal to accept medical advice and treatment 
indicated a breakdown in that trust, a breakdown in the fnendship. 
In such a circumstance, the doctor may feel she or he has no 
alternative but to remove the patient from their list (Goss, 1998). 
Here the College’s advice to its members was justified to the general 
public on the familiar principalist ethical grounds, namely, the nature 
of the doctor-patient relationship. Financial considerations were not 
mentioned perhaps because, as in the case with the 19th century 
practitioners of Digby’s study (1999, p .99 ,  they might present the 
wrong image. 
Whilst it would be inaccurate to say that financial and business 
concerns are paramount in the mind of most doctors, it is equally 
inaccurate to present the practice of medicine, even within the 
context of the NHS, as above any interest in such matters. Klein 
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describes the belief that the NHS divorced the practice of medicine 
from money as “perhaps one of the most important founding myths 
of the NHS” (Klein, 1995, p. 195) And although doctors may assert, 
as did one of the GPs I interviewed for this research, that they know 
precisely where to draw the line in order to ensure that patients’ 
interests are protected at all times, this too is an ideal, or even, one 
of the most important myths of modern medical practice rather than 
an everyday reality 
The influence of values other than the values of the formal 
explicit professional medical ethics, including those more commonly 
associated with business, may be less obvious in the case of the 
doctor than the manager, nonetheless the influence is, and always has 
been there It rises from the profession’s ethos, its fundamental moral 
tone, reaches into the heart of modern medical ethics, and the 
doctor-patient relationship with its values of patients best interests 
and clinical autonomy 
Core Medical Values 
Patients’ Best Interests 
“Make the care of your patient your first concern” (GMC, 1995, 
inside cover). This. according to the GMC, lies at the heart of the 
tmst patients vest in their doctor. The so-called core values of 
commitment, caring, compassion, competence, integrity, 
confidentiality, responsibility, advocacy, and even spirit of enquiry 
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(BMA, 1995, quoted by Allen, 1997a, p.3), can be seen as embedded 
in this primary statement of duty. 
Despite the expectation that the doctor acts as the ‘‘perfect 
agent” (Mooney. 1992, pp. 28, 29. 79, SO), for each patient, that is 
to say takes no account of interests and values other than those of 
the patient, in practice the medical practitioner is, to a greater or 
lesser extent, pressed to consider a number of interests and values 
other than those of the individual patient. These can include 
professional or academic interests such as might arise if the doctor is 
involved in clinical trials or research, business interests especially in 
cases of fees for service and where some aspect of the service is 
sponsored by a medical supplies or drugs company, personal political 
interests and those imposed on the doctor as a representative of the 
state (Sheaf, 1996, pp.104-5,i i 1). Many of these interests 
potentially conflict with that which is presented as the doctors “first 
concern,” namely, patients’ interests. 
Patients Best Interests and the Doctor-Pharmaceutical Relationship 
There is a “close alliance between doctors and the 
pharmaceutical industry” (Kelleher et a/, 1994, p ix), that has been 
strengthened and enhanced by each new pharmacological 
development. 
The relationship between the pharmaceutical companies and the 
medical profession is, unsurprisingly, of special importance to the 
industry. Sales of medical drugs amount to $300 billion a year and in 
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1996, the average profit margins of the ten largest drugs firms was 
30% (lhe bGxmornrsí, supplement, 1998). It is in the interests of the 
large pharmaceutical firms to influence doctors to use particular 
products produced by these firms and they have become highly 
skilled at exerting this intluence, often in rather subtle ways. The 
nature of this relationship is one that, nevertheless, raises concerns in 
the context of patients’ best interests. Particularly so as evidence 
suggests that it can even lead to the medicalisation of what might 
otherwise be seen as a “normal” human condition. 
For example, the vast increase in demand for fertility treatment 
is now an industry worth $2 billion a year, Once a couple is classified 
as infertile, and that can happen if they have not managed to 
conceive after just 12 months, they become suitable candidates for 
expensive fertility treatment. A television report exploring this issue 
ended with these words: “This baby boom is all about science 
becoming big-business and business is booming” (Channel 4). 
Within the üK, fertility treatment is linked to ability to pay and is 
thus, in many areas, only available “to privileged women” (Lupton, 
1994, p.160). The whole issue is one that has raised considerable 
concern among feminist scholars ( cf. Sherwin, 1992). 
Hence, whilst the doctors’ ethical code is meant, among other 
things, to assure patients that clinical and not economic objectives 
guide the doctor’s decision, the ‘invisible hand’ of market-based 
pressures may be subverting that protection (Evans, 1981, p.337). 
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Patients’ Best Interests and Consumer Demand 
Doctors themselves point out that patients can put them under 
pressure to prescribe a treatment or order a procedure because it is 
expected by, rather than specifically indicated for, the particular 
patient. The vagaries of ‘consumer demand’ are seen, by doctors at 
least, as putting the clinician under increasing pressure to act, not 
according to her or his best professional judgement of patient 
interest, but on the basis of the patient’s insistence on receiving a 
treatment about which the patient has heard. One doctor-directed 
journal carrying an information poster advertised it as follows: “Are 
you tired of patients demanding antibiotics when they just aren’t 
appropriate? Use our patient information poster to cut down on 
your wasted time” (Pvlse, 1998, p 1 ; Gabe ri al, 1994, p. 186). 
This assessment appears, however, to be very much a matter of 
perspective, for research indicates that rather than increased 
consumer demand for drugs the mood over the last couple of 
decades has shifted more towards a questioning of what is seen by 
patients to be the doctors’ over-enthusiasm for the routine use of 
prescriptions. There is among patients “a pervasive anti-drug 
culture”, in relation to prescribed medication, linked, according to 
the authors of the research, to a more conservative moral order that 
includes self-reliance along with autonomy and personal freedom 
(Gabe & Bury, 1996 pp.76,90; Calnan & Williams 1996, p.40). 
Other research suggests that while doctors may interpret patients 
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needs and expectations in terms of a prescription for antibiotics, what 
patients themselves often actually want is information and 
reassurance (Butler et a/, 1998, pp 637-642) 
Patients’ Best Interests and the Common Good 
It is not difficult to  see that the emphasis on what Veatch terms 
“traditional Hippocratic individualism” (quoted in Mooney, 1992, 
p.86) sits rather uncomfortably with the more ‘common good’ 
community-wide approach that must underpin the health care 
managers’ decision making. Wall sets out rather well what is still 
widely perceived to be this fundamental difference: 
managers are unable to return to the safety of the Hippocratic 
oath which endorses the supreme right of every single patient 
to expect that their physician will always act unambiguously in 
their interest (Wall, 1995 p i). 
Here then seems to be a direct conflict: one that would, at least 
theoretically. create ethical problems for those undertaking any dual 
role as practitioner and manager Once again, however, an analysis of 
the situation shows the everyday reality as rather less antagonistic, 
To begin with, any potential conflict arises not between an ethical 
and an unethical set of values but rather from different sets of ethical 
positions. The deontological tradition is ostensibly the one from 
which medicine draws its ethical principles. “Duty” for the doctor is 
duty to her or his patients, “patients’ best interests” is the over-riding 
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consideration 35 The manager’s guiding principles are derived from a 
utilitarian ethics, one that emphasises the common good. 
In determining which ethical position should dominate decision- 
making within the NHS it is worth remembering that the service was 
founded on collectivist, utilitarian principles. Yet, as Mooney 
observes, even when the BMA in its Handbook OfMedical bJthics 
acknowledges a general duty on the part of the doctor ‘Yo advise on 
[the] equitable allocation and efficient utilisation” of resources, this is 
subordinated to the “professional duty to the individual who seeks 
his clinical advice” (Mooney, 1992, p.86). Quoting Jonsen and 
Hellegers, Mooney asserts that the individualistic “patient’s best 
interest” emphasis is flawed and argues with some vigour for the 
inclusion of considerations of the “common good’ in contemporary 
medical ethics, The BMA’s position appears to be endorsed by the 
GMC in its guidance on good medical practice. Thus. in its outline 
of good standards of practice and care the emphasis is on the care of 
the individual patient, no mention is made of concern for utilisation 
of resources apart from the one smail reference in the body of the 
text which simply reads “pay due regard to efficacy and the use of 
resources” (GMC, 1995, p.3). 
35 In deciding on the best treatment for the individual patient. however. the doctor 
uses consequentiaiist reasoning. asking what treatment will produce the best 
consequences, the greatest utili@. for my paiient. Nevertheless the central 
underpinning moral principle is deontological: duty to the hdwidual patient 
regardiess of consequences beyond the needs ofthat individual patient (Vang, 1988, 
p.140). 
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Despite these clear statements on the overriding moral 
obligation of the doctor to her or his individual patient, it is 
interesting to note that Gillon (1988), a leading medical ethicist and 
editor of one of the definitive works on medical ethics, dismisses as a 
mere simplistic stereotype, the notion that doctors always put the 
interests of the individual patient first. Using examples from his own 
clinical experience, he shows that in practice doctors recognise 
competing moral claims and take these into account in their decision- 
making. Accordingly, the assumption that the interests of the 
individual patient always take precedence over the interests of others 
is not only “intuitively somewhat implausible” hut “when clinical 
examples are adduced even more impossible”. Thus, he declares: 
“there need not be and should not be any unbridgeable moral chasm 
between medical ethics and health care economics” (pp. 114-1 15). In 
other words, in this essential area, the core value of the doctor’s 
practice does not conflict with values of the common good 
underpinning much of the decision-making of the manager because 
doctors do not recognise it as overriding. 
Gillon’s contention appears to contradict the apparently 
unambiguous statements from both the GMC and the BMA on what 
constitutes ethical conduct. It is also at variance with a belief held by 
many doctors. Although Gillon is only prepared to acknowledge 
that this “simplistic stereotype” is held by some doctors he 
introduces a quote from Levinsky as follows: 
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Levinsky probably wntes for many doctors in stating:.. 
‘physicians are required to do everything that they believe may 
benefit each patient without regard to costs or other societal 
considerations. in caring for an individual patient the doctor 
must act solely as that patient’s advocate, against the apparent 
interests of society as a whole, if necessary’ (ibid. p. 11 5). 
It would seem reasonable to assume that as this value is centrai 
to  both the codes of the GMC and BMA and is enjoined on all 
doctors, Gillon’s assertion that only some doctors hold to this value 
is probably an understatement and his recognition that Levinsky’s 
statement reflects the view of many doctors, is closer to the reality. 
Nonetheless, in presenting his argument Gillon raises an important 
point with regard to the actual practice of doctors around this 
particular tenet of formai, explicit principalist medical ethics. Here is 
an indication that the profession in its proper desire to  reassure the 
public, its potential and existing patients, of the trustworthiness of 
their doctors may prefer to  conceal a reality of practice behind a 
more acceptable medical myth. It has already been noted that part, 
perhaps a significant part, of the function of medicai ethics is to  
“legitimise to society the authority and power of the medicai 
profession” and in this, as ten Have and Freidson note, the ethical 
values espoused must meet with the approval of the wider society 
(ten Have, 1988, p.28; Freidson, 1970, p.243; Bullough, 1966). 
Thus, it appears that in its formal ethical code, the profession focuses 
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on the reassuring ideal of patients’ interests taking precedence over 
all other considerations, although being aware that other values, ones 
that it perceives as possibly less acceptable to the client population, 
guide actual practice. However, it is not just patients or potential 
patients who may find it unacceptable for a doctor to  be required to  
move away from ethics that focuses on care of the individual patient 
and towards a wider common good ethics. Doctors themselves have 
concerns about this change of emphasis and it is here that they 
perceive the possibility of contlict if they combine their role as 
practitioners with that of manager 
Leaving aside matters relating to individual life-styles and 
confidentiality which, although important, are not especially relevant 
to this discussion’6, the point of concern arises around questions of 
overt health care resource allocation decisions, or rationing: 
For the doctor in a clinic .‘abstract’ choices between groups 
of people are not relevant. , For the planner, however, 
consideration has to be given to the circumstances in which 
two patients will benefit from treatment when there are only 
sufficient resources to treat one of them (Lewis & Charny, 
1989, p.28). 
For example. a doctor may be faced with a patient presenting with a sexually 
transmitted disease and at that point questions of the needs of the individual patient, 
including their right to confidentiality, may conflict with what the doctor sees to be 
a duîy to at least some members of the wider community 
36 
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This is the commonly held view - doctors care about the best 
treatment for the individuai patient whereas managers, or planners, 
have to care about how to share resources across whole patient 
populations. To ask doctors to take on the management role of 
direct resource allocation decision-maker is to compromise their 
integrity. As one doctor is reported to have said “it’s not my job to 
look down the road and see where we’ll end up if the spending isn’t 
slowed do m... Somebody else is going to have to tackle that 
problem. My job is to do the very best 1 can for each of my patients, 
and the cost be damned’. And this from an American family 
physician (Nelson & Nelson, 1995, p.62). Yet, as Gillon powerfully 
illustrates with his clinical examples, doctors themselves are 
constantly, on a day to day basis, faced with questions of how to use 
resources most effectively. Two forms of the same antibiotic used in 
the treatment of acne, the more expensive of the two “somewhat 
more likely to be effective . . .  and even less likely to have nasty side- 
effects”; if the overriding consideration is what will be the best 
treatment for an individuai patient then the more expensive antibiotic 
should be the drug of first choice According to Gillon, GPs 
routinely start a treatment with the cheaper antibiotic, only moving 
on to the more expensive if the condition is unresponsive (Gillon, 
1988, p.126). 
In fact, the need to consider the wider cost-benefit implications 
of individual treatment decisions has been a reality for doctors for 
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many years and certainly from the early days of the NHS. Despite 
the fact that the NHS had been created with the express purpose of 
removing financial considerations from treatment needs; “a 
comprehensive Health Service . . .  to ensure that every man, woman, 
and child can rely on getting all the . treatment , . which they need. .; 
that what they get will be the best medicine..; that their getting them 
shall not depend on . . .  any. .factor [other than] real need’ (Sir John 
Hawton, quoted in Hoffenberg, 1987, p. IO), very quickly this ideal 
proved unrealisable. Doctors soon discovered that the system 
designed to free them from all financial inhibitions had in reality 
turned them into the “State’s agents for rationing” scarce health care 
resources (Klein, 1995, pp.33, 36). 
More to the point, a system for the rationing of health care has 
been part of the NHS virtually from day one. Firstly, in the general 
practitioners historic role as ‘gate-keeper’ to the secondary layer of 
NHS services, such as appointments to see a consultant. And 
secondly though the use of waiting-lists. Although in recent times 
the waiting-list has become somewhat infamous, in reality it is a well- 
established device for rationing NHS care (Klein, 1995, p. 229). 
Despite this traditional, and even obvious, requirement to take 
into account needs other than those of the index patient (the patient 
before the doctor at any one time) there is a decided reluctance on 
the part of practitioners to admit such a scope of interest. Hoffenberg 
suggests a reason for this reluctance. He notes that although doctors 
179 
are responsible for generating the bulk of NHS costs, they have not 
for most of the life of the NHS been called to account for their 
spending decisions (Hoffenberg, 1987, p. 10). Part of the reason for 
this lack of accountability was that doctors hands were not actually 
on the purse strings. Their relationship to the financial implications 
oftheir decisions was at a remove. They were not, in the phrase used 
by Harrison et al, “formally responsible” (Harrison et al, 1992, 
p,128), for managing resources. Others had the job of standing 
between them and the money and it was those others, not the doctor, 
who had to account for the way resources were used. 
Aaron and Schwarz (1984), in their comparison of health care 
resource allocation in both the United States and the United 
Kingdom, described the way that within the British system doctors 
would present to their patients what was in reality a cost-based 
decision as if it were guided by clinical needs alone (pp.24,25). They 
noted that, for example British GPs, as gate-keepers to further levels 
of treatment; accepted and operated a dialysis rationing system based 
on a tacit but widely understood cut-off age. Thus, when an older 
patient presents with a condition for which dialysis would be the 
optimal treatment rather than referring them on to a consultant the 
GP would tell the patient, or more likely their family, that “nothing 
more can be done” other than “keeping your mother comfortable”. 
In this way, the doctor maintained her or his professional integrity, 
the patient and the family were re-assured by the kindness and care 
180 
provided, and a scarce NHS resource was saved for a “better” use 
(pp.101,103,107). Thus, “political problems are, in effect converted 
into clinical problems” (Klein, 1995, pp.77, 78). Doctors’ acquiesce 
in this arrangement although it clearly works against the best 
interests of individual patients. 
The evidence indicates that all concerned were, to a greater or 
lesser extent, aware that the reality of practice differed from the 
theory and the explicit ethical commitment. Patients had some idea 
that certain limited resources were allocated on criteria other than 
health needs and the operation of waiting lists, a device Harris has 
termed “covert euthanasia” (Harris, 1985, p.86), has long been 
recognised and accepted, albeit grudgingly. Doctors have lived with 
this conflict of interests: the needs of the individual patient against 
those of the wider society. However, they have done so covertly and 
in a “hands off  way. This has allowed both doctors and patients the 
reassuring illusion that the needs of the individuai patient are always 
paramount (Klein, 1995, p.78). 
The NHS Reforms have changed that hands off approach. 
Holding clinicians to account for expenditure they incur was seen as 
“the last unmanaged frontier in the NHS” (Hunter, 1994, p.6). 
“Individual doctors are now expected to be more accountable for the 
financial consequences of their clinical decisions”. This, in turn, 
“leads to a change in style of medical practice” (Hoffenberg, 1987, 
p.11). Like the Hippocratic oath, the principle of patients best 
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interests has been thought of as vital to both the doctors’ and 
patients’ image of what medicine is all about, another element in the 
myth of medicine Doctors are no longer able to operate a covert 
rationing system and patients are much more aware that the doctor 
will take note of the cost implications of their treatment While some 
practitioners recognise the need and value of making their long- 
established rationing role more overt (Ambury, 1998), others feel 
this has undermined the doctor-patient relationship 
Clinical Autonomy 
Alongside the principie of patients’ best interests stands an 
equally important concept in the medical mind. one that underpins 
all medical practice and which the profession, as I have already 
shown, fought long and hard to establish. It is the principle of clinical 
autonomy. IMne has described it as the profession’s “central 
doctrine” (Irvine 2000). 
Clinical autonomy has two aspects. The one most obvious to 
patients is “in the consuitation, the central professional act’’ (IMne, 
2000). It is the freedom of individuai doctors to prescribe whatever 
íreatment she or he considers appropriate for “their” patients. The 
second aspect is about professional control. Collective professional 
autonomy focuses on “professionally-led regulation” (IMne, 2000), 
the profession’s right to set and maintain its own standards free from 
outside interference, “no accountability or strings attached” (Imine, 
2000). The introduction of a more proactive management system 
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within the NHS was seen to threaten both aspects of this core value 
(Hunter, i 994, pp.7-8). 
However, when the basis of clinical autonomy is scrutinised, the 
principle appears less than morally tenable in the light of modern 
medical practice. Such a scrutiny must begin by understanding how 
and why this principle has come to figure so prominently in 
medicine’s value-system. Freidson’s (i970), study on the 
professionalisation of medicine shows the importance of 
independence, or autonomy in the establishment of professional 
status. He identifies this as the hallmark of a profession. Based on 
that criterion medicine, with its ability to command clinical autonomy 
as the right to regulate its own standards, is the quintessential 
profession. Whilst professional self regulation was all important to 
the profession, it also saw the control over its patients as another 
mark of its professional status. 
Lawrence (i996), describes in some detail the way in which 
medical men established control over their work and their patients, 
gaining the authority to define “good knowledge” and acceptable 
practice. The process was “a culmination of ongoing relationships” 
and out of this process, hospital medicine emerged in the early- 
nineteenth century 
Hospital men, their pupils, and their colleagues, 
constructed medical knowledge in the eighteenth century 
through their behaviour, what they said about health and 
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disease . . . . . .  Having the power to determine what, out of all a 
sick person’s experiences and corporeal names, had 
considerable significance lies at the heart of medical 
authorrty . . Locating that power in hospital men and in medical 
men of science made modern medicine @p,20, 28). 
Once gained, medical men would be disinclined to let both aspects of 
that status enhancing power, collective and individual autonomy, go. 
The determination to  maintain control meant practitioners had to  
keep within the hounds of acceptable behaviour as determined by the 
elite groups the profession aspired to  join. “Thus, in order for 
hospital men to establish themselves as a professional elite.. ..they had 
to construct new medical ideas and methods . . . .  all the while paying 
careful attention to the nuances of ktiowledge in lay socieS” 
(Lawrence, 1996, p.21 emphasis added). For, as Freidson observes, 
the profession was hardly likely to have been granted its special 
position by the elite society which it saw as its natural home “if the 
profession did not represent or express some of the important beliefs 
or values of that elite” (Freidson, 1970, p 73). Thus, the “idea of a 
friendly, familiar doctor “being there” assumed a key role in deep- 
rooted ideals of good medical practice” (Porter, 1997, p.670; Bury, 
1997, pp.77,78). 
Nowadays, however, for the vast majority of patients the reality 
of that image is long past. Whereas in the days before the huge 
advances in biological science “medicine was a form of healing that 
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primarily involved and inevitably required a relationship between a 
healer and a patient”, today ‘the new medicine can work on patients 
who don‘t know their doctors or don’t like their doctors” (Lantos, 
1997, p.4). And the structures within which most health care is now 
provided mean that patients will see many doctors but rarely if ever 
their “own” doctor. Medicine is now a complex multi-speciality 
operation, provided by different professionals within a vast 
organisation. Against that background it is difficult to  justify the 
doctors’ claim to a special right to clinical freedom. Shall each 
individual specialist be entitled to claim total freedom to treat a 
patient without any responsibility to  consult colleagues and take 
advice? A recent case considered by the GMC highlights the dangers 
of this isolationist approach The doctors involved refused to heed 
advice from colleagues and despite serious misgivings as to  their 
competency they were allowed to  continue their apparently unsafe 
pra~t ice . ’~  Notwithstanding guidance from the GMC which 
encourages doctors to “recognise the limits of your professional 
3i The case involved cardiothoracic surgeon whose practice appeared to have led to 
a significantly higher number of deaths in children on whom he operated than w-as 
the case with other similar operations performed by other surgeons. A consultant 
anaesthetist who considered the surgeon’s practice unsafe reported the matter lo the 
GMC. Ta.0 of the doctors involved who by the time of the case had both retired 
were struck off the register. The third has been allowed to continue practising 
although banned from operating on children for several years. His employing Tnist 
has now sacked him. The whistle blowing doctor has moved abroad beliming that 
following his action he had become something of a pariah and would not find 
employment in this country 
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competence” and “be willing to consult colleagues” (GMC, 1995, 
p.2), clinical freedom continues to be a jealously guarded right. 
As Klein has astutely observed, fundamental contradictions were 
built into the structure of the NHS (Klein, 1995, p.26). One of the 
most fundamental of those contradictions arose from the reality of a 
system created on socialist collectivist principles, yet dependent for 
its success on a profession whose stated core ethical value is highly 
individualistic; medicine operates around a one to one relationship; 
the needs of an individual patient met by the clinically autonomous 
individual doctor. Indeed, it was thought at the time that such 
obviously conflicting sets of values were irreconcilable (Webster, 
1997, p.25). Nevertheless, as has been shown, the conflict, although 
theoretically fundamental and important, has proved in the reality of 
ongoing practice to be rather less significant. Having gained “a 
monopoly of legitimacy among health service providers” within the 
XHS, the medical profession, or at least the more powerful elements 
within the profession, appeared content to work within and 
participate in running, the new structure (Klein, 1995, pp.25,75). 
Although, through its various representative organisations, the 
medical profession has raised the voice of protest on many 
subsequent occasions, the areas of concern have generally focused 
around matters of professional self interest rather than more 
immediately patient-centred issues (Klein,l995, p.69). 
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And yet there remains a conflict inherent in this situation. “The 
medical imperative of maximising the input of care for the individual 
patient was.. at odds with the financial structure of the NHS” (Klein, 
1995, p.76). But “the price of preserving clinical autonomy - the 
right of individual doctors to  do what they thought right for 
individual patients - was accepting the constraints of working within 
fixed budgetary limits” (Klein, 1995, p.75). Irvine concurs in this 
judgement: 
The State, chronically strapped for cash, encouraged the 
medical profession to ration care on its behalf through the 
doctrine of care according to clinical need - in plain language, 
waiting lists. Doctors, the reasoning ran, would be more 
trusted by the public than politicians to make decisions on 
clinical priorities As a result doctors in the UK retained far 
more clinical freedom than for instance, their American 
colleagues (Irwie, 2000) 
If putting the best interests of the patient first is the moral 
principle at the heart of clinical autonomy then clinical autonomy 
cannot be bought at the price of accepting “fixed budgetary limits”. 
The doctor’s decision to offer a patient treatment must not be limited 
by the need to work within the constraints of a budget. Yet, the 
medical profession accepted the principle of budgetary constraints as 
the price for maintaining clinical autonomy. “The doctrine of clinical 
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autonomy continued to reign supreme” (Hunter, 1994, p. i4 quoting 
Moore). 
But while doctors may, understandably, try to circumvent efforts 
to limit their clinical autonomy (Hunter, 1994, p.10 quoting Caper), 
that position cannot be sustained on the basis of a moral argument 
familiar to, or widely accepted by, those outside the profession. Its 
purpose and impact is open to question and reassessment (Nelson & 
Nelson 1995, pp.61-62). The emphasis on the new managerialism 
within the NHS creates the framework within which such a 
questioning and reassessment might at least begin with the potential 
to benefit patient care, though such a positive outcome is by no 
means guaranteed (Hunter, 1994, pp.i8-20), as the experience of 
one “new style” manager illustrates. 
The audit manager interviewed for my research, and to whom I 
have already referred, had direct experience of the lengths to which 
doctors would go to safeguard their clinical freedom. The manager’s 
job involved trying to devise treatment protocols, that is guidelines 
for best practice for general practitioners. This meant first asking 
GPs to describe their treatments for a given condition and then 
comparing outcomes. The aim was to find the most effective 
programme for a range of common conditions and set these out as 
guides for future practice. The extreme reluctance of virtually all the 
GPs to open their particular treatment methods to any kind of 
scrutiny - “many of them won’t even talk about such things with their 
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colleagues let alone me as an outsider” - made it almost impossible to 
gather the data on which the project depended Protecting clinical 
freedom was the GPs stated reason for refusing to co-operate with 
the scheme, even though what was being proposed had the potential 
to offer benefits to patients 
Doctor-Patient Relationship: Passive Recipients or Active Consumers 
Closely allied to clinical freedom is perhaps one of the most 
powerful myths within the NHS, and Western medicai practice in 
general, namely, that of the doctor-patient relationship. “The model 
personal physician or familiar doctor looms large in the public 
imagination, yet has the ring of myth.. , This idea of a hendly, family 
doctor “being there” , , medicine characterised not by perfect health 
but by a desirable clinical relationship” (Porter, 1997, pp.69-70). All 
the other issues explored in this chapter rest on the fundamental 
assumption of the sanctity of that relationship. Many of the concerns 
raised regarding the changed nature of the role ofthe doctor within a 
more managerialist NHS centre around the potential damage to this 
vital and yet delicate relationship. The fear expressed is that by 
emphasising standards, quality control, and citizens’ rights the 
interaction changes from the traditional doctor-patient relationship to 
something closer to that of customer and service provider. Doctors’ 
at least, appear to find this change disturbing and even dangerous. 
Yet once again, when the nature of the “traditional doctor-patient 
189 
relationship” is explored in greater detail, we find that it is the 
mythical element rather than the day to  day reality of doctor-patient 
interactions that is being defended and protected: 
In fact, while the term “doctor-patient relationship’’ has 
widespread currency, it probably emerged originally from 
medical circles, referring to the claims of doctors to have a 
special “relationship” with the patient. Put this way, the term 
seems more ideological than descriptive, rendering clinical 
judgement and medical claims over the patient benign, and 
conveying a ‘medico-centric’ image of trust and public 
acceptability. The use of the term in the medical sociology 
context may have always been more problematic than 
recognised (Bury, 1997, p.77). 
Alongside the trusting, caring components of the doctor-patient 
relationship there are other aspects that raise ethical questions 
regarding the value of maintaining the traditional approach to this 
interaction. 
In the days when medicine had very little to offer apart from 
care and comfort, the relationship between the doctor and patient 
was probably the most important aspect of medical practice. “The 
rituals of scientific, diagnostic medicine spelt out the message that 
care was being dispensed, and hence strengthened the bond between 
physician and patient.. . .Curing remained a subordinate 
consideration.. .A sympathetic, caring manner was therapeutic in 
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itself’ (Porter, 1997 pp.680, 682; cf. Porter & Porter, 1989). As 
medicine became more scientific, reductionist, and mechanistic it 
became less and less important to see patients as persons, or 
understand them as social beings; unique individuals. The doctor- 
patient relationship moved into its modern phase with the doctor as 
expert to be obeyed without question, and the patient as passive 
beneficiary of the professional’s expertise. With “real” medicine to 
hand doctors no longer had to play the game of soothing and 
paciíjmg, now that they could fight and win against disease the role 
for the patient was reduced to acquiescence. “Medical authority, 
medical institutions and medical science and technology.. . combined 
to render the patient paradigmatically passive, with the doctor on top 
- the position preferred by the medical profession for treatment” 
(Porter & Porter, 1989, p.12). The patient’s View was seen as 
immaterial, marginal to the practice of medicine. too subjective to 
have any credibility in medical decision-making with its new 
emphasis on objectiLity (William & Popay, 1994, p.121). Their role 
was restricted to that of compliance with “Doctor’s orders” (p.57). 
This new interaction was, as it continues to be, referred to as a 
doctor-patient relationship. It thereby camed all the old images of 
humanity and a fair degree of mutual respects based on the 
recognition that each party to the relationship had something 
valuable and worthwhile to contribute. Nevertheless, the reality of 
the relationship had fundamentally changed. By and large patients 
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seemed prepared to accept the changes in order to receive the 
obvious health care benefits the new scientific medicine appeared 
able to deliver. 
However, medicine has again moved on. Nowadays, not only is 
medicine a highly technical endeavour with many of its procedures 
involving patients in considerable risk and potential long-term 
problems (Sharp, and Fade, 1998), but it has also proved unable to 
meet some of society’s most challenging health care needs Wendell 
(1992, p.72), points to the cultural myth of the sick body as that 
which can be controlled. Modem Western medicine has long played 
into this myth: doctors and patients enjoying the image of medical 
hero curing all diseases and saving lives. The realisation that not 
eves. disease is amenable to cure, that some conditions must be lived 
with, has obliged “patients to a more active involvement” in 
identifying and meeting their own health needs (Kelleher, 1994, 
pp 109-1 12; Wendell, 1992, p.73, Harrison, 1993, p.21 I ) .  
Furthermore, there is a significant body of evidence to show 
that far from the objective, scientific view medicine claims as its basic 
model the subjective values and prejudices of doctors can impair the 
quality of their decision-making in the case of particular patient 
groups. Thus, in 1979 Jeffrey reported on his study of what was 
then termed Casualty departments, now known as A&E. He found 
doctors working in these departments classified certain patients as 
“rubbish”. Those patients were generally treated less well than 
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patients doctors viewed as medically interesting or challenging 
(Jeffrey, 1979, pp.249-254). Timmermans (1995), observing staff in 
emergency rooms in north American hospitals, found that they 
withheld “potentially beneficial treatment because of moral 
judgments (sic))’. That is to say, judgements based not purely on 
medical conditions but also social position, Patients with socially 
valuable characteristics were considered worth treating whereas 
those judged of “low social viability”, including “drunks and drug 
addicts”, “might die a premature biological death” (pp 127-150). 
Timmermans was “discouraged’ to find that the attitudes he 
observed appeared to have changed little from that found by Sudnow 
in a study he had conducted almost thirty years earlier (p.151). 
Likewise in the modern A&E department of hospitals in Britain, 
“arrogant” casualty officers still dismiss certain patients as “dross” 
and routinely deny them the treatment that would be offered to more 
acceptable patients (Ambury, 1998). 
Doyal (i994)> notes that many black and working-class women 
were given very little time and attention by a predominantly white, 
middle-class, male medical profession. “Women’s own experience is 
devalued by comparison with that of doctors’ expert 
‘knowledge’. . .As a result, female patients frequently become the 
passive victims of doctors’ ministrations”, And these ministrations 
often involved providing less effective treatment than that offered to 
men with the same conditions. Thus, in one English health care 
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patients doctors viewed as medically interesting or challenging 
(Jeffrey, 1979, pp 249-254). Timmermans (1995), observing staff in 
emergency rooms in north American hospitals, found that they 
withheld “potentially beneficial treatment because of moral 
judgments (sic)”. That is to say, judgements based not purely on 
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Timmermans was “discouraged’ to find that the attitudes he 
observed appeared to have changed little from that found by Sudnow 
in a study he had conducted almost thirty years earlier (p.151). 
Likewise in the modem A&E department of hospitals in Britain, 
“arrogant” casualty officers still dismiss certain patients as “dross” 
and routinely deny them the treatment that would be offered to more 
acceptable patients (Ambury, 1998). 
Doyal ( 1  994), notes that many black and working-class women 
were given very little time and attention by a predominantly white, 
middle-class, male medical profession. “Women’s own experience is 
devalued by comparison with that of doctors’ expert 
‘knowledge’. , . .As a result, female patients frequently become the 
passive victims of doctors’ ministrations”. And these ministrations 
often involved providing less effective treatment than that offered to 
men with the same conditions. Thus, in one English health care 
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region research showed that men were 60 per cent more likely to be 
offered coronary artery bypass operations or angioplasty (pp. 145, 
148). 
In this increasingly complex and even “messy” situation there is 
a growing need for doctors to  “take their patients seriously . . . .  To see 
patients as active decision-makers’’ (Nelson & Nelson, 1995, p.62). 
Many patient groups have not waited for the medical profession to 
change its attitude, they have actively pursued a new model of that 
old relationship. 
People living with life-threatening diseases began to  question the 
medical orthodoxy. In the treatment of breast cancer, women 
became much more actively involved, taking responsibility for 
understanding the nature of the condition and the medical treatment 
offered, They then challenged and changed the traditional medical 
procedures, the result has not only been “a more ethical approach but 
also a more therapeutic one” (Doyal, 1994, p. 152) With the arrival 
of AIDS in the homosexual community, a group of mainly young- 
vocal, men used to standing against the orthodox and the traditional, 
found themselves apparently beyond the scope of medical expenise 
As a result of their insistence on active involvement in the 
management of their condition “the traditional idea of expertise was 
challenged, provoking a great debate on who was entitled to a seat at 
the table in a paternalistic medical set-up forced to become more 
democratic, accessible and client-friendly" (Porter, 1997, p. 708). 
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Those with long-term disabilities, chronic illnesses, and 
conditions associated with ageing, have grown increasingly 
dissatisfied with the role of passive patient. Many actively seek 
knowledge about their condition, becoming experts in their own 
right. Rejecting the medical model that dominates much of the 
professional attitudes towards their needs, they have pioneered 
"totally new perceptions of themselves and the services that they 
need' (Finkelstein, 1993, p. 42; Bury, 1997, p.81; Williams & Popay, 
1994, p. 133; cf. Sideli, 1997, pp.l0,12). 
Ail this, together with the managerial challenges to medicine, 
suggests that a new type of doctor-patient relationship may now be 
emerging. It is one that has moved away from the passive grateful 
recipient model and toward a more active, involved, and information- 
demanding model. In other words, away from doctor-patient and 
towards doctor-consumer (Bury, 1997, pp.82. 106) 
Although studies indicate that a more co-operative, less 
hierarchical relationship is likely to exist between the doctor and the 
private patient this has not been the experience of patients within the 
NHS (Silverman, 1987, p.57). Indeed, there are a number of 
objections to the idea that NHS patients are becoming, and should 
become, more active consumers Most of the objections are, 
however, based on a rather limited and negative view of the concept 
of the consumer. 
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It is argued that moving to a consumer sovereignty model 
requires doctors to act, simply, in response to their patient’s wishes 
and desires, thus taking no account of the doctor as “independent 
agents with professional and moral commitments” (Brock, 1993, 
p.58). Sorell finds the whole idea objectionable because “in 
consumerism. . .  .it is the customer who gets precedence;. . .and quite a 
lot of latitude . . .  in pursuing and defending their own interests against 
providers.. .Consumerism is unconcerned with responsibilities of 
users or consumers to one another” (Sorell, 1997, p.75). And while 
Ranson and Stewart concede that viewing their client group as 
customers forces public organisations to look outward and at least 
consider those who use their services, they nevertheless, believe the 
emphases of consumerism “inadequate”; focusing too much “upon 
the individual in receipt of a service, rather than on the citizen as an 
active participant in the polity” (Ranson & Stewart, 1994, p.19). 
Similarly, Paton, stressing the choice factor in the consumer model, 
suggests that the notion of the patient as consumer can never be 
more than an artificial device without any substance, a mere 
“bureaucrat’s buzz-word” (Paton, 1992, pp 14-19) 
The complexities and weaknesses of the concept of “the 
consumer” (Gabriel & Lang, 1995, pp.2-3), are perhaps only 
matched by the complexities and weaknesses of the concept of “the 
patient”, which is no longer able to serve the best interests of those 
in need of health care. The trust at the heart of the traditional doctor- 
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patient relationship is no longer appropriate. Patients must now deal 
with a virtual army of specialists, few if any of whom will be known 
personally to the patient: “Trust which might have gone to a doctor 
long known to the patient goes less easily to a team of strangers, no 
matter how well meaning or expert” (Bok, 1989, p.233; Kelleher, 
1994, pp.114-5; cf. Little & Femcide, 1997). The values of the 
patient seem quite divorced from the expert system that is modern 
medicine, thus, people feel the need to take a much more positive 
role in protecting those values. In the case of the Bristol cardio- 
thoracic surgeons (see footnote 13) many parents of the 29 young 
patients who subsequently died during or following surgery, 
condemned the fact that as a matter of established medical policy 
they were denied full information on the risks involved. Without that 
information, they argued, they were not in a position to give 
“informed consent”, 
And while consumers can be as demanding and selfish as any 
patient, the rise of the ethical consumer demonstrates that 
consumerism has moved on. Now the distinction between concepts 
of “right and wrong, damaging and beneficial, useless and useful, 
needs and wants” has become important in many areas of 
consumption (Gabriel & Lang, 1995, p.171). A more explicit 
“market relationship” can potentially make doctors more careful 
about how they treat their patients, and patients more careful in 
selecting and evaluating their doctors (Bury, 1997, p.105). The 
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responsible consumer can operate within the NHS as ethically and 
effectively as they now operate in many other areas (Descombes, 
1999, p 191f) 
Summary 
Exploring the perception of a clash of values between doctors 
and managers around ethical principles has shown up many areas not 
of contlict, but of concord, albeit perhaps reluctant and maybe even 
often hidden or unrecognised. The principles of good management 
are as important to the medical practitioner whether in private 
practice or in the small GP partnership as they are to people 
operating in any other area of business. Although doctors may not 
want to admit it, these principles have equal value to the care of 
patients within the NHS. Nevertheless, where conflict exists 
between the two, it has arisen around those values doctors are at 
such pains to defend as central to good practice: clinical autonomy 
and the doctor-patient relationship. But the centrality of these values 
arises from their link to the traditions informed by the medical ethos 
rather than to the four principles of modem medical ethics; their 
significance lying more in what they tell the profession about itself - 
the profession’s self-image - than about ethics of patient care. 
Furthermore, this analysis suggests that it is the management values 
of accountability, consumer-oriented provision, and the common 
good that may actually be of more benefit to patients as a whole. 
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PART TWO 
Case Study and Analysis: Testinq the Theory 
The historical emphasis in the first part of this study has allowed 
me to develop two main points. First, defining and drawing out the 
subtle but important distinction between the concepts of ethos and 
ethics. Second, using the particular example of the medicai 
profession: tracing the development of the medical ethos - that belief 
in itself as a noble, superior profession, of special dignity and worth - 
and demonstrating the relationship of a profession’s ethos to both its 
explicit formai statements of ethics, and its implicit ethics of 
everyday thinking and practice, 
in order to test the validity of the theoretical material, I now 
introduce a specific case study of the response of the profession to 
the reforms that began with, and followed on from, the Griffiths 
Report. This study has two elements It begins with secondary 
historical data that looks back to the early 1980s when the reforms 
were devised and introduced and sets out the reactions of both the 
medicai profession and the new NHS managers. 
Howevcr, that data alone would have offered an incomplete 
case study This research was undertaken while the impact of the 
Griffiths and post-Griffiths reforms were still unfolding. The case 
study would have lacked depth if it had ignored this living and lived 
experience. Thus, following on from the secondary data the case 
study moves to primary empirical interview data. It presents the 
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voice of individual doctors as they faced the dilemma of introducing 
management values and practices into the heart of clinical practice. 
Did this new situation create a conflict? What values and beliefs 
informed their thinking? Does the hypothesis offer a valid 
interpretation of the GPs thinking and action around their decision? 
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Chapter 5 
A Case Study: Griffiths and Beyond 
Clinicians carry with them a culture in which 
'management' has been a dirty word - the 
subject of ridicule - where, for example, often 
the least influential consultants were elected t o  
the position of Area Medical Officer. 
Huxham and Botharns. 1995, p. 3 I 
Introducing the Case Study 
This case study, or paradigm example, will demonstrate how my 
hypothesis relates to a particular historical challenge, namely, the 
reforms that followed from ûriffiths and, beyond that, Enthoven. 
Through the historical data will first be heard the voice of the 
leadership of the medical profession including the representatives of 
general practice as the branch of medicine that has been the special 
interest of this study. This material is taken from mainstream 
authoritative sources including the BMJ, the Lancet, a study by a 
former chairman of the BMA who was closely involved with process 
of formulating and presenting the profession's position, and an 
address by the president of the GMC, Sir Donald Irvine. The voice 
of the "ordinary" individual doctor, including their dissenting 
opinions, will he heard later in the study. 
The questions addressed in this first part of the paradigm 
example are: how did the leadership of the profession present the 
reforms to their members? What issues did it emphasise? What 
response did this encourage from the body of the profession? How 
were these matters presented to the public? 
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Next, I refer to historical data that sets down the views of the 
new breed of managers the reforms brought centre stage in the NHS. 
What was their attitude to the reforms and how did this compare 
with that of the medical profession? Answering these questions will 
help pin-point the impact of those underlying attitudes and beliefs 
that I have identified as the hallmark of the medicai profession’s 
ethos, namely, the sense of itself as noble and superior, that informs 
its thinking and practice. The main source for this section will be 
Strong and Robinson’s (1990) ethnographic study of the new NHS 
managers in which the researchers interviewed a large number of 
these managers from across the üK 
Chapter six onwards focuses on primary data gathered directly 
by interview with individuai general practitioners. It offers a first- 
hand account of their responses to the clear cut choice presented by 
the reforms, namely to become fund-holders or stay as non- 
fundholders 
Interviewing both fundholders and non-fundholders allows me to 
present the different positions taken by individual doctors to the new 
management and internal market in the NHS. Fundholders offer their 
rationale for accepting markets and management; then non- 
fundholders present their arguments for rejecting that path. The 
empirical data, thus, offers a further powerful test of the hypothesis. 
What values and beliefs informed each GP’s decision and how well 
does the hypothesis account for those decisions? 
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General Management and The Intemal Market 
This section begins by setting out the management reforms 
initiated by the government of 1979. The main focus is on the 
responses to those reforms of the two main groups affected by them, 
namely managers and the medical profession. Finally, it analyses 
those responses in the light of the thesis hypothesis. 
As noted above a wide range of sources have been consulted 
for this section, however, 1 have also chosen to focus on a few main 
texts for the authority of their opinions, observations, and 
assessments. Griffiths (1983; 1992), figures prominently as the 
author of the report that provided the basis for the reforms; Lee- 
Potter’s (1997) account of the impact of the reforms on the medical 
profession carries great weight since he was closely involved at the 
highest levels of the profession, including. a period as chairman of 
the BMA during the 1990s; the same must be said of Irvine, speaking 
as President of the GMC; the voice of the new breed of NHS 
manager is heard through Strong and Robinson’s (1990) use of 
direct interview, observation and listening, capturing, in their phrase, 
“the vision that inspired most of them” (p.65). 
Although the name of Griffiths is still most commonly associated 
with the changes that took place in the NHS during the 1980s and 
 OS, the reforms were the result of a combination of two sets of ideas 
new to the NHS: general management and the internal market. The 
former arising from the report of Roy Griffiths and his team; the 
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latter the result of work done by the American academic Alain 
Enthoven. Reference has already been made to both these elements 
but they will now be discussed in greater detail as background to the 
main focus of the chapter; the case study material. 
In 1983 the Secretary of State for Health, Sir Norman Fowler, 
invited the supermarket head, Roy Griffiths, to lead a team of four 
businessmen to advise on an effective management structure for the 
NHS. Within just six months the committee produced its report “It 
proved the most unconventional NHS report of all time” (Timmins, 
1996, p.409). Rather than a wordy tome running to hundreds of 
pages the team produced a twenty-three page” letter addressed to 
the Secretary of State. This document, the Gnffiths Report, set out 
in clear, simpie terms “what we would do in his [the Secretary of 
State’s] place”. It offered seven pages of recommendations. As a 
prelude to these recommendations the Report stated, 
we believe that a small, strong generai management body is 
necessary at the centre (and that is almost ail that is necessary 
at the centre for the management of the NHS) to ensure that 
responsibility is pushed as far down the line as possible, i e. to 
the point where action can be taken effectively (Grifñths, 
1992. p.62). 
This figure vanes according to which account vou read falling somewhere 
between wens-two and wen@-five pages. M’ figure is based on Sir Roy Gnffiths’ 
own count. 
38 
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Thus, the intention was to  move the NHS away from the 1974 
consensus management According to  Griffiths, this model 
had produced weak and fuzzy management. The team noted that 
individual management accountability could not be identified, it was 
difficult to know who was in charge “if Florence Nightingale were 
carrying her lamp through the corridors of the NHS today, she would 
almost certainly be searching for the people in charge” (ûriffiths, 
1983, p.22; cf, Harrison et a/, 1992, pp.44-45; Strong and Robinson, 
1990, p.4ff ). 
Overall, management lacked thrust, so change was very difficult 
to secure. “There is no driving force seeking and accepting direct 
and personal responsibility” (Griffiths, 1983, p. 12). Furthermore, 
Griffiths was surprised to  find an almost total lack of performance 
orientation. Thus, he noted that: 
rarely are precise management objectives set; there is little 
measurement of health output; clinical evaluation of particular 
practices IS by no means common and economic 
evaluation.. .is extremely rare (Gnffíths, 1983, p 10; Griffiths 
1992, p.62) 
h s i n g  from this assessment the Team’s recommendation was a 
positive move towards a general management model. At all levels 
there were to be general managers “responsible for making things 
happen” (Klein, 1995, p.147), “one individual who has ultimate 
39 For a discussion of consensus management see chapter 3 subsection 1969-1 979 
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responsibility and decision-making power over ali staff within their 
unit” (Tilley, 1996, p.292). Griffiths envisaged a clear line of 
command stretching from Whitehall down into every unit of the 
hospital service (Strong & Robinson, 1990, p.20); the generai 
manager would not take the parochial view of the specialist, as 
typified by the thirty thousand doctors, but rather their focus would 
be integrationist and “global” (Strong & Robinson, 1990, p.24). 
In order to implement a clear line of command Griffiths advised 
the creation of a NHS Supervisory Board with strategic 
responsibility. This Board to be made up of the Secretary of State, 
the Minister for Health, the Permanent Secretary, the Chief Medical 
Officer, and the Chairman of the next element in the chain of 
command, namely, the Management Board, and two or three non- 
executive members. The Management Board itself, “the small strong 
general management bodyl” was to be responsible for implementing 
the strategy devised bv the Supervisory Board. effectively taking 
over ali the management responsibilities formerly undertaken within 
the Department of Health and Social Security. 
General managers were to be appointed at every level of the 
service down to each separate Unit. It was these individuals who 
would be personally “accountable for the performance of their 
organisation”; responsible for making sure that it met the objectives 
of the local health authority, itself working under the overall strategy 
set by the centre (Gnffiths, 1992, p.66; Harrison ef al, 1992, p.44). 
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Griffiths envisaged health care professionals taking on these new 
roles as general managers. Of his management reform programme he 
says: 
I personally believed and intended..,that the doctors and 
nurses . . .  would..,take the top management positions. ,They 
would become the best of all managers, T-shaped managers 
wiih an indepth professionalism accompanied by the 
broadening of management experience (Griffrths, 1992, p.65). 
The traditional rigid separation between various roles was to be 
broken down, “the managers and clinicians of tomorrow were to  be 
crossbreeds” (Strong & Robinson, 1990, p.72). 
However, as the Team set out on their inquiry, they encountered 
considerable ill feeling from health care professionals. In the words 
of Timmins “all hell broke loose” (Timmins, 1996, p.408). Once the 
report had been published the situation did not improve. Doctors 
perceived the changes as “altering the balance of power between the 
professional staff and the managers”; in their view, Griffiths “wanted 
the NHS to he run like Sainsbury’s”. Although at first they were 
merely rather wary, in time they came to see the managerialism 
Griffiths had started as posing a significant threat to the NHS. Just as 
they had once opposed the creation of the NHS on the grounds that 
it would destroy the doctor-patient relationship, they now opposed 
generai management on the grounds that it would destroy the NHS 
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and with it the doctor-patient relationship (Klein, 1995, p.150; Lee- 
Potter, 1997 pp.32,146; cf. Tinunins, 1996, p.410). 
Despite the concerns of the professions, within a year the 
government had implemented virtually all the main 
recommendations, And, after all the preliminary fuss and anxiety, 
everyone appeared to settle into the new arrangement (Strong & 
Robinson, 1990, p.27). However, in the words of ûriffiths: “just as 
general management was finding its effective feet, the level of 
decibels both in the Health Service and on the political front scaled 
new heights and Margaret Thatcher in early 1988 decided to 
establish her own Review” (Griffiths, 1992, p.66). 
In his “biography” of the welfare state, Timmins describes the 
heights to which the decibel level rose at that time. In just four 
pages (Timmins, 1996, pp. 454-457), he sets out in graphic detail the 
“spiral of despair” that the NHS had entered. During that period, 
4000 beds were closed, nurses took strike action. GPs placed 
advertisements in newspapers telling their patients that cash 
shortages meant treatment would not be available, and the presidents 
of the senior Royal Colleges issued a joint statement warning the 
government that the NHS was in danger of collapse. According to 
another authoritative voice “doctors were becoming angrier and 
angrier., . .consultants were intensely frustrated.. .and their junior 
colleagues had become seriously militant” (Lee-Potter, 1997, p.44; 
Klein, 1995, p.177). Against this background of anger and despair 
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the Prime Minister announced, during an interview on a current 
affairs television programme, “our own enquiry” (Klein, 1995, p 176, 
181, Allsop, 1995, p 157) 
In 1984. even as the Griffiths Reforms were being implemented, 
another short review of the NHS was taking place Alain Enthoven, 
Professor of Health Management at Stanford University, had been 
invited by Nuffield Provincial Hospitals Trust to cast his expert eye 
over the Service The result of his analysis was a paper entitled 
Hejlectrons on the Management of the NHS (Enthoven, 1985) in 
which he proposed the creation of an “internal market” within the 
NHS. Enthoven’s ideas were already in circulation as the Thatcher 
review began. 
The basic idea behind the internal market involved the separation 
of the purchase of health care from the producers of health care, the 
so-called purchaser/provider split The intention was to increase 
efficiency and cost sensitivitv throughout the Service by introducing 
a new element of competition into it thereby making more effective 
use of the available NHS budget (Paton 1996, p.l@. Managers 
would be able to buy health care services from the producers who 
offered the best value for money This carried the assumption that 
such a judgement was possible. Griffiths had noted the paucity of 
information in the area of costs and quality of output. His 
management reforms were intended to address this lack and clearly, 
Enthoven’s internal market would depend on, as well as encourage 
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attention to these areas. Once health care providers realised that 
their senices would only be purchased if they could be seen to offer 
'%alue for money", the belief was that this would concentrate the 
mind wonderfully and they would find ways of costing and 
evaluating their product s. 
This type of radical thinking appealed to the political minds4' 
brought in by Mrs Thatcher to join her in a review of the NHS. In 
Paton's assessment: 
The origin of the NHS reforms lay in the desire by the.. .Prime 
Minister to move from the defensive to the offensive about 
health policy and to change the terms of the debate from one 
about levels of fundmg to one about levels of technical 
efficiency This was the context in which the market evolved 
as 'the answer' (Paton, 1996, p.332). 
However, despite the appearance of a clear, almost pre- 
determined course for their deliberations, the Cabinet Committee 
undertaking the review actually pursued a somewhat uncertain path. 
Griffiths recalls that: 
It started out by seeking to examine new methods of funding 
the N H S .  .moved abruptly from this theme [and] then 
switched to building on the existmg management reforms and 
"' Four members of the Cabinet: Nigel Lawson and John Major. Treasury: John 
Moore and Tony Newion. DHSS (later DOH). The laiter mo were replaced by Ken 
Clarke and David Mellar. Sir Roy Grüñths and a member of the Pnme Minister's 
Policy Unit, were imited to attend th is  Cabinet Committee's meetings on a regular 
basis (Klein. 1995. p.184). 
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seehg to inject more competition and choice into the service 
(Grifñths, 1992 p.66). 
Klein describes the process as “a singularly rudderless operation” 
that “tacked rather erratically between different options” (Klein, 
1995, p.188). The end product of all these uncertain deliberations 
was the White Paper Workingfor Putietils (DOH, 1 989).41 
l h e  Response of the Medical Profession 
The medical profession was greatly angered by these moves not 
least because the result of the review was not a Green Paper, a 
document for consultation, but a White Paper, virtually presenting 
the intended changes as a fair accompli, There was considerable 
chagrin within the leadership of the profession that it had not been 
formally consulted by the Committee during its review, This 
intensified when it was not invited to discuss the findings before the 
precise nature of the reforms were decided upon The intensity of 
feeling roused by the process of implementation is revealed in the 
emotive language used by Shock (1994) - himself a doctor and 
former rector of an Oxford College - in a speech he gave to doctors’ 
leaders and later printed in the BMJ. Looking back on the events of 
that time he described the process as “blitzkrieg with little 
consultation, indeed not much discussion., .It was almost a textbook 
campaign. Particularly to be admired was Panzer General Clarke’s 
For brief details of elements of W$rP cee chapter 3 subsection 1979-1991. 41 
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[Kenneth Clarke, Secretary of State for Health] handling of the 
decisive weapon, money”. 
According to Shock (1994), whilst the profession would have 
anticipated an attack from a leí? wing government it was “îhrown 
into confusion” by this attack from a government of the right. 
Despite any initial confusion, it quickly recovered and over an 18 
month period mounted a “spirited challenge” to the White Paper. An 
editorial in the BMJ referred to “anger and bitterness”, a “near 
hysterical atmosphere” and “acrimonious turbulence” as doctors 
voiced their protest (BMJ, 1996). Butler (1993), described the 
“sceptical and even hostile views of doctors”. Gladstone and 
Goldsmith ( 1  995), specifically identified the medical profession’s 
opposition as “Consultant-led‘. The BMA, traditionally recognised 
as representing the voice of the general practice branch of the 
profession, saw its membership rise to the point were it virtually 
became the voice of the whole profession with three-quarters of 
doctors joining its ranks (Lee-Potter, 1997, p.87) Thus, when it 
launched its campaign against the reforms it did so for the profession 
as a whole (BMJ, 1989; Klein, 1995, p 185). Later it wrote to all 
GP practices urging them not to join the fundholding scheme, 
warning that supporting the reforms would create a divided health 
service with hospital against hospital and GP set against GP (BMJ, 
1990). 
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The BMA also ran a E2.5 million advertising campaignd2 that 
showed the public the profession’s opposition to the reforms. This 
included a poster that read: “What do you call a man who ignores 
medicai advice? Ken Clarke”. This wording carried a message that 
the profession knew would be well understood by the public, namely 
that doctors had advised against pursuing the reforms and by 
ignoring this medical advice the government’s approach would be as 
damaging to the NHS as ignoring doctor’s advice would to the 
individual patients. It sent out to GPs a poster for use in their 
surgeries. The poster read “SOS FOR THE NHS” (Lee-Potter, 1997, 
pp.90,92) There was also a leaflet for GPs to distribute to their 
patients. Among the questions the leaflet asked patients to consider 
was: “Do you want the cheapest treatment or what is best for you?’ 
The message presented to patients was that the reforms would force 
doctors to give more consideration to costs rather than to care, that 
their clinical judgement would have to take second place to 
budgetary constraints 
Patients were clearly being told that the profession’s opposition 
to the reforms was based on shared ethical principles it was 
defending patients and the primacy of their care (Klein, 1995, 
pp. 192-3) After describing the BMA’s campaign Lee-Potter notes 
12 The campaign has been described as “a classic of its kind that mill go down in lhe 
annals of the advertising industry as a major success” (Lee-Potter, 1997. p.92). 
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that "there were not a few doctors who were uneasy about involving 
their own patients in the dispute" (Lee-Potter, 1997, p.91). 
Despite all the opposition, in 1991 the NHS began operating 
with an internal market The Service had entered a new era, the era 
of general management and the internal market (Baggott, 1988, 
p.188-194; Lee-Potter, 1997, p.14; Klein, 1995, p.131). It is worth 
noting Griffiths own assessment of the response to  his Management 
Inquiry Report In his view it: 
was well received by government, but less well received by the 
professions.. 
He then observes.. .
1 am given to understatement.. .
and continues: 
The medical profession saw the report correctly as questioning 
whether their clinical autonomy extended to immunity to 
being questioned as to how resources where bemg us &...[in 
their view] the introduction qf'economicr into the care of 
patient.?. . was inimical io good care. There was a deep-seated 
feelmg that what distinguished the Health Semce from the 
private sector or business or commerce was the very ¡nunun@ 
of the Health Service from the supposedly corrupting influence 
of profit making . . . .  The report was never meant to be 
confrontational.. . .What the Report did.. .was force the 
professions themselves to rethink their position. I pay tribute 
to them to the extent they have done this . . .  The response two 
214 
years ago [I9901 of the Royal Colleges to the latest 
government legislation was, even thou& III disagreement, 
considered and managerial to an extent which many would not 
have believed a few years ago (Gnfñîhs, 1992, p.63, 
emphasis added). 
General management and the internal market, would only work 
if managers and doctors could find new ways of co-operating with 
each other. As Hunter noted early on in the reform process: 
If the support of the medical profession is not 
forthcoming.. then it is unlikely that [the Refom] will prove 
to be effective . . .  Working with the medicai profession to secure 
the required shifì in clinical culture is . . .  the only sure way 
forward (Hunter, 1993, p.38). 
Nevertheless, whilst it was thought desirable, and even essential, 
to increase the involvement of doctors in management in order to  
achieve “organisational effectiveness in the quality of health care 
provided’. (Ashburner, 1996 p.ZZOj, the early response of the 
medical profession to the package of reforms, Working,f¿r Patients 
(DOH, 1989) building on the Griffiths Report, indicated that this was 
very unlikely to happen. The profession saw this move as inimical to 
its core values and was not prepared to co-operate. As one 
commentator noted in the BMJ: 
Contrary to what politicians think, the opposition of doctors to 
government refo mis... may not be due to an objection to 
relinquishing power. A more enlightening explanation is that it 
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owes more to their desire to protect their core values against 
the onslaught of an untested economic model of public services 
(Smith, 1994). 
The medical profession emphasised the unbridgeable gap 
between its values with their overriding commitment to the care of 
patients, and those of the “generalist” manager whose first loyalty 
must always be to the organisation and its success. Doctors would, in 
Klein’s phrase be ‘Torced to subordinate the search for health to the 
search for solvency” (Klein, 1995, p. 193 j. 
Thus, Lee-Potter quotes The Joint Consultants Committee 
response to the proposed introduction of self governing hospitais: 
These proposals inevitably change the prime aim of the 
management of these hospitals, from the provision of adequate 
care to the community as a whole to the financial success of 
the hospital (Lee-Potter, p.96). 
It had been part of the aim of the reforms to address and deal 
with the complex problem of the relationship between general 
managers and those who possess a specialist skill that the 
organisation needs to use, for example doctors (Metcalfe I% 
Richards, 1993, p.123). Griffiths had envisaged that this cultural 
divide would be crossed by finding “new ways of fostering a 
partnership between professionals and generalists”, through 
encouraging more people who span the two cultures to take on dual 
responsibilities and translate the languages of the separate groups 
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(Metcalfe & Richards, 1993, p.130). In the immediate aftermath of 
Workingfor Pufienf.? (DOH, 1989), that looked increasingly unlikely 
to  take place. 
One problem with the new approach arose from the fact that it 
was thought that these “crossbreeds” (Strong & Robinson, 1990, 
p.72), would need to be drawn from highly respected consultants 
with an instinct for management. Enthoven had observed that 
prestigious consultants command a high income and it would not be 
easy to entice them into management if that involved “a large drop in 
income”. This was a point the BMA repeatedly made to  the 
government of the day (Lee-Potter, 1997, p.38), 
The leaders of the profession saw the need to present a united 
opposition to the reforms. Any of their number who attempted to  
take on the new dual role had to face the opposition of their 
colleagues. Lee-Potter tells of one doctor, a member of the BMA, 
who found his situation among his professional colleagues untenable 
when in those early days he opted to become a manager: 
Russell Hopkins who combined being a hospital manager with 
his clinical work was a management evangelisî He had 
practised &at he preached by becoming we, but later 
struggled to maintain his influence and credibility within the 
BMA by becoming too closely identified with those seen as the 
forces of darkness - that is, Mrs Thatcher’s marketeers (Lee- 
Potter, 1997, p.76). 
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Russell Hopkins pro-reform stance was so out of tune with the 
rest of the profession that it became the subject of a question at 
pnme Minister’s Questions in the House of Commons. Hansard 
reports the following exchange: 
Mr. Thome : Will my right hon. Friend [The Prime Minister, 
Margaret Thatcher] find time to consider the remarks made by 
Mr. Russell Hopkins, the general manager of University 
hospital of Wales, Cardiff when speaking at the BMA 
conference at Swansea? He accused the BMA of spreading 
fear, apprehension and uncertainty among the chronically sick, 
elderly and infirm through its disgraceful publicity campaign. 
Will my right hon, Friend denounce such behaviour? 
The Prime Minister : Yes, I am glad that some doctors and 
managers have the courage to speak out against the scare 
tactics which are frighening ( S I C )  a number of patients totally 
unnecessarily . The reforms are intended to bring about 
even better patient care When we put them into operation, 
they will do just that (Hansard, 1989) 
Another BMA member, Paddy Ross, who “spoke strongly for 
consultants to become involved in management in order to  avoid 
being sidelined’ was “well aware that [his views] could be seen as 
fratenizing (sic) with the enemy”. Accordingly, “it was a hard time 
for Paddy Ross” (Lee-Potter, 1997, p.42). 
As the following quotes From a doctor, a doctors’ leader, and a 
former doctor turned DGM, will show, the focus of the medical 
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profession’s opposition was presented in terms of the ethical conükt 
that doctors taking on the dual role would face, “The moral integrity 
of doctors is violated by the imposition of a managerial role which 
attempts to use them as means to particular organisational ends and, 
in so doing, limits their ability to fulfil their obligations to their 
patients” (Satz, 1996, p.80, emphasis added). Consultants were 
feamil that becoming involved in management would “compromise 
their clinical freedom” (Lee-Potter 1997) p.43). “I tell the [new 
nurse] managers that the first eighteen months in the job is the worst 
because they will all have terrible paranoid conflicts . . .  The 
professional on one side of their head is saying different things to the 
businessman on the other side” (Strong and Robinson, 1990, p.73). 
“Doctors with a management role have the potential pressures that 
these possibly conflicting roles entail ..How these individuals 
continue to cope with their dual roles will be critical” (Ashburner, 
1996, p.222, cf. Hunter, 1992). Thus, efforts to incorporate this new 
management culture into the heart of the NHS met with considerable 
opposition from the medical profession. 
However, the specific issue that caused the profession greatest 
concern was clinical autonomy. In Imine’s words “the contentious 
issue was the new accountability” (Imine, 2001). At the level of the 
individual doctor-patient consultation: 
moves to strengthen management [were] seen...as posing a 
threat to clinical freedom and as being antithetical to the 
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medical tradition of treating individual patients (Hunter 1992, 
p.558). 
In response to a recommendation to the Dutch government that 
consultants in that country should be integrated into hospital 
management the BMJ reported that: 
consultants have banded together out of fear that a so called 
“English situation" could anse.. .which they say will lead to a 
loss of professional autonomy and result in restricted access to 
specialist care (BMJ, 1996, 3 August). 
But beyond individual clinical autonomy there was also concern 
about collective autonomy, overall professional control and power. A 
professor of health put it thus: 
At the core of the debate about doctors as managers is the 
balance of power between the two groups . . .  It would not be 
long before the medical profession suffered loss of status and 
control over the system (Hunter 1992, p 5 5 8 ,  259). 
The increased threat to clinical autonomy arising from 
developments following the Reforms is graphically described in a 
BMJ article significantly sub-titled ‘Sacred Cows: to the Abattoir’. 
The author, a specialist registrar, suggests that clinical autonomy has 
long been viewed by government as a threat to its control of the 
NHS. He presents, albeit in somewhat dramatic terms, a matter that 
clearly exercised him and many others in the profession. In an 
imaginary conversation between Aneurin Bevan and a Whitehall civil 
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servant the civil servant sets out a long-term strategy for removing 
clinical autonomy: 
Firstly, you take the burden of administration from doctors by 
developing a complex management structure to run hosprtals. 
Then, once the running of the hospital is out of their hands, 
rearrange things so that hospital administrators employ 
doctors". 
"I can understand dodors employing administrators," said 
Bevan, "but not the other wayaround. 
"Of course not. it's ridiculous. So you dress it up You point 
out that the new structure allows doctors no say in 
management. You suggest they become part of the 
administrative hierarchy to have a voice in decisions affecting 
clinical services . . .  I think 1 can promise you that one day 
doctors will beg [the government] to take control (Orchard, 
1998). 
Gnffiths. as already noted, was only the start of the reform 
process With each change the medical profession saw more and 
more dangers to its professional independence and clinical freedom. 
And its immediate response was to oppose those changes. It 
believed and argued that what was damaging to the profession was 
ultimately damaging to patients. Thus, there was a moral obligation 
on the profession to  oppose the reforms. In 1989 "the profession's 
feelings.. .were beginning to consolidate toward the non-co-operation 
end of a spectrum of resistance". A meeting of the BMA passed "a 
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motion put forward by a young surgeon that GPs should be asked 
not to volunteer for budgets and consultants asked not to take on 
management responsibilities” (Lee-Potter, 1997, p.92). 
In due course, however, the profession with its eye on the 
“bigger picture” moved from opposition to working with the 
changes. Even a diminution of an aspect of clinical autonomy was 
accepted in order to protect what to the profession was the more 
important element of this key value. Klein describes the situation 
that developed: 
The individual autonomy of NHS consultants does appear to 
be shrinkuig . . .  Most imtably, the post-I991 period has seen the 
mass production of guidelines and protocols which d e h e  good 
practice . . .  The real significance of these developments is that 
the medical profession [is] acknowledging its responsibilm.. .to 
give greater precision and visibility to the criteria against 
which the performance of indtvidual practitioners can be 
assessed (Kelin, 1995, p. 243. 
He then points to the profession’s reason for allowing this change: 
The medical profession appears to be ready to restrict the 
autonomy of individual clinicians in order to strengthen 
collective professional autonomy (Klein, 1995, p.  244). 
In the context of this observation Imine’s assessment of the 
He medical profession pre-Thatcher Reforms is worthy of note. 
described it as: 
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a medical profession that was too paternalistic and used to 
defining accountability on its own terms, consequent to that, a 
system of medical regulation [the core of professional 
autonomy] which was reactive, inward-looking, unresponsive 
and, as the profession and management wanted, concerned 
only with the most flagrant abuses or dysfwiction (Imine, 
2001). 
According to Imine: 
Mrs Thatcher, sensitive to changing public expectations, 
signalled that patients and the public had to come first (Imine, 
2001). 
Thus, according to the retiring President of the GMC, the 
changes the reforms set in train, far from undermining patients' best 
interests had protected and enhanced them to the extent that an 
inward-looking and unresponsive medical profession had itself taken 
steps to change 
Thai was not how the profession originally saw or presented the 
reforms. And Hunter, summarising the result of his study of doctors 
as managers, indicates the nature and extent of the changes the 
profession was actually prepared to make. First he outlines the 
thinking behind the emphasis on management: 
A desire to improve the qua lo  of care and render services 
more responsive to user preferences has resuiteú in 
management being viewed as an effective means of tackling 
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these issues There is a shift toward creating managers out of 
doctors with all that that Implies 
But then he notes 
Far from managers incorporating doctors, the end result may 
prove to be the other way round..,Medicine’s traditional 
preoccupations and its resilience to change are likely to remain 
as strong as ever (Hunter, 1992, p 557) 
The medical profession’s response to the management reforms 
followed a well-established path. Its “resilience to change” began 
with outright opposition presented as an ethical concern for patients’ 
best interests, then an acceptance of the new situation followed by 
“tactics and practices” (Hunter, 1992, pp 563,564), designed to 
protect its “traditional preoccupations” those fundamental values 
arising from its ethos 
Which Values, Whose Ethics? 
As the nature of the reforms became apparent, many experts, 
both from medicine and academia. offered their assessment of the 
likely impact. Paton, a professor of health policy, saw the whole 
move towards markets and c.ompetition as undermining the stability 
and popularity of the NHS. He characterised the response to these 
management reforms as supported on the one hand by government, 
health managers, and a particular group of academics but opposed by 
“most of the public; the vast majority of the medical profession; the 
majority of the nursing profession; and ‘voices of conscience’ ... who 
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[see] the reforms as damaging the altruistic culture of the national 
health serviceper se” (Paton, 1996, p.344ff). 
For Pollitt (1 990, p. 15), the reforms spelt a movement toward 
the imposition of “managerialism” - the system practised in big 
business and the military - on the welfare state. He noted the neo- 
Tayiorian character of many of the changes introduced into the 
public services during the 1980s, in the bureaucratisation of the 
structures of control, as previously unmeasured aspects of the work 
process were measured and the information gathered was then used 
as a basis for controlling and rewarding effort 
Harrison et al (1992), pointed to the emphasis on proof of 
performance, explicit objective setting, and the generation of 
quantitative and/or dated targets, and termed the changes: 
“Managerialism on the Grifíiths model” The approach, the authors 
contended, 3 s  founded on distrust”, whereas, ‘‘by contrast, 
consensus management and beyond that the whole diplomatic 
collaborative culture of the pre-Griffiths NHS is founded on trust” 
(p68) The authors concluded that Grifíiths’ claim to be able to 
preserve the best features of the old consensus management system 
alongside the new management model, was open to doubt 
Metcalfe and Richards (1993), offered a different perspective. 
They argued that NF’M was more than merely “managerialism”. In 
their view the term “managerialism” was a disparaging epithet 
employed by academic commentators with a deep-seated resistance 
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to  management ideas. According to these supponers of the reforms, 
NPM involved not just a search for operational efficiency but also 
the promoting of effectiveness, in their view a much more difficult 
task. This, it was suggested (Ham and Hunter, 1988), could be 
achieved by raising professional standards through use of medical 
audit; standards and guidelines, involving doctors in management by 
delegating responsibility for a budget as well as appointing doctors as 
managers; and strengthening the external management control of 
doctors through contracts and closer supervision of medical work. 
Wilkinson (1995) describes the values at the heart of NPM as 
representative of a “hate culture”, specifically referring to  them as 
discriminatory, alienating, and dehumanising whereas “a British 
idealism for equity, compassion, and collective responsibility’’ are the 
fundamental values out of which the NHS arose, 
Stewart and Waish (1992) wrote of “conîìicting interests and 
values” and noted that. 
many of the changes by the government can be seen as 
attempts to change the cultures of the public services, 
dominated as they have been by the traditions of 
administration, hierarchy, and professionalism.. There has 
been . . .  an emphasis on a commercial culture with a resulting 
search for an entrepreneurial approach. There are dangers if 
that emphasis leads to a neglect of the values of the public 
domain b.150). 
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They concluded that “the management of public services has to be 
grounded in the purposes, conditions and tasks of public domain, lest 
it undermines the basis on which those services are provided 
(pp.208-217). 
Such views echo a widespread perception that the values of 
medicine are intrinsically moral with doctors generally trusted and 
respected. Managers, however, find themselves viewed in a very 
different light (Hunter, 1992, p.557). Thus, whilst one authority can 
refer to management as a significantly moral activity he also 
recognises that it is far from esteemed amongst the general 
population, with managers much more likely to be “ridiculed or 
vilified than praised and admired’ (Pattison, 1997 pp.5,7). This is 
due, in part, to a cultural difference. Whereas in the USA, 
management is traditionally highly regarded with a well established 
and prestigious training programme. by comparison in the üK, 
management has been a rather impoverished concept (Metcalfe & 
Richards, 1993, p 14). McIntyre (1994, p.73) presents managers as 
one of the central characters of what he sees as the present moral 
Dark Age who trade in “moral fictions” and embody “the doctrine 
that . . .  .all moral judgements are nothing but expressions of 
preference,. . . .attitude or feeling”. 
Although in the world of business and the private sector this 
attitude has changed, within the context of the NHS, management 
continues to be viewed with suspicion. In the popular culture, such 
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as television and radio dramas, the NHS manager is represented as 
‘lhe villain” concerned only with saving, and even making, money 
whilst the doctor battles to save lives (Gabe & Bury, 1996, p.78). 
And a health service journal reports one prominent NHS user as 
speaking “ w a d y  of dedicated clinicians” while expressing anger at 
hospitals being ‘‘run by accountants” with their concerns for budgets 
and the balance sheet (HAY, 1997). The language of management, 
“management speak,” is dismissed as essentially trivial, furthermore, 
it “can be counterfactual, lacking in empirical basis, and downright 
misleading” By contrast the languages of professionals are “tight, 
meaningful and precise” (Pattison, 1995, p,542). 
A junior doctor saw managers as: 
act[ing] as if the NHS were their personal fiefdom . . .  
provid[ing] themselves with expensive tools like computers 
while clinicians are asked to make do with the barest 
essentials ,.we know doctors diagnose and instigate treatment. 
We know nurses.. carry out treatment . . .  We know 
administrators ensure bills are paid, contracts honour ed... No 
one IS quite sure what managers do. Their work appears to 
deal primarily widi the symbolic world of words and numbers 
(hi, 1997, p.20). 
The assessment of another junior doctor was that: 
Managers are not held in any esteem by us. We see them as 
deriving largely from industry and commerce, looking for 
secure sinecures on the NHS gravy train. .Managers possess 
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no commitment to the NHS . . .  [Their] agenda[s] seem so far 
removed from that of those with real patient contaci (Gaba, 
1996, p.33). 
Against this background it is not surprising that doctors were 
apparently highly reluctant to enter the murky world of management 
as Dopson (1996), found in her small scale study of hospital 
consultants who had moved into management. Many of the 
consultants interviewed expressed their reluctance in terms of the 
“ethical dilemma taking on a management role created for them: 
alienating colleagues, undermining clinical relationships, and taking 
them away from patients and research that might benefit patient 
care” (p. 183). 
Manaaernent, Medicine, Mvth, and Morality 
In reality the relationship between medicine, management and 
morality is actually fai. more complicated than many of the rather 
simplistic comments noted in the previous paragraphs would 
indicate. 
Indeed, Brereton and Temple (1999), suggest that NPM has 
exposed “the fragility of a myth of public service values that lie at the 
heart of British public administration”, namely, that public service is 
honest, impartial, passionate for justice, and not self-seeking 
whereas the private sector is ‘’venal and profit-driven”. 
Following the introduction of the NHS reforms of the early 
198Os, Strong and Robinson undertook a number of studies on the 
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impact of these on the NHS professions. In their 1990 study they 
explored the attitudes and biews of managers themselves, to the new 
manageridism. The study aimed, in their words, to “capture the 
vision that inspired most of the managers who were appointed in the 
wake ofthe Griffiths reforms” (p.65). 
The new managers were “deeply committed to the new way of 
doing things” (p.65). They had been inspired by what they saw as 
new opportunities and determined to make the reforms succeed 
despite the many and obvious problems. Teamwork and good 
communication were identified as essential but also clear direction 
and control. “Let managers manage” became the new mantra. There 
had been great frustration at the old consensus model but alongside it 
was the awareness of the over-riding power of the doctor whose 
power had often worked against - in the view of managers - the best 
interests of patients ‘Doctors were left to run things in the way they 
wanted and the power of medical syndicalism meant, so the 
managers argued, that a rampant individualism reigned throughout 
the length and breadth of the service” (p.32). An RGM told the 
researchers: 
There was a study in our region of cataract surgery The 
variation in length of in-patient stay for the operation was 
between three and twelve days with a mean of four days. Yet 
for the private patients the mean was just two days! When we 
challenged the twelvedays man he said it was to ensure high 
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quality of care - yet his private patients were only staying for 
two days @.32). 
Gff i ths  seemed to offer the chance to  move away from these 
entrenched professional attitudes into a new direction. However, 
managers were angered at the doctors ignorance of management 
issues, their lack of interest in the new management proposals, and 
their refusal to play any part in the management side unless they 
were paid extra. This latter issue caused particular resentment 
among managers who were paid far less than the doctors. A DGM 
reported that: 
Doctors in the acute unit think Gnfftdis is the worsi thing that 
has ever happened to them because we have appointed a doctor 
as UGM and they can’t understand how one of their own 
colleagues can be making decisions - particularly when it 
conflicts with the medical executive machinery b.34) 
Another manager described devices they had felt obliged to  employ 
in their unit in order to avoid the necessity of paying consultants 
extra money for involvement in management decisions. “OK, it’s a 
very small amount of money - but we feel very strongly about it”. 
Managers saw the individualistic ethics of the doctor as not only 
working against the best interests of patients hut the NHS as a 
whole. “Some doctors were engaged in ruthless competition with 
one another for more power and resources . . .  The clinical stress on 
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patients too often meant a partiality for the patients of the most 
powerful clinicians” (p.34). 
A former anaesthetist assessed the doctors’ attitude as follows: 
The only reason I’m treated with just a bit of respect in this 
district by the consultant is because i once was nie...Doctors 
as n group are an absolute shower really. They’re worse than 
any other occupation in terms of selfishness b.36,  emphasis 
added). 
Doctors were used to getting their way, often by bullying or 
patronising those whose role they saw purely in terms of responding 
to doctors needs. This assumption, based on traditional attitudes, 
carried through into their dealings with the new managers: “Many 
consultants ..[assumed] that managers, no matter now senior, were 
there to  serve them individually” (p.36). 
Despite these negative images, the managers were also quick to 
point out that many individual doctors were “decent chaps”, “hard 
working”, “superb performers”. Significantly, from the perspective 
of this thesis, the criticisms were levelled against their character or 
“properties as members of the profession” (p.46). 
Testina the Theory 
The theory takes a nuanced approach by drawing out a subtle 
but significant factor that influences the medical profession, namely, 
the medical ethos. It explores the idea that the medical ethos, the 
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belief in itself as a noble and superior profession of special dignity 
and worth, informs the profession’s responses and gives rise to an 
“implicit ethics of practice”; a mode of thinking and action that the 
profession recognises as right and proper from its members. The 
key values arising from this ethos are autonomy for the profession as 
a whole, clinical freedom for the individual practitioner, and 
paternalism. These are not merely traditional values, they carry the 
weight of moral imperatives. Historically they have been seen as 
right for the profession and this most senior profession’s right 
(Morrell, 2001, Imine, 2001), 
Changes perceived as likely to impose any outside control, or 
even joint control, over its activities would undermine those essential 
freedoms and would be bad for the profession. Such changes must, 
therefore, in the first instance be opposed while in time 
“countervailing practices and tactics are developed that lessen or 
divert their impact” (Hunter, 1992. p.563) From outside the 
profession such an attitude might be dismissed as arrogant self- 
indulgence, but from under the umbrella of its own ethos the 
profession sees matters from a very different viewpoint. Even so, the 
profession also takes care to publicly stress the primacy it pives to 
patients best interests, a value emphasised in Dicfies qf a Doctor, 
recognised in modern medicai ethics, and more easily understood by 
those outside the profession. 
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This nuanced distinction contribute to our understanding of the 
medical profession's words and actions following the Gnffiths and 
post-Griffiths reforms. 
Management has always been important in the NHS. However, 
the particular form the management took was dependent on the 
circumstances prevailing at the time, and specifically what it was 
intended to achieve through that management (Harrison, 1988). 
Moreover, in the case of public sector management, the political 
order and the values informing its decisions also exerted a strong 
influence over the goals and, therefore, the structure of any 
management system (Ranson & Stewart, 1994, p.40fQ 
Thus, during the first two decades of the post-war era values 
arising fiom a growing faith in the role of the professional with their 
expert knowledge. led to forms of management that gave to 
powerful professional groups a large measure of autonomy. 
Management was a rather low-kev. back-room affair In the health 
care context, managers were, in Hanison's words, "the dipiomat[s]" 
(1988, p.31); "agents for physicians" (p 45); ensuring the smooth 
operation of the organisation in order to facilitate the work of the 
doctors. Under such an arrangement there was no need for 
management to emphasise any ethical credentials over and above 
those required to reassure the doctors for whom they were acting as 
facilitators, The doctors were content to work along with managers 
as long as they saw them as supportive and non-threatening: 
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At the level of practice within management, power is revealed 
in the capacby to determine the ‘decisions’ or the ‘outcomes’ 
within the organisation, a capacrty grounded in differential 
access to resources such as information, finance or authomy 
(Ranson & Stewart, 1994, p.43). 
On this assessment, real power resided with the medical profession 
inasmuch as it was doctors who determined the decisions and 
outcomes within the NHS, whereas those ostensibly responsible for 
managing the system were merely administrators. 
However, as government moved to a different “interpretative 
schema” - a new set of defining values that emphasised freedom, 
individualism, efficiency, and competition (Ranson & Stewart, 1994, 
pp.42,48) - questions began to be raised about the cost-effectiveness 
of medicine’s contribution to the well-being of the nation. Thus, in 
the changing political environment of the late 1970s onwards there 
was a clear shift in the balance between the values of the medicai 
profession and the specific values identified with management, 
particularly control of costs The result was the political decision to 
bring medicine, and hence the medical profession, under firmer 
finaticial control So the emphasis moved to the need for strong 
management 
This first element of the case study has demonstrated that the 
leadership of the medicai profession saw a threat to professional 
autonomy and clinical freedom not only in the NHS reforms 
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themselves, but in the process that had produced the reforms. The 
Review had specifically excluded the medical profession, denying 
them the place they knew as their moral right: at the top policy- 
making table, This exclusion was perceived as a direct challenge to 
professional status; it undermined the authority of the profession and, 
thus had to be challenged. Exclusion at that level and around such a 
fundamental issue - the future of its NHS - was an affront to the 
profession’s sense of self - the core of its ethos. The reforms 
themselves reinforced that perception. 
This thesis argues that for the medical profession, the principies 
of professional autonomy and clinical freedom bear the weight of 
guiding beliefs; they are expressions of its ethos, its fundamental 
moral spirit. They cannot and must not be lightly put aside but rather 
must be fought for and defended The leadership of the profession 
undertook that defence And “high profile” doctors who appeared to 
support the reforms faced considerable pressure from their peers 
In presenting its opposition to the public, the profession always 
emphasised its primary concern as the best interests of its patients. 
The reforms were a threat to patients and that was why the 
profession had to take a stand against them. The theory of the role of 
ethos expounded in this thesis allows us to understand this manner of 
presenting its case as itself a product of the medical ethos. 
Paternalistic concern is a principle arising from and informed by it. 
What is right for the profession is right for its patients. Clinical 
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freedom and professional autonomy are exercised for the good of 
patients and anything that undermines those principles undermines 
patients. 
NHS managers, however, operating from an alternative base 
saw matters rather differently. Outside the profession clinical 
freedom and professional autonomy translate into arrogance and 
obstructiveness (Morreli, 2001). Whatever the benefits they give to 
the profession, these are gained at considerable cost to the wider 
NHS, including patients. Hence, steps to constrain the power of the 
medical profession were welcomed and supported 
In due course the profession moved from outright opposition to 
accommodation and even, apparently, to a positive view of the 
reforms. Each position taken reflected the profession’s concern to 
protect the core values that come from its ethos “Doctors as 
managers becomes a stratagem for ensuring that no fundamental 
challenge is posed to their prevailing view of the world” (Hunter, 
1992, p 565). 
The above analysis has demonstrated that the concept of ethos 
can extend our understanding of the historical challenge presented by 
the management reforms, namely, how the leadership of the 
profession saw the challenge and why it responded as it did (Baeza 
et al, 1996 p. 130). The next element of the case study moves on 
from secondary historicai data to primary data made up of interviews 
with a number of individuai GPs. This will show how the ethos 
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influenced the responses of practitioners in a branch of the 
profession situated at the lower echelons of the medical hierarchy. 
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Chapter 6 
The Interview Data 
The chapter begins by setting out some of the technical and 
other relevant details involved in gathering and handling the 
interview material. The body of the chapter contains the full text of 
one of the interviews. This, as noted earlier, is a guided narrative. 
Comments, observations and explanations are set within the body of 
the doctor’s own narrative and lead in to a full analysis. 
Recording the Interview Data 
All but two of the 15 interviews were recorded on audio 
cassette; this was not an unproblematic procedure as on three 
occasions the equipment failed to operate properly resulting in 
material being either difficult to hear or lost completely. Of the 
interviews not recorded on cassette one was conducted over the 
telephone with the interviewer making notes as the conversation 
progressed and the other depended on brief notes made during 
interview supplemented by further notes made immediately following 
the interview 
The audio cassettes were all transcribed by a professional 
transcriber. However, no matter how competent the transcriber, this 
is by no means a straightfonvard procedure. On occasions, where 
the problems presented were of a technical nature, they were 
insoluble (Mishler, 1986, pp.47-49). Immediately after receiving 
each transcription 1 listened to the recorded interview alongside the 
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written text. Although this allowed me to correct major errors and 
"miss-hearings'' there were still several occasions on which it was 
impossible to determine the exact word or words used, however in 
the context of the point being made 1 do not think any of these gaps 
have significantly altered the meaning. I was also anxious to include 
at least some of the "non-lexical expressions" as well as those 
interruptions, overlaps, hesitations, and pauses that the transcriber 
had left out but that I considered, again in the overall context, 
particularly significant. I realise, of course, that "particularly 
significant" is a judgement that I made and others listening to the 
same text may have come to different conclusions. However, it is 
precisely this process of refining and reassessing the spoken text that 
lies at the heart of transcription: "How we arrange and rearrange the 
text in light of our discoveries is the process of testing, clarifying and 
deepening understanding of what is happening in the discourse" 
(Mishier quoted by Riessman, 1993 p 60) 
It is quite probable that were I to return to the material at some 
future date I would hear new things and change my opinion on some 
of the judgements made. There is no one "true" interpretation of the 
interview text for, as Riessman notes: "what may be the most 
persuasive interpretation of a narrative text at one historical moment 
may not be later. Our texts have unstable meanings" (Riessman, 
1993, p.66). Equally at any one time alternative interpretations will 
be viable depending on the particular theoretical perspective from 
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within which the researcher undertakes the analysis (Mishler, 1986, 
pp.115-16). Finally, it should be noted that this approach is very 
time-consuming and so 1 made the decision to limit myself to no 
more than three playbacks. 
Another decision I made was not to number, or assign made up 
names to, the quotes from the GPs as in my judgement this would 
not have added any useful information. This decision was, in part, 
forced on me by the particular circumstances of physically producing 
the thesis. I had set the data down without numbering the quotes. It 
was then suggested that numbering might be helpful so I returned to 
the data with that intention. However, my attempts to insert the 
information put a considerable strain on the equipment upon which I 
depend for writing the thesis and, thus, on my energies. The voice 
recognition system I have to use made it very difficult for me to add 
these small, but numerous bits of information So tedious and time- 
consuming did the process become that eventually 1 decided it was 
simply not a practical proposition This decision caused me 
considerable disquiet until on further reflection 1 saw that my 
approach was not uncommon and did not set any sort of precedent 
(cf. Strong and Robinson 1990, Allen, 1997), The text of one 
interview is set out in full and all the other interviews are given their 
setting to which I repeatedly refer when making direct quotes. This 
provided a degree of context sufficient to persuade me that un- 
24 1 
numbered quotes did not undermine the analysis or constitute, in any 
other way, a short-coming 
The interviews were, as I have already mentioned, of varied 
length ranging from 15 minutes to almost an hour and a half Those 
interviews that provided more material are quoted most frequently 
but all interview data is referred to and quoted from in the text with 
one interview set out in full thereby allowing the reader to set direct 
quotes found later in the text in their context Furthermore, the 
important distinction is between data from fundholders and that from 
non-fundholders This is clearly set out 
I am confident that the material quoted and analysed in the 
following pages offers not only a fair and honourable representation 
of the views expressed by all those generous enough to be 
interviewed but also a valid interpretation of those views 
The Core Interview Data 
Backwound 
In 199i the government introduced GP fundholding into the 
NHS. It was intended to give qualiíjmg Practices, originally those 
with no less than 9000 patients, responsibility for their own budget. 
In 1992 the size limit was reset at 7000 patients and by the time of 
the sixth wave it had been reduced to 5000 patients The first budget 
allocation was made up of five elements covering three areas of 
practice life: inpatient care for a limited range of surgical procedures; 
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all outpatient visits; outpatient diagnostic tests, excluding breast 
screening; prescriptions or the drugs budget; staff costs. There was 
an additional sum available for updating computer systems and 
management costs such as employing a Practice manager. 
By 1993 the budget had been considerably extended. It now 
included chiropody; dietetics; community health services; district 
nursing and health visiting; referrals from district nurses, health 
visitors and community mental handicap nurses; community and 
outpatient mental health services, mental health counselling; services 
to  those with learning disabilities. 
Although called fundholders no Practice actually held any funds. 
Instead the relevant monies were held by the FHSAs and payments 
were made either directly by that body when authorised by the 
Practice or were set against the cash limit allocated to the Practice 
However. any savings from one element of the overall budget could 
be transferred to another element 
While the general practitioner branch of the profession fully 
backed and even, through its traditional representative the BMA, 
could be said to have taken the lead in opposition to  the reforms, 
nevertheless a number of its members eventually decided to take the 
fundholding option. 
April 1991 saw 306 general Practices take responsibility for their 
own budgets, they were the first-wave of fundholders. Each year 
after that a new wave of fundholding Practices came into being, thus 
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those who became fundholders in 1992 were "second-wave", those 
in 1993 "third-wave" and so on. 
A pilot interview took place in August of 1996 with a GP who 
had, very reluctantly, joined a fundholding Practice just a few months 
earlier. The remaining interviews, forming the bulk of interview 
material, took place doing the spring and summer of 1997, a 
crossover time between fifth and six wave fundholding Practices. 
Selection of inteiviewees 
The interviewees were self selecting those interviewed had 
responded to a letter (see Appendix A) I had sent out to Practice 
managers asking if any of their GPs would be willing to assist in a 
research project looking into attitudes to fundholding It is 
appropriate to note at this juncture that, on the advice of fellow 
researchers experienced in interviewing GPs and other clinicians, no 
direct mention was made of "ethics" in the introductory letter A 
total of 84 such introductory letters were sent out to equal numbers 
of fundholding and non-fundholding Practices in one area of 
England Most failed to reply, a few declined the request, and 15 
agreed to be interviewed Of those 15 the majority (11) were 
fundholders with only four non-fundholders responding positively to 
the letter. 
I will not explore in depth the reason for this imbalance between 
the level of response fiom fund- and non-fundholders but in light of 
the controversy stirred up by the decision to become fundholders it 
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would seem reasonable to suggest that fundholders wanted to 
explain, perhaps even justifi, their new position, whereas non- 
fundholders, having chosen to continue with the established way, 
saw no reason to make time to discuss the matter, 
Although two of the fundholding interviewees were from first 
wave Practices by far the greatest number were from the third wave 
group. It has been observed that first wave fundholders as a group 
were generally more innovative and pioneering (O’Dowd, 1997), 
whereas those joining in the third wave were somewhat more 
cautious, less inclined to take risks. This generalisation perhaps fails 
to take account of the fact that the conditions Practices were 
required to meet before they could apply for fundholding status were 
changed between the first and third wave. Whereas prior to 1993 
only those Practices with 9000 or more could apply after that year 
the figure was dropped to 5000 This meant that small Practices 
prohibited from joining at an earlier date were then eligible 
Interviewees 
All bui two of the interviewees were male, of the female 
respondents one came from a fundholding Practice and one from a 
non-fundholding Practice Although none of the respondents were 
asked for their age it appeared that most were in their forties and 
fifties with one in the early thirties The majority were English and all 
were white The range of years in practice across both groups varied 
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from between 5 years, in the case of one fundholding GP, and 25 
years for three of those interviewed The rest clustered between 10- 
I 5 years 
The majority of doctors interviewed from fundholding Practices 
were “lead fundholders”, that is to say in their Practice they were the 
partner directly responsible for managing the Practice budget The 
pilot fundholder interview was not with a lead fundholder, and the 
second non-lead fundholder came from a Practice where the lead 
fundholder was not willing to be interviewed The GP who agreed 
to be interviewed had just completed an MA involving researcher- 
produced data and, knowing how difficult it was to obtain 
interviews, had taken pity on me and decided to be interviewed 
himself The youngest lead fundholder interviewed had only been 
with the partnership for a few months and had been asked to take on 
the lead partner role by the senior partner His own commitments 
prevented him undertaking lead fundholding responsibilities and it 
appeared that by appointing such a young lead fundholder he was in 
a position to maintain quite a considerable degree of influence and 
control behind the scenes 
None of the Practices served densely populated urban43 areas 
although most of the areas covered have been undergoing relatively 
It has been suggested to me that doctors working in inner cities may well have 
expressed Mews rather different from my sample. Even II that were the case it 
would not alter the focus of my research which is the medical profession and its 
ethos. The interviews demonstrate the impact of that ethos on the thinking of a 
particular group of doctors at a particular time. While indiyiduai doctors will 
13 
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rapid expansion; three Practices covered different parts of the 
population in the main town of a highly rural county, the rest covered 
medium-sized, but mainly small, towns and villages with their 
scattered outlying rural populations. 
Thirteen of the Practices were multi-partnerships although none 
had more than 7 partners, the remainder were two partner Practices. 
Location and lenrith 
Most of interviews took place in the surgery of the GP 
concerned, however two were conducted in small local, to the GP, 
hospitals and one over the telephone (this was a particularly difficult 
interview to conduct as the recording equipment was not suitable for 
use over telephone and I found some problems with taking notes). 
The majority of the interviews lasted from between 60 to 90 minutes 
while one was just 15 minutes. 
The Core Inleiview 
.4 number of factors influenced my decision to select the 
following as the core interview The most important deciding factor 
was that the views expressed by this GP were absolutely typical of 
the views expressed by the majority of fundholding interviewees 
(Any significant divergence will be highlighted later in the analysis ) 
respond differently to that ethos its influence within the profession and over the 
body of practitioners is the point at issue. Furthermore. reading the account of one 
GP based in an East End of London Practice shows that while he clearly eschewed 
many of the values I have identifed with the medical ethos his form of practice, 
with its paternalistic view of his patients, was still very much in the tradition of the 
ethos (Widgei-y, 1992). 
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The interview is full and detailed both in terms of the ground covered 
and the depth of responses. There was also an absence of technical 
hitches in the taping and transcribing of the material. Finally, it is a 
good length. Not so short that little of substance emerges but not so 
long as to lose its focus. 
This interview took place in May 1997 in the GP’s consulting 
room. No written notes were taken during the interview but the 
whole 75 minutes was recorded on cassette. Transcribed material 
follows the numbering used in the original transcription. 
Listening hack over the tapes it is quite noticeable that whilst in 
the main the GP, who came across as quite an expansive, genial 
person, spoke very fluently with considerable self-assurance there 
were occasions when he took noticeably more time trying to find the 
right words, indeed he was at some pains to do so. At these points 
there would be a significant starting, stopping, pausing, hesitating 
and I have tried to show in the transcription these changes in his 
general manner of presentation. 
Within the whole narrative account the GP introduces his own 
stories. In the majority of cases these are used to reinforce or justify 
his assessment of a particular situation. The one exception is in the 
telling of the story of how the Practice used its funds to empower 
“our girls”, the nurses attached to the Practice. 
The GP concerned had been in practice for 22 years, he was the 
The Practice comprised five partners three of lead fundholder. 
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whom had been together for a couple of decades with the remaining 
two partners having been with the partnership for nine years. The 
Practice was situated in the centre of the largest town in the county; 
a Practice had been on the site for several generations of patients and 
now the patient population of just under 9500 came from all over the 
town as even when patients moved away from the Practice 
catchment area they generally stayed on the books. The Practice 
became fundholding in 1991192, hence it was first wave. 
M e r  gathering this background information I asked 
3) CD What are your responsibilities in the Practice with 
regard to fundholding? 
GP 
CD You are? 
Well 1 am the responsible partner 
In di.scu.s.sing his role as lead ,fuiidholder the GP drew a 
drstrnction hetweeit the ideal method qf operatiiig and that which 
pructicalities dictuteà as the modus operandi. In so doing, he 
introduced a fheme that reappeared several time.v throtcghout the 
rest I$ the interview, and became a ,familiar topic in all the 
interviews, tzamely, tension. ïhese tensions were not, however, 
linked in the main to speclfic ethical concerns. They were much 
Underlinings show speech overlaps I4 
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more to do with the profession’s ethos than priiicipalisf medical 
ethics. 
GP: Yes. So I suppose I’m responsible . . . . . .  Ideally I’m 
responsible for taking my partners ideas for how they want to see 
change forward and try to implement them. In practice, because 
since the new contracts general practice has become much more 
busy, I honestly believe a lot of my partners don’t have enough time 
to  think through the issues, uhm and therefore they tend to rely on 
me to have the ideas as well. Which is possibly a little unhealthy. 
It woidd have been ititeresting io ktiow what he meant by “a 
little unhealthy”. I should have asked However I didn’t and as 
there was not an opportuniîy for second interview that question 
remained unasked On this occasion, I believe it is not unreasonable 
to surmise that he i.y sïqge.stiiig that possib& too much of the 
formidating of policy, as well as the carrying of policy through, 
resided in himself a,v Iead Jirridholúer rather than being a more 
group hased decision. I n  fact, this seems to be the point he develops 
in response to my next question. 
4) CD. So what dictates the approach? 
GP: I mean it ought to be possible, if it’s a priority, to  make 
time. But inevitably whenever you do it’s not other peoples’ 
priorities. Other people, as long as they’re getting the change they 
want, and you’ve got a general feeling for the way they want to 
move, they tend to let you get on with it. Though, of course, there’s 
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always the danger that if you move too fast in the wrong way, too 
fast 0 the wrong way, then they’ll ensure that your changes are 
sabotaged 
This respon.se, and particularly “then they ’Il ensure that your 
changes are sabotaged”, suggested a certain degree of tension in 
the partnership and1 tried to explore /his firther. 
5 )  CD: Does that create tensions in the Group as partners.. . 
GP:. . .  I’m aware of them, yes. 
The fone of this comment conveys an icnwiílirzgness to discuss 
the matter further, my next remark was at2 attempt to try and 
rncozcrage the deseiopment of /he subject. 
6 )  CD: Is that a difficult balancing act at times? 
GP: We’re very lucky in this partnership. three of the partners 
have been together for 22 years. The others have been in the 
partnership for 9 years. And I think if you’re working with people 
you know that well, and we had a very big debate before we went 
into fundholding, you know where everybody’s coming from. And 
so you, in a way, you’re able to deliver what they want really 
without having to write off two or three afternoons to brainstorm it 
all and formalise it ail and do what, in any reasonable management 
structure, is the way you’d normally go about it. But I think that if 
you’ve got Practices with a number of new partners then you’ve got 
to use the conventional management techniques and you’ve got to  
get everybody sitting down and deciding what they do want out of it. 
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7he telling of this piece of narrative, the story v j  a happy, 
united Practice, in response to my suggestion that the posi tioii he 
had just  outlined called, for >’ a delicate balancing act”,. appears to 
be an attempt to o11 the part of the Iloctor to move the disczcssion 
a w q  from the issue of possible tensions. ïhis may be because we 
are very early in the interview; as the interview progresses there are 
further opportunities to explore the nature of the tensions that he 
perceived arose from his position as a jrndholding practitioner. 
We nvw moved onto the question qf why the Practice took the 
firndholding route? 
GP: One of my partners was convinced that if we didn’t 
(speaking qirite slowly with longish pauses) we wouldn’t get our 
share of the resources. That, looking to what was, . . .  what the 
government of the time was doing in schools, uhm with respect to 
putting resources into “favoured” schools, if you like, that unless we 
got some control over the funds we were (pause) we were not going 
to be able to, you know, get the resources we wanted. 
7) CD: Self-preservation? 
Zhis leads the GP to an assessment qf the quality of 
manugemerit by the local health authority. He now narrates the 
stoty o f a  Health Authority merger to reinforce his assessment that 
they knew “notking ahotrt primaïy care ”, were ‘>pretty boring”, 
“incapable of new ideas”, ‘protecting their own backs”, “not 
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corisidering the health care of the popziiatiori at all”. lhis 
judgement appeared to provide the main justificaiion for the 
Practice deciding to become jirndholders. 
GP. 1 think it probably was, it probably was Initially, I think it 
was, yes. Uhm the bottom line (pause), yes it was a self preservation 
thing. The bottom line we asked ourselves ..., I mean we had major 
problems with the health authority. You know, in those days the 
FHSA for [this county] was quite good. [County] health, there was 
an East [county] and a West [county]; East [county] health authority 
knew nothing about primary care and it really was a pretty(8 second 
pause) uhm, I shouldn’t say conservative when we have a 
Conservative party but uhm, it was pretty boring, it wasn’t ... it was 
incapable of new ideas, right. Also the first thing they decide to do 
with the changes was to merge East and West health Authorities. so 
the result was that for the first year or two all the management of the 
health authority was protecting their own backs, uhm and not 
considering the health care of the [county] population at all. And it 
was quite obvious that this was going to happen, it was quite 
obvious that, speaking to the people who were supposed to be 
making the decisions, that they really knew nothing about delivering 
care on, you know, at the sort of GP hospital interface . Uhm and 
they were going to be totally preoccupied by protecting their jobs. 
And in fact ..., so we thought well we’d better get on with it and do it 
ourselves. So I think there was an element of. .., we thought, we 
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thought we could buy care better than the health authority could. 
And I think we were proved ..., personally 1 think that in the first 
three or four years we were proved right. The health authority firstly 
had its merger, then it had a reorganisation where lots of jobs went; 
for, I think for three or four years, I really don't think they made any 
sensible management decisions because all the people in management 
were protecting their jobs and, you know, and worrying about 
reorganisation and whether they'd still have, you know, a job at the 
end of the year. And they just, I think they took their eye off the 
ball, bluntly. They were a shambles. 
8) CD: You were keeping your eye on the ball? 
GP: That's right Absolutely 
I tzow n'anted to try aird clarrh the thitikrng behind rhe decision. 
9) CD: One tends to think that first-wave fundholders had an 
ideological motivation . 7 
GP: No that wasn't the case with our Practice, no. I mean I 
do .., I think we were aware, and we're still aware, ípat~sing) that 
there are major stresses 
(echoing Ïnajorproblems '' of earlier reply) 
within the health service between uhm, free., . a service which is free 
at the point of use and the fact that there is only a limited and finite 
resource. I mean, Enoch Powell said 30 odd years ago, that the 
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problem with the health service is that if you . . .  if the cost is zero the 
demand is infinite, you know, in purely economic terms. So I think 
we were aware ..., we were aware of that problem but I don’t think 
we had any ideological commitment to the market to solve the 
problem. You know, you either need a better market or you need 
more central resources funnelled into it to solve its problems. And 
we didn’t actually believe that the internal market was going to be ..., 
the internal market was a bog-up, frankly, it’s not a market at ali. 
You know, it didn’t .., it ..., uh there was no . , . ,  the ..., demand was 
not ..., 
(speaking sluwíy and thoughtfully) 
demand was not controlled by any pressure on the patient to come 
up with something, was there? You know ..., do-you-know-what-1- 
mean So, so it wasn’t a precise . . . .  So there was no ideological 
aspect there. No. 
The manner of these responses, fhe hesitations and carejd 
searching for uord~s, somelimes apparently unsuccessfullv, (“Y ou 
know.. ., do-you-know-what-I-mean. So, so it wasn’t a precise. .”.) 
indicated that ihere had been rather more reservations, even 
tensions, about the whole decision than perhaps he intended to 
suggest. I now tried io explore this,fiirther. 
i O) CD: Were there any qualms.. . 
GP: . . .  yes ... 
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CD:, . . personal qualms for you? 
GP: I wasn’t the original partner who had the right id . . .  the, the 
the idea to go in, but I was the sort of compromise candidate who 
was asked to look at it. And the more I looked at it the more I 
realised that health authorities were going to be a shambles and 
that., . fundholding was really concerned with the manageable part of 
health care. You know, cold operations, out patients. And that if 
you actually ring-fenced that you could make major efficiency 
savings within it, I mean the situation pre-1990/91 where our local 
hospital closed for two months in the summer, because they’d run 
out of money because they’d been treating emergencies, meant they 
had millions of quid’s worth of theatres lying idle, millions of, you 
know, not millions but a number of surgeons doing virtually nothing. 
Somebody suggested, one of the surgeons suggested, uhm rather 
than having a Works Department giving the anaesthetists paint 
brushes uh so they could do something useful! 1 mean the situ ..., you 
know the whole thing ground to a halt. Now, vou know, if you ring 
fenced the money for cold surgery, obviously you could then plan it, 
you w u l d  use those theatres effectively and you could bring unit 
costs down Had to happen. So the more 1 looked at it the more I 
realised that if we had a ring fenced budget for those sort of, you 
know, those sori of procedures we could plan it, decide what our 
resources were, buy extra capacity on the margin at a cheaper rate, 
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bring our waiting lists down, and uhm deliver better health care for 
our patients, better s e c o n d q  health care for our patients. 
ïhe story qf the closed theatres is told to illustrate just haw 
hadly managed resources were Tinder the old system. Fundholding 
allowed GPs to recti& some of these inefjciericies. 
11) CD: You saw the positive side . . .  
GP: . . .  the positive side of ring-fencing. But you didn't have to 
invent GP fundholding to ring-fence that funding. But nobody had 
thought of ring-fencing that funding before and as a resuit cold 
procedures were the poor relation of the health service and not 
getting a fair deal. 
At fîrsi reading thi.r f.11 and very interesting response didn't 
seem to address the qtiestion asked However. when i reread it 
several times more, I realised that the answer. and especially the 
nurrative elements. ($fered quite an insight into the presstires that 
lhe whole , fundholding debate hadplaced on the Practice. Thus, the 
GP describes himself as lhe 'Sort oj compromise candidate" asked 
to examine the jindholding option for the group. Lbes this 
s7iggest that some partners were concerned that they might he 
bulldozed into fundholding by the partner who'd had the origmal 
idea, so there was need for a more neutral cutididate to carefilly 
examine the options? Twice he uses the phrase: "The more I looked 
at it the more i realised" suggesting that he was weighing tip the 
arguments and gaining new insights. ïhen he ofsers two reasons 
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why he found ,firndholding an acceptable route for the Practice to 
take. One, "that health authorities were going to be a shambles" 
and two, that fundholding was a system for ring fencing what he 
calls "the manageable part of health care" cold operations, 
outpatients and alike, thereby allowing for more efficient use of 
resources and the delivery of better secondary health care, To 
illustrate the level of inefïciency under a non-ring fenced Aystem, he 
0flet-s the example of a local hospital that had to close its theatres 
for two months because they had run out of money for anything 
other than emergency work. ïhus, he seems to be suggesting that, 
having looked at the whole question from a more neutral position 
than that taken by some of his partners, he had been persuaded that 
,fiindholding could be worthwhile. Nonetheless, it seems clear ,from 
his comment "but ,vou didn't have to invent GP,findholding to ring 
.fence that funding': that he still saw the ,fundholding option as a 
compromise, bui one that wa.7 probably wnrth pur.surng. 
Perhaps though he was simply hying by this lengthy response, 
to gather his thoughts by directing the discussion away from a 
.subject he did m i  want discuss any more directly. 7his occurs as a 
possible option when it is noted that, despite indicating some degree 
of reservation, the GP clearly says just a .few moments latter (see 
below) "I personally had had no qualms at all". 
Whatever the case, at the time I thought we hadn't looked in 
sujiìcient detail at the qualms partners may have had about 
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,fundholding. 7herefore I decided to and take the matter a little 
further. I by began with a brief summary of what had just been said 
before coming back to the origrnal question. 
12) CD: So you saw a need to do something about the way 
resources were being used and then fundholding came in as the 
Government’s answer, though not necessarily an ideal answer. Did 
you personally have any problems with the concept of fundholding? 
GP. I personally had no qualms at all. Providing we were given 
a fair budget and not an excessive budget, because that would create 
other tensions, I had no qualms at all.... 
This mutter of “a fair budget” will come up uguin when we 
discuss how the possibility of tensions created by an excessive 
budget became u reality. 
. . ,  . . .  Amongst the partners, 1 think we had three positive and two 
negative. One of the negative became positive, the other one was 
always a bit negative and at our final meeting we said. “look you’ve 
got the right to veto this; this is a big change, you don’t, you 
know. i if you really want to say no then say . . .  veto”. And he 
abstained. So we moved in on a sort of four out of five majority, if 
you like. 
13) CD: And the sort of concerns expressed by others in the 
Practice were of what nature? 
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GP: Uhm, they were about.. I think.. gosh. I didn’t express 
them so I can’t really answer the question because your asking me to 
interpret other people’s motives. 
By this time I judged it was possible for me to press a question 
a little harder, bui I didn’t expect to be allowed to get away with 
pushing this purticirlur line us fur as I did. However, us it was 
central to the whole thrust qf the interview I had to have a go. 
14) CD. But you must have discussed them? 
GP: Oh yes, but that’s what people say is the matter. That’s 
not what’s really the matter. 
IS) CD: I see. So what was ostensibly presented as a problem? 
GP: What was ostensibly presented as the matter was that 
u h  . . . .  What was ostensibly presented as the matter was that it . . .  
that it involved money and that money was somehow alien to the 
health service culture, I mean, to which you could reply well call it 
resource points; we never see the money anyway, it’s only a figure at 
the end of a. ,  you know, call them Monopoly money, or multiply it 
by ten or divide it by ten, or whatever. But, ya, I mean, there was 
the, the, there was also 1 think, there was a huge amount of pressure 
from hospital consultants Who were very much against it because 
they could see power shifting. And they, hospital consultants, have a 
lot of subliminal power over GPs. GPs sort of tug their forelocks, 
still, a lot, to consultants. And 1 think there was pressure brought, 
there were people feeling they were rocking the boat, they were, you 
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know, upsetting the established hierarchy of things and they didn’t 
like.. . they felt uncomfortable with that. And I think that was actually 
the biggest reason. 
Here was the f i n t  mention of the po.nibilify of an ethical 
coniflict, a partner expressing a moral concern about the 
fundholding route, but his colleague, who apparently had no such 
qualm (“I personally had no qualms at all”), was not prepared to 
accept that line of argument dimissing it as a mere subterfigee; the 
high moral ground covering over a raiher less noble motives, 
namely a disinclination to upset the status qzto, a hending weakly to 
the “suhliminal power ” of hospital consultants who saw 
fiindholding as a threat to iheir power base. ï&e moral concern was 
actual4 forelock tugging hy a GI’ to a consultant. In other worh, 
based more on values arising jrom the traditional ethos than 
moàern principdist medien1 ethics. 
It is iniere.sting that the expressed concerns. ai least in this 
partnership were , foeused around the issue of money. One partner 
had no qualms at all providing ihe Practice wasn’t seen to be 
getting an unfair budget: the other partner felt uncomfortable with 
the whole concept because “it involved money and . . . .  money was 
somehow alien to the health service culture”. Yet, whilst the first 
concern was presenied as valid the latíer was not. The thinking 
behind this assessment became, in my view, clearer as the interview 
progressed 
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16) CI>: From the point of view of your Practice here, what 
has been the most significant difference since becoming fundholding? 
The most significant? If you’d have asked me that two 
years ago I would have said to you: virtually abolishing our waiting 
list. Uhm, we had brought our waiting list down so that virtually no 
patient waited for more than (long p u s e )  5 to 6 months, and most 
of our patients were seen and treated within three months. Then we 
started to run into problems because there was a lot of..  a lot of 
backlash. Uhm, actually also from some of the other fundholders. 
GP: 
CD: Really 
GP: Uhm, people assumed we had more money than anybody 
else. Actually we didn’t; out of the 12 fundholders round here we’re 
about the fourth lowest funded per capita. But then, uhm, [town] 
hospital had major problems with their theatres, they had to rebuild 
their theatres, there were long waiting lists. waiting lists went up 
because ofthat. We didn’t feel that we wanted to move patients 
around horrendously, so we did actually allow waiting lists to move. 
16af CD: Rather than going out of [area]? 
This comment refers to the jiindholders option io contract with 
ho.ypita1.s outside iheir immediate area for care of their patients. 
GP: Rather than go out of [area].. . 
A positive aspect ofjindholding, namely the abilig to bring 
waiting lists down so that “m9si patients were seen and treated 
within three months ” was abandoned apparently out of concern for 
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those same patients: “we didn’t feel we wanted to move patients 
around horrendously, so we did actirally allow waiting lists to go 
up”. Yet, the next remark points to another motive. 
....Uhm and that defused some ofthe political problems. 
Earlier in our discussion this GP hud castigated his colleague 
for presenting what was, in his judgement, nothing more than 
,forelock tugging to the consultants. rather than a concern ahout 
undermining the ethical principle on which the NHS was hased 10 
the outsider, however, the decision to “allou! (an interesting use of 
the word linked to the increased power (2’s were discovering they 
ha4  waiting lists to go zip I ’  seems io he as much, and perhaps even 
more ahout relieving some of the tensions building up between 
professional colleagues, “a lot qf backlash” even from other 
,fiindholder.s, than ahouí the good qf the patients Hut it is the 
‘ethical principle ’, paiieiit.r he.rt interests, thul is pre,reented as the 
ïhe extent and nature of the primav motivation .for the decision. 
tension is now descrihed. 
. . . .  I mean, some of my friends who are consultants were having 
some problems. You know, they’d say, well I’ve got to do this list 
for (names his Practice) because we’re bound on the contact. And 
within the hospital there were tensions about that: “why should we? 
Why should you do that? What about these patients?’ ‘Well we’re 
not getting paid for those patients”. You-know-what-I-mean? “ 
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We’ve got this contact with (names his Practice).. ”. It was creating 
some difficulties. Uhm, and as I say, uhm initially 1 thought that was 
the main thing, but actually it probably wasn’t. Uhm, probably it 
wasn’t because all we were doing was getting a short-term gain for 
our patients rather than really changing the system. Probably, in the 
medium term, I think in the medium term, the potential for what we 
can do in primary care maybe, may turn out to be the greatest 
change. Uhm, for instance, uhm, this building (referring to the well 
equipped surgery complex. A large building that included a new 
mitior surgery tinit.) I think probably cost 750K. Now there was 
absolutely no way we could have funded that through existing 
schemes. And we did actually only get 50Ks worth of savings from 
the fundholding. But that allowed us . . .  ail that 50K was spent on 
resources for health visitors, district nurses, and CPN service, and 
that son of thing. So it wasn’t actually spent on the GPs, it was 
spent on ancillary services 
Anofher of /he issires that created tensions between fund- and 
liori-ficiidholders, was the fact that .firndholders could keep back 
.savings made from their hirdgeis and, by such actions as increasing 
the valile of their jointly held building, apparently profit personally 
from fundholding, Noti-fundholders interviewed had talked angrily 
about this siphoning of  of funds. Here the GP is at pains io 
emphasise that ail savings were ploughed back into patient care, in 
this case by improving the range of ancillary services. 
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. . . . And we have excellent health visitors; they are running things 
like stress management clinics, childhood eczema clinics, enuresis 
(bed-wetting) clinics, they’re doing a lot of things which within.,, 
And we’ve got an in-house CPN who’s has his own office here and 
we work really close ... he’s in everyday; the management of 
psychotics is so much better when you’re seeing people all the time. 
You know, 1-1-1 think actually being able to ..., having the freedom to 
put a bit of extra money into.. . uhm resources in primary care.. .
16b) CD: m m  . . .  
GP:. , .and allowing people to fulfil what they think they can do 
with their jobs, is probably going to be more important than just a 
temporary shortening of waiting-lists. Uhm, however we sat all the 
health visitors, and district nurses, and Practice nurses down, and we 
said: “ Look, you know, okay, clean sheet of paper, what would you 
really like to be doing with their [sic] jobs?” And they were sort of 
L eobsmacked. their managers had never asked them questions like 
that, you know. Up until then health visitors did nothing but sort of 
do developmental checks on nought to fives 
CD: nought to five’s, yes.. . 
GP: d’ you know what I mean! Uhm so the idea of actually 
being empowered to do . . .  and we’re going to take . . .  we . . .  I’m now 
chairman of a multi-fund of fundholders and that’s an idea 1 want to 
take forward in the autumn across the ten Practices in the multi-fund, 
you know. And looking to use health visitors, you know, minor 
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illness clinics, uhm all sorts of. . .  which would help with the load on 
GPs, but also developing their own skills and possibly, you know, 
swapping, cross Practice transfers so that, you know, our girl will be 
the, if you like, the enuresis specialist and she might help enuresis 
management across three or four Practices, some other health visitor 
might do something else. You know, I think it’s the, the ability to 
affect change within primary care. 
17) CD You’ve got flexibility. 
GP: Exact . . .  and that is where 1 think the real benefits are going 
to come from, you know, but that’s taking a long time because 
changing attitudes and-and, bluntly, having the guts to do it, ahh has 
been, you know, that’s-that’s come later I think 
i 8) CD: Ya, ya, because initially you saw it in terms of, as you 
say, shortening waiting lists? 
GP. Ya, I just saw it as a sort of mechanistic exercise, you 
know, we could uhm, uhm . .  purelv economic terms. vou know, 
uhm, you know, buy this amount of operations if we make., .; in the 
early days it was quite easy to make savings on drug budgets because 
drug budgets were relatively generous now their absolutely 
horrendously tight, that’s a major problem; but if you could make a 
£30000 saving on a £U2 million drug budget you had €30000 to go 
back to the hospital with. Now you go back to the hospital with 
&30000 and do a marginal cost deal on another 70 patients and 
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you’ve only got 140 on your waiting list, it tumbles pretty damn 
quick, you see. 
CD: Yes, yes. 
GP: Uhm, so it was possible, as I say But again, but that, as I 
say, created tensions, it created tensions within the hospital which 
were unhealthy; it created tensions within the medicai community 
which was unhealthy. Unless other people got their act together; and 
I kept saying to people: “look why don’t you do the same?’ But 
they didn’t have quite the control over their drug budgets, or they 
couldn’t . . .  they didn’t seem to get their act together. So it didn’t 
happen. 
Once again we returned to the theme of tensions around the 
budget and savings, this seems to have been the issue that set 
fundholders apart ,from the rest of “the medical communig ’I, and 
roused the greatest gerieral hostiíily toward~~iidholders. li appears 
(hai much of the time w m  ,spent working ou1 a c«mpromi.se position 
in order to facilitate a reasoriable workitig relationship withiti their 
home di.ytrict. 
19) CD: Getting control over drug budgets. How have 
partners responded? 
GP: I think . . . .  to be honest, in the early days, you know, uhm, a 
lot of GPs were using a lot of expensive antibiotics because that’s 
what the drug reps were coming round saying, now all the evidence 
is that for 95% of conditions in general practice the older fashioned, 
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cheaper, generic products get just as good results and you can, you 
know, save a lot of money by using them. If you then use those 
products that are just as effective, the patients aren’t suffering, uhm 
and your freeing up money for other things. I think things have 
become so tight now that actually (longish pause) you could almost 
say that GPs in general are not spending enough money on some 
drugs. You know, in some areas. 
CD: Because of the financial pressures? 
GP: Because of the financial pressure, ya. Ya, I think it’s, it’s 
going to be.. . . I mean, whether., ,, because we’ve had good financial 
controls in this Practice, it hasn’t hit us - yet, 1 think it might do this 
current year, uhm, for the first time in seven years. But what I said 
to my partners when we embarked on it, I said: “look, 1 think we’ve 
got five years on this, after that everything’s going to tighten up and 
it’s time to drop it” So we’ve had two more years than we expected. 
ïhis assessment, offered apparentlv at the outset of the project, 
itdicuted that the Pructice did not see ,fiinúholding as a long-tem 
option, hiit us n short to mediiim term opportimiiy to change the 
boundaries ~ I J  favour of primary care. Eundholding presented a 
business opportunity for those whose business was health cure. The 
consideratiotis of modem medical ethics did not appear to figure 
prominently in this equation. However, it was thought important to 
keep the pressure ojf the sensitive areas. 
21) CD: Mmm When you say drop it ..... ? 
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GP: Well, bluntly, bluntly, if this government decides it wants to 
do away with fundholding it doesn’t have to pass an Act of 
Parliament, it just tells health authorities to h o c k  everybody’s 
budgets by IO%, doesn’t it, you know? The whole thing becomes 
unviable, and if that happens you’ve got to walk away from it. 
22) CD: It may be forced upon you? 
GP: Ya. 
23) CD You talked earlier about multi-funds and that seems to 
be one of the alternatives that is being suggested now. 
GP: That’s why we formed a multi-fund, yes. 
CD. Right? 
GP: Ya. 
24) CD: Again, seeing the direction things are going 
in the future?. 
GP Well, trying to But it’s a bit bloody difficult, isn’t it, with 
this government? I mean, vou h o w ,  I’ve got nothing against them, 
uhm, but it’s actually quite difficult, it was incredibly ..., one thing 
they would not do in their manifesto or pre-election, was tie 
themselves down to what they were going to do, in terms of the 
detail we want to see where we’re going in the health service. So, I 
mean, I think we live in a very uncertain time, we don’t know. 
25) CD: Has that been a problem? You’re not clear exactly 
where it’s going? 
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GP: I mean, I mean, it’s been an advantage, hasn’t it? It’s been 
a huge advantage in the past because fundholding was fhe, you 
know, the blue-eyed baby of the Conservative government, purely by 
accident, but it was. So, you know, you could always pick up the 
phone to Region and have a bit of a moan at them and things got 
sorted out. Uhm, this last year things have changed, the Region has 
read the tea-leaves, you know, their not going to be quite SO close to 
fundholders as they were. 
CD: Oh right. 
GP: But the political situation has been one that has been very 
useful to exploit when health authorities have been a bit slow to 
move. 
26) CD: Ya, so it sounds as if, as you say, for the first five 
years, and possibly seven, it has been a reasonably fnendly wicket to 
bat on? 
GP. Yes, ves. If you managed things well. 
27) CD, By the lead fundholder? 
GP: Yes, and he’s got to have good information, so the 
financial information that’s coming through’s got to be good 
28) CD: Has fundholding changed the way you see and 
approach decisions as a GP? 
GP: I suppose it must do. I think one is (longish pause), one is 
probably more aware of the cost-benefits, and one queries (pause) 
much more (pause) whether it’s worth using the secondary sector in 
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certain areas where you know very well, 20 odd years of experience 
has told you, they don’t deliver much and they are going to turn you 
out a bill for two or three thousand pounds for it, do you know what 
I mean? So, 1 think ya, I think you become ..., I think you must ..., 
you must become much more cost aware. Uhm, now whether that’s 
a , , . ,  in conventional medicine that’s a bad thing (long pause) but I 
think it’s something we’ve got to get to grips with anyway. 
29) CD: When you say that in conventional medicine that’s a 
bad thing what do YOU mean? 
GP: , . .  ya, ya I mean the doctor’s is supposed to be there too0 
(pause) too0 be the patient’s advocate and get the best (pause), the 
best he can for that patient. And he’s beginning to have to view 
things in terms of (pause) the good of the community rather than the 
good of the patient. And there are, obviously, increasing conflicts 
there, you know, 
Here we had an issue that appears to have caused the til’ 
considerable problems, words such as “increasing conflict”, 
“constant dilemma ’*  “tension ” are used ï b  illustrate the nature of 
the dilemma, and to emphasise the cost to the NHS of the 
traditional role of the doctor as patient s advocate, at ihis point he 
wanted to introduce a particular example. bui aware of my 
wheelchair he didn ‘t want to cause distress so first he had to clear 
the wqy for what he wished to sq. 
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30) i mean, uhm, with respect, I don’t know what your 
condition is uhm. 
( I  very briefly named my ‘condition I . )  
GP. Okay Well let’s take something like MS. That’s why I 
didn’t want to  put my foot in it. Uhm, you know, you’ve got these 
new drugs coming in, say, right? Now, as a GP one would say to 
your patient: “Well look, let’s at least give it a go”. And yet the 
evidence is that very, very few people are going to benefit and, then, 
only very much on the margin and maybe for only six months or a 
year and then, at the end of that time, they’re going to  be back to 
square one. So, the health economist would say, this isn’t an 
effective intervention. 10000 quid’s worth of drugs for the year, you 
know, we could get 20 cataracts done for that price. At the end of 
the year the patient’s going to  be back at square one, ail we’ve done 
is loosen them up a bit. For the patient it’s very important to be 
loosened up. dav’s. .. that .., d’vou see what 1 mean? 
CD: Ya,ya. 
GP: So, you’ve got this constant dilemma, haven’t you? 
Between the individuai, who, obviously, wants the latest thing, at 
least to  try, If you’re terminally ill your going to clutch at ail straws. 
CD: Right.. 
GP: And yet, statistically, that straw may be a busted flush. 1 
mean on the . . .  you know, there’s a hyperbaric oxygen machine in the 
(home for care of MS patients) in a , . . ,  out in (nearby large village) 
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which was going to be the answer to MS 20 years ago, you know. 
The population raised, the population of [town] raised, €200,000, 
when that was quite a lot of money, to get that machine. They were 
totally useless; but we had to have it because the demand for it was 
there. That’s, that’s the tension. 
31)  CD: Extrapolating fiom that a little bit. Is there a tension 
as you as a fundholder think about your little area, your patient 
population, against the wider locality and you say my patients first? 
GP: There those are the sort of conflicts. 
32) CD: Is that a particular problem with fundholding? 
GP: I think if you’ve got patients waiting for cataract 
operations, I don’t have any particular problems. Because, to my 
mind, 20 cataracts is worth more than 10000 quids worth of non- 
effective health care. Now, trying to explain that to that one patient 
may be a problem, uhm, and that’s where, you know, I think the 
government’s been deliberatelv naughty in . ~ in saving all these 
decisions must be made locally, you know, at health authority level 
or even at Practice level. I mean, it would be much easier if centrally 
a decision was made that this was not an effective mechanism and, 
therefore, it would not be part of, uhm, NHS treatment. Now those 
decisions are now being made by health authorities, ‘cos somebody’s 
got to make them. The trouble is you get different health authorities 
making different decisions, different things. So you find Mrs X, one 
side of the border, can get a treatment and h4rs Y can’t. I don’t 
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know whether you read that down in Bristol, some sort of breast 
cancer treatment. 
CD:Yes. 
GP. Uhm, so. The government’s made damn sure that they 
haven’t. . .  
CD: . , the buck doesn’t stop.. . . 
GP: ,., stop with them, yes. Uhm which is a shame because, 
bluntly, it’s much easier to say to people: “look, I’m sorry, this isn’t 
available on the health service” full stop (longish pause) than it is to, 
you know. If people say: “you’re a fundholder, you’ve got the 
money” then you’ve got to say: “well, I’m sorry, you know, even 
though we’re fundholders we’re not prepared to fund procedures 
that are not available for non-fundholders”. You know, you have to 
use various strategies to get around that I think. 
Here the GP seemed to he saying that decisions regarding what 
rreatments can and cannot he offered to patients ought to be made 
centrally and applied nationally. But a.s we developed this theme he 
a h  made the point that he wanted less centralised control, more 
freedom to run his .show as he . s a w  fit. Furthermore. he argued 
strongly ,for doctors accepting responsibihiy for their spending 
taking much more accoiinf of costs against benefits when making 
treatment decisions. 
This somewhat contradictory set of arguments well illustrated 
the challenge that ficndholding presented to conventional medical 
274 
thinking. Here was a doctor prepared, as a firndholder, to accept 
what doctors by tradition had seen as beyond their area of concern, 
namely, the cost implications of their treatment decisions. The 
profession had up to now regarded that either as a matter for the 
patient themselves, or some third par@ mainly over recent decades 
the state-jùnded NHS. And yet this GP was still clearly 
uncomfortable with the full implications of stepping outside the 
îraditional medical position; he still wanted someone else io take 
some of the responsibiliq for making the diflicirlt treatmeni 
allocation decisions a limited budget made unavoidable. 
These points are developed following my secorid attempt to 
raise the isme of jmdholding Practices having a ring fenced 
budget, a point made forcejrlly by the non-jundholders í’d 
interviewed 
33)  CD- Oh right. Yes, but then in terms of fundholding. 
Your concern is with your patients. in a sense. your budget is nng- 
fenced for [your Practice]. Now, if, as you mentioned earlier, you 
save, say. &iO,O(>O on your drug budget then you can use that money 
within your Practice for what you want to do. Whereas under the 
old arrangement, if that money was saved, it would go into a larger 
pot and maybe benefit a broader spectrum, or a particular group who 
were, at the wider level, in difficulties that maybe were not 
necessarily reflected in your Practice. Does that present some 
problems to you? 
275 
ïhe response identified the problem that arose when people 
That is to say, whet1 they made arms íeiigth spetzdiïzg decisions. 
were riot direct& affected by the corisequerzces of those decisions. 
GP: I think there’s a dan., ,, I mean 1 think if-if-if the benefits of 
the savings are too far removed from the people making the savings, 
then there’s no incentive to make the savings. So you’re not going 
to get them anyway. Right? 
CD Ya. 
GP: Now, I mean its, it’s an interesting issue and it’s one that, I 
hope, we’ve resolved within the multi-month. What we’ve done in 
the multi-fund is restricted the amount of savings that any Practice 
can keep for themselves to, say, £10-£15000. And ail the rest will 
go into the multi-fund (pause) savings for multi-fund development. 
So that the Practices will still get a benefit ‘cos they’ll share in those 
developments. 
34) CD. So there is still an incentive 
GP So ,,, there has to be yeah And now, it might well be that, 
as the multi-fund develops, and savings get less and we can show 
that the multi-fund centrally can give benefits to the individual 
Practices, that we can do away with the concept of being able to 
spend savings locally. But we have to keep the incentive there. 
35) CD: Yes. So it was a problem that you recognised and had 
to deal with? 
GP: Oh yes. That’s right. 
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Rut the incentive io make savings raises ifs own problems and it 
is to fhis that I now turned 
36) CD: Thinking about savings? Is there ever a temptation to 
provide “in-house” more cheaply that which might be ‘better’, from 
the patient’s point of view, provided outside? I notice, for example, 
that you have a minor surgery unit here. I’m sure that that is a 
thoroughly good thing but is there a potential problem? 
GP: Yes, of course there is. But actually I, I mean I don’t think 
there is a dilemma here. Uhm, 1 mean if you look at the audit of our 
results for the minor surgery unit everybody’s really happy with it, all 
the consumers. Uhm, I presented the audit to a medical meeting of 
GPs, consultants, and so on, you know, and one of the consultant 
surgeons said: “Well, you know, it’s a one stop service”. You know, 
you come in, you’ve got something, you’ve got a lipoma, or even a 
vasectomy, you come in, you chat with the surgeon, you’re through 
in the theatre. you have it done it’s one stop. you know. And he 
said, you know “1 really don’t know why we haven’t been doing that 
for the last 20 years. Patients are always saying to me ‘well why 
aren’t you going to do the operation doc?’ And I say well no I’ve 
got to put you on a waiting list, it’s going to be six months time”. 
Again, you’re changing the pattern of health care for the better. 
Uhm, I think people actually like to have facilities and resources 
locally. Uhm, and I think that, unless you want instant access to 
high-tech equipment, at least half tbe stuff that’s done in hospitais 
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could be done in the community. 
cheaper. 
.4nd 1 think it could be done 
The problem was accepted in theory, hut in practice, as the 
story he narrated was meant to clearly show, it really didn ’t exist. 
ïhe real difliculties arose ,from the status quo encouraging a 
projìigute hospital based system, rather than from jmdholders too 
concerned with cost-cutting. 
37) CD: Do you mean more effectively? 
GP: More effectively for the patient. Uhm, so, I don’t think 
we’ve started, we haven’t scratched at the surface yet of what we 
could . . .  The snag is that hospitals require such huge amounts of 
money to  keep running that the whole system is, you know, if you try 
to  move too much away the price for everything else goes shooting 
up and-and. . . .  because they can’t seem to be able to down-size. 
CD: It’s rather like the mighty liner trying to  turn 
GP. That’s right, yeah Absolutely 
38)  CD: Thinking about the facilities you have here, which 
look absolutely amazing. The patients next door, so as to  speak, 
don’t have those facilities because that is not a fundholder. Some 
talk about a two-tier system. Is there a dilemma? 
Once again, the GP acknowledged the possibility of a problem, 
even an ethical dilemma, hut immediately exonerated his own 
practice and Practice with a lengthy narrative account. 
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GP. Yes, yes if that’s what we were doing. We embarked on 
that project (long pause) because we believed in it and because we 
had outline agreement with the clinical directors of (local) hospital 
that they would use it. That they would shift suitable cases down 
there, free up capacity, uhm, at uhm, in the day case unit, free up 
capacity in the main op . . .  you know, get a cascade affect which 
would have increased their efficiency hugely. And the idea was 
that ..., it’s not for our patients, okay. In fact, oniy the gynaecologist 
carried on with that scheme. The others, their morale got so low and 
they were fed up with all the work they were doing and they just said 
no they were too busy, they couldn’t possibly come and work 
outside the hospital. So they all backed off, so we had to  find other 
people to  come in. So the gynaecology service we run down there, 
the hysteroscopy service, isn’t anything to do with ..., isn’t two-tier in 
any way It’s run for the patients in (the whole area) Right? The 
minor surgery service we run down there. and the cataract service 
we run down there, at the moment is only available to  fundholding 
patients, but all the fundholding patients. Right? And we’ve said to  
the health authority they’re very happy to use it. We can provide, we 
can provide simple procedures at half the price of (the 1ocal)hospital. 
We can provide cataract at a little bit cheaper, maybe 10% cheaper. 
But the health authority is so wrapped up with big hospital 
expenditure that it simply hasn’t been able to withdraw funds out of 
the hospitals without ... The hospitals are already running at $2 to  E3 
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million deficits, so anything they move out of the hospital makes the 
hospital situation worse. So they’re locked in, right. Now, I mean, 
that’s all wrong. They’re paying far more than they need to for a 
certain percentage of their procedures, but there’s nothing.. , We’re 
not, we’re not running that service just for us, we’re running that 
service for whoever wants to use it. If the people ..., if the non- 
fundholder.. . if people purchasing for the non fundholders don’t get 
their act together and want to use it well then that’s-that’s that’s not 
our responsibility. But I don’t have a problem with a two-tier system 
because it’s there on offer. 
39) CD: And on other levels, do you feel that the concerns 
about a “two-tier’’ system have any validity? 
GP: No! 
ïhe vigorous w q  the GP responded io m.v question suggested 
that he and his ,felìowfrrtidholders had had io deal with the iwo tier 
issire, and nll the objections and cmrnrer-ur~rments. on manv 
occasions. I t  W U . ~  clearly a topic that had raised strong feelings ot1 
both sides. but the fundholders were not prepared io coticede that 
their position disadvantaged the patients of non-jìrndhold~ng 
Practices. 
Although the “no ” is clear and definite the rest of the answer 
recognised that a iwo-tier system was operating, bzrt it was noi 
always in favozrr offindholders and when jmdholders appeared to 
be gaining some advantage this was merely a temporary measure 
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whilst they irndertook the role of gzrineupigs on behalf of their non- 
fundholding colleagues as the story of the hack clinic demonstrates 
. . . . .  If you’re going to affect change, you’re going to create a 
different system with different standards right? By definition that’s 
two-tier. Now, our first attempt at purchasing physiotherapy in the 
community was a disaster. Uhm, there were huge waiting lists, the 
woman who was supposed to be running it kept losing the the 
appointment books. ühm, there was a two-tier system and our 
patients were getting the worst system. (General laughter) Right? 
No problem. You know. Of course there was a two-tier system and 
that’s one that, you know, fouled up. Right? We run a back clinic, 
okay. We uhm . . .  There’s about a years waiting list for people with 
back problems; we’ve got a GP who comes in, he assesses 
everybody, he. uhm, works up those who might need surgical 
intervention from a consultant who comes in just once a month. So, 
uhm we’ve brought waiting times down to that clinic down to 6 to 8 
weeks; classic two-tier system, big row with the non-íùndholders, 
you know, Uhm, we said: “okay, well look why don’t you just send 
a few patients down if there urgent. You know, we’ll. we’ve got a 
bit of capacity we’ll see some of your patients”. “Ooh, mustn’t have 
our patients sent their, two-tier system, it’s all in the community, 
must be in the hospital. Terrible”. Right. We now have a 
commissioning group, which is two fundholding GPs, three non- 
fundholding GPs. The first success of that commission group is 
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getting that back clinic available for everybody. Okay. I see what 
we did there not as a two-tier system but as a pilot scheme which we 
showed worked, which is now being rolled out for the benefit of 
everybody in (the area) But if you establish a pilot scheme and it 
works, obviously, those who are benefiting from the pilot scheme are 
getting a better deal, otherwise if their not, it’s not working and 
there’s no point in pursuing it. If you’re going to be successful you 
have to create a two-tier system. The important thing is that that 
should be a temporary two-tier system and that the structures should 
be in place to take those good ideas forward and ensure that the 
playing field is levelled out. And the most vociferous opponents of 
that back clinic are now it’s biggest supporters. 
40) CD: Mmm. That’s an interesting point about the structures 
being in place to level out the playing field. Do you think that, in 
general. those stxuctures are in place? 
GP. They are now in piace in (this area) through this 
commissioning group They’re not in place, as I understand it, in 
(the neighbouring area) where there isn’t really a strong enough 
commissioning group or in (names another neighbouring authority) 
I think that’s fair. I think we’ve got an extremely good 
commissioning group which started off with a lot of,. .  certainly a lot 
of anxiety on my behalf in that this was just going to be a committee 
that tied our hands behind our backs. I’m glad to say it hasn’t and 1 
think there has been a lot of mutual respect between a fundholders 
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and the non-fundholders. And it’s going to be a very powerful force. 
And if we’ve read the tea leaves correctly it will be the right way 
forward. 
41) CD- Are there constraints operating in the fundholding 
system? 
The reply highlights the extent qf the ill-feeling between ,fund- 
and non-fundholders even 5 years into the scheme. ïhe problem 
still presented in terms of ihe sh@ NI p m e r  thai findholding 
created. However, it  also revealed that jindholders had taken 
matters rather too far in some cases, resulting in central 
go~~ernment curbing some cf the new found,fieedom and restoring a 
degree of control io the local health authority. The GP rails against 
this stifling btireaucracy. 
GP: Yes, the health service is still totally bureaucratic and there 
are a lot of people who very much resent the power shift to 
fundholding And they’re all going to come roaring out of the 
woodwork now It’s going to be great fun, all the people who have 
been paying lip-service but actually not really very much in favour, in 
health authorities and in Tmsts. are all going to come pouring out of 
the woodwork to stab the fundholders in the back now. 
C.’ivid imagery that powerfully illtistrates the strength qf the ill- 
feeling that still existedfive years into fundholding Once more the 
doctor IISKS a narrative account io reinforce the point. 
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And, you know, it’s little things, you know, provider numbers 
for instance. You know, the regulations are intensely complicated if 
we want to provide services. A GP wants to provide services in his 
own surgery, theoretically he can get a provider number now and get 
approval, okay. But the trouble is that nobody ever thought of the 
fact that GPs are actually too busy, we can’t all be dermatologists as 
well, or, you know, surgeons as well, or do these other things. So 
the obvious way to handle it is to bring in, into primary care, people 
with skills Married women who are doing three or four sessions a 
week at the ophthalmology department who can handle our 
ophthaimoiogy in-house at a level in between highly specialised 
consultant and general practice, for instance. Now, the provider 
number business doesn’t allow us to do that, ‘cos you have to be a 
principal in general practice to have that sort of provider number. 
And I’ve spent four or five months trying to organise a provider 
number for the building. so that the building can become a provider. 
and then we would submit each individual who comes to work here, 
their CVs, to make sure they’re up to quality, I don’t mind the health 
authority, you know’ monitoring quality in that way. But the system 
doesn’t exist to do it. So the Director of primary care has been, you 
know, on the phone to Region trying to get decisions out of them. 
He’s finally phoned me last week and said: “Look, sod it, let’s just 
go ahead with it and I’ll find you a provider number”. But I mean, 
that sort of bureaucracy is still in there, you see. You . . .  you know, 
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there’s still . . .  I think the first year of fundholding things were 
far...got so loose, with people forming these companies and so on, 
the government just took fright and the bureaucracy took fnght and 
wanted to grab control again. So there’s still far too much control in 
the system to really innovate 
I n  response to a government ruling that fundholders could not 
provide services in-house but where to remain purely as purchasers, 
some Practices had opted to form private companies, enabling 
them, so they argued, to operate as separate providers. Affer 
initially allowing this practice, the DOH changed its mind and 
forhade any jkrther such activities. It  did agree, however, to allow 
fundholders to undertake a very limited range of procedures for 
which the partners would receive puymentfrom the fund. Hut even 
this concession was hemmed ahout with many restrictions. ïñe 
entrepreneurial ,firtidholding (ips ,found “these intensely 
complicated replations “. and the “totally bureaucratic ” attitude 
that utiderpinried them extremelyfrirstratitig 
42) CD: You talked about the power hfi as consultants have 
had to recognise that their GP colleagues have some status and 
power of their own. What about the relationship between colleagues? 
GP: Oh yeah (laughs). There are certain consultants in the 
hospital who are just a disaster kom that point of view and are 
constantly trying, you know. I mean, there’s one, you know, 1 mean, 
you know there’s one who has managed to block virtually any 
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ophthalmology development that we wanted to do here, which we’ve 
been trying to do for a year to eighteen months, with the result that 
we’ve got IOS, independent ophthalmology service, people doing 
cataracts. That shouldn’t have happened, it needn’t have happened, 
you know. I didn’t necessarily want them in here but I was going to 
make damn sure that those people didn’t control what 1 did in my 
building, you know. (Long silence) 
43) CD: Has this affected the collegiate nature of the medical 
profession? 
GP: WeU I think it’s a bloody good thing, frankly, because the 
people who are objecting to change we can’t afford them anyway. 
They’ve got to he shaken out. But then, perhaps I’m a bit radical in 
that respect; I don’t think all my colleagues would agree. I don’t 
think we’ve gone far enough in that; I don’t think we have brought 
home the lessons of responsibility for costs Again, it’s this dilemma, 
isn’t it? I think nowadays all G all doctors have to accept some 
sort of responsibility They either have to live within a health service 
which has a finite budget, in which case they have to accept 
responsibility for the costs they’re generating, and whether they’re 
effective or not, or, if they wish to be the patients ..., I know this 
sounds crazy, I know. ,, but if they wish to be the patient’s advocate 
and give the patient everything the patient needs, they have to be in 
the privzte sector because that’s the only place where their decisions 
aren’t going to impact on the rest of the population. Ya? Now 
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the. .., I mean, the fascinating thing is that the people who are (pause) 
the strongest patients advocates are also the left-wingers who are 
very keen on the concept of the health service. And they . . .  they- 
they’ve got a ., I mean li , it-it it’s just not a logical . .  and that.. one 
of the advantages of having a Labour government is perhaps that will 
come home to the left-wing of the profession. You know, that you 
can’t have, u h m . .  and it’s nothing to do with fundholding, i mean it 
wouldn’t have mattered, whatever health care system you’ve got in 
the world you’ve got this problem, haven’t you? I’ve worked in 
America, many, many years ago, and saw the difference between the 
poor and the rich ‘cos I was in the pathology department, uhm, doing 
the post-mortems, you know, uhm. So, (shggling to find the 
 word^) you’ve.., when th-th-the people who ... th-the people who are 
objecting to the sort of things that we’re doing are the sort of people 
who want the autonomy to be able to continue to practice in the way 
thev think is best for each individuai patient, Now, I respect that 
What I don’t respect is the idea that they can do it within the health 
service and gobble up a higher share of the resources than they need 
to be doing Because in doing so, they’re disadvantaging other 
people. I don’t mind if they do it in the private sector. 
45) CD: Has that had an effect on clinical autonomy? 
GP: Oh yes, but 1 think that had to come anyway. I mean, and I 
think you’ll find, fascinatingly you know, when we have our 
consortium meetings now, which is fundholders and non- 
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fundholders, big consortium with a representative from each 
Practice, there is a . , .  there is a view right across the medical 
profession, not just in fundholding but amongst the non-fundholders 
as well, that they can’t have their cake and eat it, that the health 
authority has finite funds and that we have to look at priorities. And 
there is just as much enthusiasm for saying the health authority is 
wasting money here, you know, we shouldn’t be doing this, as there 
is for saying this is what we want more of. So I think the shift isn’t, 
you h o w ,  . . .  maybe fundholding focused it, the market focused it, 
but it-it had to happen. 
I was iiow aware that we had beeti talking,for an hour and 1 
coiildti ‘t iake much more qf the GP s time. 
46) CD: Can I just conclude by asking about the management 
values that you’ve had to bring into your Practice. Do they sit well 
alongside your professional values? 
GP. Yes: 1 feel perfectly comfortable with it and 1 think what 
fundholding has taught me is that good management is good 
managemert. And, hopefully, that reflects in the way the whole 
Practice is run: the way patients get appointments, the way we 
handle, uhm, urgent appointment as against routine appointments, 
the way we deal with people on the phone, you know. 1-1 would 
hope., ,, I would think that there is a. ,  , there’s been a beneficial fall- 
out, our exposure to modem management techniques has had a 
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knock-on effect, not just in managing the fund but throughout 
general medical services. 
47) CD: Some might think that is has been purely cosmetic, the 
“have a nice day” approach, but . . . 
GP, . , . I would hate to think it had, I would hate to think it had. 
It’s not a phrase I ever use (general laughter) but I know exactly 
what you mean and perhaps . . .  It’s difficult isn’t it, to find a...  I mean, 
what do you . . .  what do you want w-hen you go into a doctor’s 
consulting room, you know? You don’t want a meaningless “have a 
nice day” but you do want, I suspect, some sort of body language 
and words which do convey an interest in you as a person. 
48) CD: Does thinking in terms of management values make 
that more likely to be achieved? 
GP: 1 would hope so but I haven’t got any evidence for it. 
49) CD: Do you get some feedback from your patients about 
how it’s all working out? 
GP: We’ve been very, very reticent about adverti... because of 
the political sensibility, we’ve been very, very reticent about 
advertising the fact we’re a fundholding Practice. 
50) CD: Do patients notice? 
GP: I think they probably do. But actually our patients have 
been very good; very, very few of them have pushed it. Very few of 
them, I’ve had one or two people who’ve written me letters sayhg: 
“since you’re a fundholding Practice, surely you can get me my 
289 
operation done d o m  at such and such a hospital next week, rather 
than waiting for three months in (local hospital)”. That’s happened a 
bit but not-not-, it’s not been a big issue. 
Patients were notjilly informed about the fundholding statzts of 
their GP Practice because the doctors concerned feared thai such 
information might result it1 large numbers of patients ‘pushing i f  ’ 
and demanding particular or preferential treatment. However, the 
fear was not realised, most patients “have been very good”. mis  
decision is jìílly in line with the ethos of medicine, where the 
traditional view taken by doctors with respect to p i n g  their 
patients itformation seems to be a paternalistic least said the betier. 
51 CD: Do you feel, by and large, that the two sets of values 
can sit alongside each other? 
GP: (longish pause) A publicly funded health care system, 
because it’s so short of money, has to be: to my mind, managed in a 
first-class way And 1 think one of the problems the current 
government is going to get into is that if it thinks it can cut 
management (pause) much more, in order to shift that money into 
patient care, it’s going to find that it’s going to go back into a badly 
managed system, where it doesn’t know what it’s doing and it’s 
doing all the wrong things. 1 think that’s the big trap it’s going to 
fali into. 
52 CD: But you see the future of health care provision in the 
community in term of the consortium? 
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GP: Hmm The consortium? Yes, yes (Fidgets around on 
Jwivel chair, its squeahng can be plainly heard as he now speaks) 
The consortium’s going to have its own tensions; the consortium’s 
going to have tensions between the Practices that were 
comparatively well funded and the Practices that were comparatively 
badly funded. Those tensions aren’t too much of a problem because 
it was obviously inherently unfair that X got 2150 a patient and Y 
got 84. Right. That’s greater than the difference you might expect 
by different list sizes and (indecipherable) populations. Where the 
tensions are going to come are going to  be in those Practices which 
were relatively generously funded and haven’t managed demand. So 
they’re already going over-spent and they’re already being bailed out 
by Practices like mine, who are getting a less good deal from the . . .  in 
the big block hospital contract to  ensure that those Practices stay 
within the ‘on.: year waiters’ and-and you-know the various other 
things So I would think there’s a cross subsidv of ahout somewhere 
between 7 and 99” of our hospital budgets, from us to other 
Practices. And that’s going to  create tensions unless .. well it-it 
actually. . one reason why it won’t create tensions is because we 
know very well that we won’t survive as individual fundholders 
under a new government, so we have to  do it. So that, in a way, has 
restricted the tensions. But there’s going to be tensions there if the 
higher, if the higher referring Practices don’t do something to handle 
their higher referral rates and starts to do a bit more work in-house. 
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53 CD: Developing better management? 
GP: Well, somehow our manag.. , , , the multi-fund management 
has got to persuade the higher referring Practices that the GPs need 
to work up their own patients a bit more, treat them themselves a bit 
more instead of pass them on. That’s going to be quite an interesting 
little battle. 
CD: It still appears to be quite a challenging situation. 
GP: It does, doesn’t it just? 
n e  interview had to come to an erid Although there were so 
many more yiresiions I wanted to ask, a tuimher of topics I woirld 
like io have exploredfirriher, it was lime to go. 
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Chapter 7 
Analysis 
The Core Interview: Identifying Thematic Threads. 
The core interview is just one of 15 interviews 1 conducted with 
GPs. In this and the following chapter 1 will analyse all the interview 
data. The variety of viewpoints expressed by the GPs, as they 
contemplated a very particular challenge, namely, the fundholding 
option, provides a further test of the validity of the research 
hypothesis. 
Thus, the question I sought to answer from the interview data 
was what factors exerted the geater influence on the doctors as 
they contemplated the fundholding? Were the principles of modern 
medicai ethics uppermost or other factors identified in this thesis as 
linked to the profession’s ethos? 
In this core interview the answer came in the form of a number 
of themes that emerged from it. I have already described the process 
used to identify these themes They form the key elements in the 
thinking of the GP as he deliberated over the question of 
fundholding. They show up a concern with issues that this study has 
shown are linked to the ethos of the profession, including the long- 
standing desire of GPs for the status and respect granted to their 
hospital-based colleagues. In the main they are not concerns related 
to the principies of modem medical ethics. 
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The interview highlights the significance of context This can 
helpfully be visualised as circles of varying degrees of influence 
operating around an individual Practice, or even the individual 
partners within a Practice The operation of this range of influences 
is often expressed, either overtly or by implication, in terms of an 
ideai outcome and an actual outcome in practice. Between the two 
outcomes areas of tension are evident. 
Thus, the narrative threads of interpretation, the analytical 
themes, can be seen in terms of these four main factors: circles of 
influence; ideal outcomes; actual outcomes; and areas of tension. 
These open the way to an explanation of the empirical data in light 
of the theoretical material that draws attention to the distinction 
between professional ethos and the principles of modern medical 
ethics and explores the relative impact of the two on professional 
thinking and practice (Strauss & Corbin, 1994, p.278). 
Influence of Partners 
The first, and possibly most powerful, of the circles of influence 
is that of the partners making up the Practice Within the small 
business that is a GP practice, maintaining good relations in the 
partnership is understandably important However, it also reflects an 
element of the profession’s moral spirit, namely the importance of, in 
the words of one doctor “the collective commitment and solidarity” 
(Fitzpatrick, 2000), the esprrt de corps 
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In the paradigm interview the GP describes his partnership in 
very positive term, an ideal partnership: ’We’re very lucky in this 
partnership”(6). It is a stable, happy partnership with three of the 
partners having worked together for over 20 years and the remaining 
two having been with the partnership for almost a decade. They 
know each other well. 
ideal Outcome 
Prior to becoming fundholders the partners had a big debate (6), 
the result of which was that everyone knew where everybody else 
was coming from. This, linked to the close-knit partnership, meant 
the ideal outcome was that the lead fundholder would be able to 
deliver what the partners wanted without the need to ‘’write off two 
or three afternoons a week” with “everybody sitting down and 
deciding what they want” The GP suggests that this ideal has been 
realised: “and so, in a way, you’re able to deliver what they want” 
(6). 
Actual Outcome 
However, other comments highlight a less than ideal outcome. 
his use of the phrase “in a way” points to a significant area of 
tension Pressure of time hadn’t allowed partners to think through 
the issues so they tended to leave that to the lead fundholder Thus, 
he had been expected to initiate as well as implement “the ideas” ( 3 )  
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Tensions 
This situation created pressures when one or several of the 
partners thought the Practice was being taken in directions that they 
did not want it to go. Then they ensured that the planned changes 
were sabotaged (4). However, even this presentation of the situation 
glosses over the full extent of the tensions that might have arisen 
around the making of major decisions. Thus, whilst at one point the 
very hands-off decisions-making approach of the partners is 
presented by the lead fundholder in rather positive terms, at another 
point his comments suggest that he is less than happy with their 
response to priority issues. “lt ought to be possible,” he says, “if it’s 
a priority, to make time” (4). But rather than make that time, 
partners left the decision to the lead and only reacted if and when 
they felt their own interests or priorities were under threat. 
There is also the suggestion of a split within the practice along 
the lines of the three older partners, who had been together for 22 
years, and the two more recent partners. 
Partners and the Fundholdina Decision 
Prior to the fundholding decision itself, however, the partners as 
a whole not only met but had “a very big debate” (6) ,  where 
everyone was able to express their views. This meeting revealed 
three out of five in favour of fundholding. Of the three, one partner 
seemed particularly positive, he was “convinced’ of the need to 
pursue the fundholding route and appeared to have initiated the 
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whole discussion (6) .  
changed his mind and the other abstained in the final vote (12). 
Of the two who opposed the plan one 
It was in discussing the reason why the one partner continued to 
be less than fully supportive of fundholding that the tensions really 
came to the fore, At this point other factors that had impinged on 
and influenced the Practice were revealed. The motives of the one 
partner who maintained some degree of opposition were questioned. 
His stance was viewed as negative and hypocritical, Although he 
had presented his position as an ethical one, it was interpreted by his 
colleagues as an example of bending to the power that consultants 
had over GPs (1 5). 
This whole scenario encapsulated the struggle between GPs and 
consultants; the historicz! tension between these two sections of the 
medical profession. Fundholding presented GPs with the 
opporíunity to re-dress the power balance, GPs who failed to grasp 
the opportunity were just too weak to stand up to the pressure from 
the consultants who saw power shifting away from them. This 
struggle appeared in various forms throughout this and all the other 
interviews with fundholding GPs and was summarised by several 
interviewees in the phrase “consultants now send Christmas cards to 
us”. 
The importance the GPs attached to re-dressing the long- 
standing struggle is a core aspect of the profession’s ethos. The 
profession had worked hard to achieve status and respect, but within 
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the profession itself status and respect attached to the elite group 
and not GPs According to the president of the GMC (2001) general 
practice has always been viewed by the specialist as “the dustbin of 
medicine”, for those who had “fallen off the consultant ladder” 
Fundholding gave GPs the first real opportunity to achieve status 
and respect in the eyes of their erstwhile superior consultant 
colleagues 
This emphasis on redressing the status imbalance is seen again in 
the second theme 
Influence of Relationship with Other Professionals 
GPs work within a network of other professions and 
professionals. All these groups had some influence on the decision 
the Practice had made to manage its own budget. The relationship 
with each was changed when a Practice became a fundholder. From 
the fundholders perspective the influence was both positive and 
negative That is to say, fundholding gave the Practice more 
influence in its relationships with fellow professionals, on the other 
hand those other professionals were often able to exert their own 
influence over the fundholders or potential fundholders. All these 
influences and counter-influences came through in the paradigm 
interview. 
In relation to the PCT operating directly around the GPs, the 
Practice saw fundholding as giving them the freedom to structure 
the team in line with their particular needs. The paradigm 
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interviewee described “empowering” them: ‘ took ,  you know, okay, 
clean sheet of paper, what would you really like to be doing with 
[your] jobs?’ Members of the PCT were “gobsmacked’ because 
under the old regime their managers had never taken such an 
approach (16b). At the time of the interview, the Practice, working 
with the multi-fund, was in the process of extending the role of H V s  
in order to take some of the burden off the GPs. Other changes 
already implemented were making much more effective use of the 
team’s skills. Whereas HVs had previously been confined to 
developmental tests on nought to five year olds as fundholders, the 
Practice was in a position to extend their role to include running 
specialised clinics. 
Beyond the opportunity to exercise more control over the 
immediate primary care team, fundholding was seen as giving the 
chance to loosen the grip of the HA with whom the Practice had had 
“major problems” (7). This bodv was seen as boring and 
conservative. In the eyes of the GPs affected by their management 
style and decision-making they appeared to know nothing about 
primary care. They were a shambles; more concerned about 
protecting their own backs than supporting good primary care. Thus, 
when fundholding came along, GPs saw the opportunity to shake off 
the shackies of this ineffective and inefficient bureaucracy. ‘We 
thought we could buy care better than the health authority could. 
And 1 think we were proved . . . .  right” (7). 
299 
Glennerster ef al (1994), notes that prior to fundholding no-one 
at regional level had bothered to listen or take notice of GPs views. 
“GPs had never normally had any dealings with region . . . .g eneral 
practice had had a marginal status in most RHAs” (p,32, 34). From 
the perspective of fundholders the relationship with the RHA 
improved greatly. Certainly that had been the interview GPs 
experience: “Fundholding was.. .the blue-eyed baby of the 
Conservative government.. .. So. ..you could always pick up the 
phone to Region and have a bit of a moan at them and things got 
sorted out” (25). 
The most dramatic change, however, was with service 
providers, local hospitals and consultants. Here the old relationship 
was turned around. Local hospital managers soon realised that 
fundholding GPs had choices, they no longer had to routinely refer 
patients to the secondary sector for treatment. “One queries much 
more whether it’s worth using the secondary sector in certain areas 
where . . .  20 odd vears of experience has told you they don’t deliver 
much and they are going to turn you out a bill of two or three 
thousand for it” (28). This was a change from the days when the GP 
had been left out in the cold by the consultant. Now the relationship 
had completely reversed. 
Besides the freedom to undertake certain procedures in-house 
there was also the option to contract with providers outside the 
locality All this gave fundholders considerable power. Holding the 
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purse strings they could bargain for the best deal for their patients, 
negotiating to buy extra capacity at a cheaper rate (10) Such power 
was not enjoyed by their non-fundholding colleagues Unsurprisingly 
that relationship also changed 
Former colleagues now found themselves on opposite sides of 
the fundholding divide The relationship became very difficult The 
interview revealed a considerable degree of mistrust and hostility 
between fund and non-fundholders Over time this improved to the 
point where the two were able to work together in a multi-fund Yet 
at the time of the interview there was still Enistration at the way non- 
fundholders practised Their apparent refusal to accept 
"responsibility for the costs they were generating gobble[d] up a 
higher share of resoaces than they need" (44) 
Ideal Outcome 
Fundholding had an influence on all the professional 
relationships and in many cases that influence had been significant 
Indeed, no relationship was unchanged At every level, fundholding 
altered the established dynamics of the relationships Whereas much 
of the primary care area had been "the poor relation of the health 
service and not getting a fair deal'' ( i l ) ,  the interviewee saw the 
opportunity for altering that imbalance. Thus, the goal from his 
perspective was "changing the system", "the pattern of health care" 
(16,36), and specifically the place of primary care in the overall 
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structure. That was the ideal outcome, at least in the medium term 
(16). 
Actual Outcome 
The interview GP highlighted resistance as the most common 
and sustained responses to these changed relationships The political 
climate had forced an acceptance of the new structures but there was 
a sense of the superficial and temporary about that acceptance The 
GP noted that they hadn’t really changed the system He mentioned 
that, in light of the new political situation, the RHA45 was cooling off 
in its responsiveness to fundholders The gains that fundholding had 
made were being lost 
However, the GP thought the relationship with fellow GPs had 
moved in a more positive direction Initially there had been 
considerable hostility from non-fundholders but this had gradually 
softened and there had been a recognition that by redefining the 
GPihospital and GPhealth authority relationships, fundholders had 
broken new ground from which non-fundholders could benefit Both 
parties were coming together in a commissioning group, largely due 
to trends they saw arising from the changed political climate, and 
“mutual respect” developed as non-fundholders saw the value of 
what fundholders had achieved Thus, the back clinic that had been 
li By the time of the inteniew RHAs no longer existed; in April 19% their work 
had been passed over to the eight regional offices of the NHS executive. However, 
for much of the period covered in the interview “Region”. the local M A .  had been 
an important element in the life of fundholding practices. 
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the cause of "a big row" between the two was now enthusiastically 
supported by its former "vociferous opponents". Furthermore, he 
noted that "there is a view right across the medicai profession, not 
just in fundholding but amongst the non-fundholders as well, that 
they can't have their cake and eat it, that the health authority has 
finite funds and that we have to look at priorities. There is just as 
much enthusiasm for saying the health authority is wasting money 
here, you know, we shouldn't be doing this, as there is for saying this 
is what we want more of' (45). 
Tensions 
Between the ideal of permanently changed relationships resulting 
from the influence of fundholding on the health care system and the 
reality of temporary and superficial changes, the GP identified huge 
tensions. 
The ill-feeling that fundholding had created was indicated by his 
prediction that "a lot of people who very much resent the power shift 
to fundholding in health authorities and in Trusts are going to come 
pouring out of the woodwork to stab the fundholders in the back 
now" (41). 
Consultants had strongly resisted the fundholding system 
fearing, according to the GP, a loss of their own power. He thought 
that one partner in the Practice had felt pressured into rejecting the 
fundholding option by the consultant's opposition. Moreover, that 
partner was not alone in succumbing to such pressure. "There was 
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pressure brought, there were people feeling they were rocking the 
boat. .upsetting the established hierarchy of things ... and they felt 
uncomfortable with that”( 15). 
But it was not just weaker partners who caved in under the 
pressure from consultants. The interview suggests consultants 
placed pressure on each other not to give priority to fundholder 
contracts. The system created tensions. “It created tensions within 
the hospital., .it created tensions within the medical community”. And 
the judgement was made that this “was unhealthy” (18). Under this 
pressure the fundholders hacked down. Thus, for example, the 
Practice “did actually allow” (16) its waiting lists to rise in order to 
relieve some of those tensiors. 
The GP described many consultants as disasters, as they 
continued to apply pressure in order to protect their own interests. 
He told how they were “constantly trying” to stop the Practice 
developing in-house services One consultant had blocked every 
attempt on the part of the Practice to develop an ophthalmology 
servi ce^ Far from buckling under this pressure, the GP was even 
more determined to stand his ground: “I  was going to make damn 
sure that those people (consultants] didn’t control what I did in my 
building”(42). No suggestion on this occasion that a confrontation 
was “unhealthy”. 
Other schemes involving consultants providing services at the 
Practice, although recognised as “changing the pattern of health care 
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for the better” (36) ,  floundered under various pressures. Thus, the 
GP quotes a consultant as saying of one such planned scheme ‘‘I 
really don’t know why we haven’t been doing that for the last 20 
years. Patients are always saying to me ‘well why aren’t you going to 
do the operation doc?’ And I say well no I’ve got to put you on a 
waiting list, it’s going to be six months time”’ (36) .  “Despite an 
initial positive response, in the end “only the gynaecologist carried on 
with that scheme . . .  The others all hacked off (38). 
All these accounts suggest an ongoing power struggle, Each 
situation involved weighing up the strengths, either numerically or in 
terms of influence, of the opposition, or the popularity of the project, 
and then deciding on the best course of action, backing down or 
standing one’s ground. Thus, in the case of waiting lists the Practice 
had backed off, but on the issue of developing in-house services, the 
Practice, or rather the lead GP. had decided to pursue the matter as 
far as he could On this latter issue. the positive stand seemed to 
have an element of the crusade about it and so met with considerable 
approval among his colleagues. 
But, once again, the issues raised by fundholding and identified 
in this core interview relate to the profession’s ethos rather than its 
public principalist ethics. A power balance had changed and GPs’ 
status had been raised. The RHA and consultant now showed respect 
to the GPs whom they had formerly hardly taken the trouble to 
notice, Nevertheless, first wave fundholders, in particular, had 
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broken the united front the profession wanted to present to changes 
that its upper echelons strongly opposed They had “rocked the boat 
and upset the hierarchy”(l5) That action had, in the experience of 
one first wave fundholder, resulted in colleagues treating them like 
“Christians in the arena” (BMJ, 1996) Although, according to my 
core interviewee, himself a first waver, the tension had eased, over 
time there were still problems with relationships Indeed, he saw new 
tensions on the horizon with both non-fundholders and fellow 
fundholders 
Influence of Political Climate 
This influence was identified in the interview as operating from 
two levels, national and local The Practice saw itself as vulnerable 
to the winds of political change and this had influenced and 
continued to influence its decisions. 
Thus, it was the action of national government that had first 
pointed the Practice in the direction of fundholding The partner 
who pushed for the Practice to take on fundholding did so because 
he saw “what the government of the time was doing” (6) in targeting 
resources There was a sense of threat inasmuch as those Practices 
that refused to take the fundholding route would find themselves 
starved of funds. 
However, at the time of our interview they were aware of a 
possible change in the political climate. If national government lost 
interest in fundholding it could very easily destroy it. “It doesn’t 
306 
have to pass an Act of Parliament, it just has to tell health authorities 
to knock everyhody’s budget by 10%. The whole thing becomes 
unviable.. you’ve got to walk away from it” (21). For that reason 
the partners had begun to work more closely with other fund and 
non-fundholders in multi-fund and commissioning groups, This was 
also a direct result of the changing political climate. “We won’t 
survive as individual fundholders under a new government, so we 
have to do it” (52). 
But small ‘p’ politics at the local level also had a considerable 
health influence on the Practice’s decision to pursue the fundholding 
option. The partners saw a health authority management too 
wrapped up in the politics of protecting their own jobs to make any 
sensible decisions about the delivery of primary care (7). Thus, they 
decided to take control of their own situation rather than leaving it in 
what they considered to be incompetent hands. 
However. once they had become fundholders the Practice found 
that the politics often worked against their entrepreneurial efforts. In 
theory, they could “buy better care” for their patients but in practice 
they were often defeated by the internal politicking. In the interview 
the GP spoke of efforts they had had to make in order to “defuse the 
political problems” encountered because they were fundholders, 
Later he narrated a lengthy tale to illustrate the impact of these 
political pressures on the delivery of health care in the locality. He 
believed that “at least half the stuff that’s done in hospital could be 
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done in the community” at up to half the price. But when, for 
example, the Practice offered its minor surgery services to the health 
authority the response was wholly negative. “The health authority is 
so wrapped up with big hospital expenditure that it Simply hasn’t 
been able to withdraw funds out of the hospital” (38). 
Similarly, after “a big row” with non-fundholders, the Practice 
decided to invite them to send urgent cases to the fundholder’s back 
clinic because they had objected to the service giving fundholders’ 
patients an advantage over those of non-fundholders. However, on 
that occasion the offer was refused because it was seen as taking a 
service away from the hospital: “Ooh, mustn’t have our patients sent 
there, two-tier system, it’s ail in the community, must be in the 
hospital. Terrible” (39). Everyone had their, often very different, 
political agendas and finding a compromise position was far from 
easy. 
Ideal Outcome 
The interview suggested two ideal outcomes in relation to the 
influence of national politics on fundholding Practices First, that 
government would pursue clarity and consistency in health service 
policies in general: “in terms of the detail we want to see where 
we’re going in the health service’’ (24). And in the area of a very 
specific policy, what should or should not be funded within the NHS 
was a decision national government had to make rather than pushing 
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it down to the health authorities or even individual Practices. “It 
would be much easier if centrally a decision was made that this was 
not an effective mechanism and, therefore, it would not be part of 
NHS treatment” (32) Secondly the GP wanted to  see less 
bureaucracy; less regulation (41) Freedom to practise was the ideal. 
Actual Outcome 
GPs had to  cope with an ever changing political climate, having 
to  keep an eye on the signs “Reading the tea leaves” (40) had 
become very important, but recent change in government had 
increased the sense of uncertainty (24) and made reading the signs “a 
bit bloody difficult” There was also a need to keep track of the 
movement among various bodies and interest groups who were 
themselves “reading the tea leaves” and adjusting their relationship 
with fundholders accordingly Thus, Region, for a brief period so 
responsive to the blue-eyed fundholding baby. had begun to cool the 
relationship (25)  Still the fundholders felt their hands tied in too 
many areas by too many vested interests 
Tens i on s 
The tensions created by fundholding, created in turn a new need 
to play the political game. The GP seemed to have relished some of 
the battles finding the challenge of pushing against and overcoming 
the opposition and obstacles a new and exciting aspect to add to the 
everyday work of a GP. The “heady atmosphere” of meetings to 
discuss strategy and tactics, the negotiating and hard-bargaining 
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(GieMerster et al, 1994, p 97) all find echoes in the events recounted 
by this lead fundholder in his dealings with partners, consultants, and 
the health authority 
Nevertheless, pushing for the ideal and having to accept the 
compromises of actual practice was also deeply fnistrating Changing 
attitudes was ‘taking a long time” (17), there was “still too much 
control in the system to really innovate” (41) 
Influence of Patients 
Within the context of fundholding, patients exerted a range of 
influences, both passive and active, over the doctors 
a) passive 
Much of medicine is about direct contact with and care of 
patients, so simply by reason of the fact that they were patients they 
exerted an influence. Thus, the Practice opted for fundholding in 
order to ensure “better health care for our patients”(l0). The GP 
evidenced genuine concern for the needs of their patients; there was 
obvious sympathy for their distress and an understanding of their 
desire for even some small relief. 
Discussing the expectations of the average patients the interview 
GP asked rhetorically “what do you want when you go into the 
doctor’s consulting room?” and answered “you. ..want, I suspect, 
some sort of body language and words which do convey some sort 
of interest in you as a person”(47). 
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Ideal Outcome 
The traditional and ideai relationship was that of the doctor 
acting solely in the interests of the individuai presenting patient. The 
role of doctor as patient advocate: “the doctor’s supposed to be 
there to . . .  be the patient’s advocate and get the best . . .  he can for 
that patient”(29). 
Practice 
Such advocacy no longer had a place in the NHS. The core 
interview makes clear that fundholders in generai recognised this, not 
so much because they had become fundholders but rather because 
“there was no pressure on patients to control their demand’, so the 
NHS as a whole found itself having to meet more and more demands 
with fewer and fewer resources. In those circumstances Practices had 
to move from being patient centred to being community or 
population centred. GPs were “beginning to have to view things in 
terms of ...., the good of the community rather than the good of the 
patient”(29). 
As for GPs who wanted to follow the traditional ideal; “if they 
wish to be the patients advocate and give the patient everything the 
patient needs, they have to be in the private sector” (43). 
Tensions 
It was around this issue that the interview GP identified what he 
described as a conflict; a constant dilemma. This came across very 
powerfully as he talked about a hypothetical patient with MS 
(Multiple Sclerosis) and at that point there was a real sense of an 
311 
individual doctor struggling to come to terms with the new context 
within which the patient had now to be set. The GP addressed it in 
the third person perhaps because it was a challenge that he personally 
was still finding it difficult to face: “He’s beginning to have to view 
things in terms of the good of the community rather than the good of 
the patient“ (29). 
Whereas he used to be able to say to a patient of any treatment 
“let’s at least give it a go”, now he found he had to say no (30). A 
veIy uncomfortable position in which he would clearly have preferred 
not to have been placed. In his opinion the government had been 
“deliberately naughty” ( 3 2 )  in exposing GPs to that type of decision 
making. 
It was interesting to hear the example which he chose to 
illustrate the dilemma. “Ten thousand quids worth of non-effective 
health care”, “a busted flush’; against twenty patients receiving 
effective treatment for cataracts (30). This approach oversimplified 
the dilemma and again indicated the difficulty the GP was having in 
facing the reality of making the really tough rationing decisions. Or 
perhaps the problem was reluctance to discuss the true nature of the 
situation with a lay-interviewee, an outsider. 
b) Active 
There was an anxiety that the Practice’s decision to become 
fundholding would change the attitude of patients to the care on 
offer, that is to say, they would expect, and even demand, special 
312 
consideration. For this reason the Practice decided not to advertise 
its fundholding status. 
Ideal Outcome 
The thinking seemed to be that if doctors did not talk about the 
Practice as fundholding then patients expectations for, for example, 
quicker referral or non-standard treatment, would not be raised. On 
the other hand, because they were now responsible for controlling 
their own budget the doctors would be free to make decisions about 
patient care that took into consideration costs involved. Thus, “all 
the evidence is that for 95% of conditions in general practice the old- 
fashioned, cheaper, generic products get just as good results and you 
can, you know, save a lot of money by using them. . . .  the patients 
aren’t suffering . . . .  and you’re freeing up money for other things’’ 
(19). 
Hence, the ideal situation in the doctor patient relationship was 
that the patients would be “very good” (50) and not make 
unacceptable demands of the budget whilst at the same time the 
doctor, without any obligation to inform the patient, would make 
treatment decisions that could, if circumstances dictated, take 
account ofthe cost element, 
Actual Outcome 
Unusually in this situation, the ideal seemed, in the opinion of 
the GP concerned, to have worked out in practice, apart that is, from 
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a very few patients who had “pushed it” ( S O )  by expecting that a 
fundholding Practice could arrange for them to receive some 
preferential treatment 
Tensions 
tn the main, therefore, the anticipated tension between doctor 
and patient had not arisen. However, there were “various strategies” 
for dealing with patients who stepped out of line and made what 
were seen as unacceptable demands on the budget along the lines of 
“you’re a fundholder, you’ve got the money” (32). Usually this 
involved some sort of stone walling “I’m so ny... even though we’re 
fundholders we’re not prepared to fund procedures that are not 
available to non-fundholders”(32). However, the GP admitted that 
this was not easy. 
The medical profession’s ethos encourages an attitude of 
“excessive paternalism” toward patients. This traditional moral tone, 
rather than the modern principalist medical ethics of open discussion 
based on patient autonomy, informed the overall approach of this 
fundholder to his patients. 
Influence of Manaoinq lhe Budqet 
In the main the interviewee spoke very positively about the 
partners’ decision to manage their own budget. He emphasised that 
they had been influenced by the opportunities they saw holding their 
own budget affording them. These opportunities fell into three 
categories: 
314 
a) Control 
The major incentive was that it offered them the chance to take 
control of many elements of decision-making that had previously 
been in the hands of “bureaucrats” who appeared to know little 
about primary care and the GPihospital interface (7) Too often most 
of the money and attention had been focused on the hospital service, 
and primary care saw itself as the poor relation to the often 
glamorous secondary care sector. Fundholding allowed GPs to “keep 
their eye on the ball” in relation to allocating resources to primary 
care. 
b) Savinss 
Managing their own budget so offered the chance to make 
savings that could then be ploughed back into the Practice. In the 
paradigm interview, the GP is proud of what his Practice had been 
able to achieve with their savings. He was quick to emphasise that 
all had gone into directly improving services to patients: “we did 
actually only get 50Ks worth of savings from the fundholding, But 
that allowed us.. ali that 50K was spent on resources for health 
visitors, district nurses, and CPN service, and that sort of thing. So 
it wasn’t actually spent on the GPs, it was spent on ancillary 
services” (16). This had been a particularly contentious area between 
fund and non-fundholders, the latter claiming that the former were 
finding ways of making and keeping back “profits” from their 
budget 
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Prior to fundholding there had no incentive to make savings 
The Practice saw that non-fundholders still lacked that (16,33). 
incentive and so, were wasteful of NHS resources. 
c) Management Values 
Taking responsibility for their own budget required the Practice 
to adopt management values and learn new management techniques. 
The GP saw this development in very positive terms. “I feel 
perfectly comfortable with it and I think what fundholding has taught 
me is that good management is good management” (46). 
Ideal Outcome 
Ideally, fundholding should have offered the opportunity to 
make a significant difference in those areas of most concern to 
patients, particularly around the issue of waiting lists In the 
paradigm interview, the GP said he believed that because of the 
major efficiency savings that could be achieved by ring fencing, what 
he called the manageable part of health care, cold procedures as 
against emergency treatment, the Practice could have virtually 
abolished its waiting lists ( I O  ,16) 
Furthermore, beyond improving waiting times fundholders could 
actually raise the standards of secondary care offered to their 
patients Thus, the GP described in some detail the situation in his 
local hospital prior to fundholding where the theatres were 
effectively closed down for considerable periods due to a lack of 
resources thereby forcing up waiting lists But there was a way 
316 
round this problem. "If you ring fenced the money for cold surgery, 
obviously you could then plan it, you could use those theatres 
effectively and you could bring unit costs down. Had to happen. So 
the more I looked at it the more I realised that if we had a ring 
fenced budget for those sori of, you know, those sori of procedures 
we could plan it, decide what our resources were, buy extra capacity 
on the margin at a cheaper rate, bring our waiting lists down . . .  and 
deliver . . .  better secondary health care for our patients" (IO). It was 
having control of their own budget that allowed GPs the freedom to 
ring fence resources for cold procedures. This was only one way in 
which patient care could be improved. 
Holding the purse strings also allowed fundholders to have 
some control over the quality of care delivered at the secondary 
level This was because they had the "power of exit" (Glennerster et 
al, 1994, p.79). If a local provider failed to provide the service they 
required. fundholders had the freedom to take their business 
elsewhere, including into the private sector. Although the GP did not 
make specific reference to this aspect of fundholding in the 
interview, he clearly referred to its consequences. The issues came 
out in section 16 where he implied that the Practice had considered 
taking their contract away from the local hospital. A decision that 
would have involved "moving patients around' by going out of the 
area. 
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GPs could also redirect resources within the Practice itself, 
making savings in one sector and boosting spending in another. 
Thus, the GP mentions how, in his Practice, they had used savings 
from their drugs budget to “put a bit of extra money into primary 
care” ( 16). 
General medical services could all be improved by adopting 
good management techniques, The management skills necessary for 
mnning the budget efficiently should have had a beneficial “fallout 
effect” on the way the Practice as a whole was run. Thus, the way in 
which patients were dealt with on the telephone, routine 
appointments were arranged, emergency appointments handled, and 
even the attitude of doctors toward their patients reflected in, for 
example, the body language they used (46,,47), could all be 
influenced positively as a Practice developed good management 
skills. 
The experience of managing the budget made the GP realise the 
importance of good management throughout the NHS. ” A  publicly 
funded health care system, because it’s so short of money, has to be, 
to my mind, managed in a first-class way” (5 1) 
Actual Outcome 
The GP acknowledged that much of what was supposed to have 
been achieved by fundholding could have been realised by the much 
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simpler process of ring-fencing the primary care budget. “You didn’t 
have to invent GP fundholding to ring fence that funding’’ (1 1). 
There was the danger that if fundholding Practices took their 
contract away from the local service provider, then it might have 
been forced to close down, This seemed to have been the position 
faced by the Practice. By giving their contract to an outside provider 
they would have deprived all patients currently using and wholly 
dependent on the local provider. This consideration curtailed some 
of the ventures into non-local contracts. 
The GP saw fundholding as, at best a medium term venture. 
“What 1 said to my partners when we embarked on it [was] ‘I think 
we’ve got five years on this, after that everything’s going to tighten 
up and it’s time to drop it”’ (20). 
He also recognised that the high value he placed on good 
management was not widely held He detected an inclination to save 
money by reducing management costs This. in his view, was “the 
big trap” (51) that would lead not to improved patient care, but a 
badly managed service. 
Tensions 
The paradigm interview identified a number of tensions that 
were directly related to the holding of a budget. Pressure came both 
from non-fundholders, but more surprisingly, from other 
fundholders. 
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One concern this first-wave fundholder expressed was that the 
budget allocated to the Practices should be “fair”. He well 
recognised that “an excessive budget” would create tensions (12). So 
it proved. Although the Practice was not particularly well-favoured, 
being the fourth lowest funded per capita of all the fundholding 
Practices in the area, “people assumed we had more money than 
anybody else”(l6). This created “a backlash” from several quarters 
(16), including the hospital where “some of my fiends who are 
consultants”( 16a) found themselves under pressure when they gave 
priority to the Practice’s patients “because we’re bound on the 
contact” (16a) The situation became “difficult” and the Practice had 
to rethink its policy. 
However, the major tensions arose between Practices and 
centred on the perception that fundholding had created a two-tier 
service. The paradigm interviewee describes a “big row” because his 
Practice had been ahle to use their fund to set up a back clinic for 
their patients, resulting in speedier service. This was seen by non- 
fundholders as proof of a two tier service with their patients falling 
into the second tier (39). 
The GP’s response to this accusation suggested well rehearsed 
and oft-repeated arguments. Fundholders were innovators trying out, 
on behalf of all their colleagues and ultimately for the good of all 
patients, new methods of delivering good health care. Once the 
fundholder had tested out the “pilot scheme” it could then be “rolled 
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out for the benefit of everybody”, if the necessary structures were in 
place(3 9). 
In the short term, schemes that proved successful gave 
advantage to patients in the pilot area. It was up to all the bodies 
concerned to make that a temporary situation by ensuring that the 
“playing field was levelled out” so that the good ideas piloted by 
fundholders could be “taken forward’(39,40). The implication was 
that fundholders could not be blamed if those bodies were unable to 
get their act together in order to take advantage of the piloted 
schemes. 
There had been some positive movement in this area of tension 
through the work of what was described as “ an extremely good 
commissioning group”(40). Where such a group did not exist there 
were still problems. 
Other positive developments such as the creation of a 
consortium of fundholders and non-fundholders. “big consortium 
with a representative from each Practice” (45). had also led to a 
reduction in some of the tensions. There was, for example, a much 
greater recognition in ail Practices of the need to “look at priorities”; 
that they could no longer “have their cake and eat it”(45). 
But others tensions were arising, particularly as groups of 
Practices were having to learn to work together in anticipation of 
further government changes. Well-managed fundholders found 
themselves having to bail out the less well-managed, in order that ail 
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in the multi-fund could meet their required targets: “The multi- 
fund’s management has got to persuade the higher referring Practices 
that the GPs need to work up their own patients a bit more, treat 
them themselves a bit more instead of passing them on. That’s going 
to be quite an interesting little battle” (52). 
There was also the potential for tensions within a Practice as it 
sought to keep inside its budgetary limits and to make savings. 
Pressure on the drugs budget meant “you could almost say that GPs 
in general are not spending enough on some drugs” (19). There was 
also the temptation to provide cheaply in-house, that which would be 
better provided, in terms of quality of care, in the secondary care 
sector (36). GPs had to recognise that they could be directly 
responsible for damaging patients if they paid too much attention to 
the cost of treatment. This was a far from comfortable ethical 
position While the GP was at pains to insist that in his Practice they 
knew where to draw the line; they had their priorities right, there was 
also an awareness that others might not be quite so careful 
According to this first wave fundholder, a strong motivation for 
pursuing the fundholding option was the independence it gave from 
outsider control. Managing their own budget removed at least some 
of the restrictions of the old arrangement. This emphasis on 
independence and fieedom from outside constraints is an attitude 
fostered by the profession’s ethos, its underlying moral sentiments. 
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Summary 
The interview data shows that the well-being of patients, 
particularly through the provision of better primary care and more 
control over the quality of secondary care, was a significant 
consideration in the decision to become a fundholder. It is 
noteworthy that the only issue which the GP felt created a personal 
conflict, and that he referred to as ‘this constant dilemma” (30), 
revolved around the place of the individual patient in a system that 
increasingly had to move away from what was perceived to have 
been its central role, namely, personal advocacy, toward care of the 
community. He was clearly exercised by the conflicting claims of his 
own desire to meet the needs or expectations of the presenting 
patient and “the lessons of responsibility for costs” (43), that is to 
say, the duty to maximise health care provision for the whole patient 
population through the wise use of limited resources, even if that 
meant denying an individual patient a particular form of treatment. 
Advocacy had to take second place. In this context it should be 
remembered that, in the view of its leaders’ “advocacy” is a core 
value of the profession and as such, one of its “greatest assets” 
(Allen, 1997a. p.3). Beyond that concern, however, the data 
highlights the contradictions and confusions in this emphasis on the 
care of patients. 
Patient care was one among a number of other areas of concern 
that included the relationship with colleagues. More than that, 
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throughout the interview with comments such as: “the power shift to 
fundholding” (41 ,); “upset[ing] the established hierarchy of things” 
(15 -); “those people (consultants) not controlling what I did in my 
building’’ (42); the GP showed his concern with issues of control, of 
status, of re-dressing imbalances in power, and of independence. 
Historically, these are characteristic concerns of the profession as a 
whole. They reflect the profession’s underlying moral tone, its ethos 
- that focus on itself as a superior and noble profession - but not the 
principles of modern medical ethics. I now turn to the interview data 
as a whole to find if it confirms the emphases of the core 
interviewee 
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Chapter 8 
Ethics and Ethos: Pullinq the Threads Together 
(Other Interview Data) 
This chapter is divided into two main sections allowing the 
voice of both fundholding and non-fundholding GPs to be heard. 
Thus, there will be some conflict between the ideas expressed. In 
hearing these conflicting ideas, it is essential to ask whether they 
weaken or undermine the core argument of this study; namely that 
the traditional medical ethos, and not the more recently developed 
principalist medical ethics, is the greater influence on professional 
thinking and decision-making? Which set of factors or values 
played the major part in the decision on fundholding? Principles of 
beneficence, non-maleficence, autonomy, and justice or those 
informed by the profession’s fundamental moral sentiments, namely, 
traditional practice. protecting independent status, and enhancing 
professional standing? 
Unless indicated otherwise, all the quotes in this and the 
following chapter are taken from the 15 interviews I conducted. 
Quotes kom the core interview are numbered, the rest, for reasons 
given above (see p.218), are distinguished only by reference to 
features I judged important in the context of the quote and especially 
whether the views are those of a fundholder or non-fundholder. 
A brief profile of all the GPs interviewed, other than the core 
interviewee, are provided in Appendix D. 
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Fundholder Interviews 
Influence of partners 
In all but one of the interviews, the views and feelings of 
partners had a significant influence both on the decision to become a 
fundholder and the way the fundholding programme was 
implemented. Thus, in one, two partner Practice in a small town, the 
younger of the partners was the driving force behind the move to 
fundholding. The two, who had split off from a larger Practice, 
seemed an unlikely partnership The younger, dynamic and forward- 
looking; his older colleague rather more set in his ways. Although 
the older partner only "acquiesced" to the move into fundholding, his 
more conservative approach dictated what changes were 
implemented and how. "We can make major changes where there 
isn't much controversy. Where there is controversy your ability to 
manoeuvre is a bit more limited". In the younger partner's view, his 
colleag~~e, a man in his fifties, was an "old timer", for whom issues 
such as clinical autonomy, the freedom to prescribe the drugs or 
treatments he wanted, was an absolute essential Any effort to "reel 
in prescribing" resulted in some very defensive behaviour, "you're 
Threatening their manhood". In these sensitive areas, the younger 
partner took a cautious approach attempting to make the changes he 
saw as necessary without "upsetting the apple cart". Nonetheless, 
despite the obvious reservations felt by the older partner, the 
younger had pushed for fundholding "Primarily I had to protect the 
business side of the Practice". He saw it as the only way the 
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partnership could achieve the rigour required to survive in the much 
more cost conscious NHS When I spoke to the older partner, his 
initial reluctance seemed to have disappeared and he had come round 
to see the benefits of their new position. 
In one large town-centre Practice, there were “moral objections 
from some of the partners”. However, the partners as a whole 
“looked at the potential benefits ... .[and] decided that, on 
balance, ..fundholding offered our patients a better deal”. Once the 
decision was made everyone agreed to go along with it. A similar 
position was taken by another many-partnered, small-town Practice. 
The partners had spent what they called an “away day” together 
looking at the pros and cons of fundholding and had agreed that, 
despite reservations, fundholding was the way in which the Practice 
had to go. 
There was only a single exception to this general approach. The 
doctor concerned. a first wave fundholder, was a senior partner with 
strong views who presented himself as disinclined to brook dissent 
from his preferred position. My suggestion that the views of his 
colleagues had played any part in his decision was dismissed out of 
hand, as, indeed, were virtually all the questions I wanted to raise. In 
his firmly stated opinion, fundholding raised no ethical concerns 
whatsoever, doctors knew exactly where to draw the line between 
the business and the medical side of running a Practice. It was 
something they had been doing long before fundholding came along 
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and they had never confused the two distinct elements. This was the 
briefest of all the interviews, a mere 15 minutes, and it soon became 
clear that the only reason the doctor had agreed to be interviewed 
was because, in his view, fundholding was erroneously seen in a 
negative light and he wanted to take every opportunity to “set the 
record straight”. He was unwavering in his support of the system, 
and fiom the strength of his views, it appeared that political 
considerations were a powerful d u e n c e  on his decision. 
Once a Practice had become a fundholder the influence of the 
lead fundholder partner seemed significant. Au but one of the other 
interviewees referred to the strength of the leads’ position. The 
exception was a Practice where a relatively new young partner had 
been given lead fundholder responsibility. What made this situation 
interesting was the fact that the senior partner had been the lead until 
a few months earlier He had relinquished that position to a very 
junior partner for reasons connected with maintaining a distance 
fiom direct management of the fund. Despite this “disconnection” 
the senior partner stili seemed to have the greatest say in how the 
Practice actually managed its fund.& In all other cases, lead 
fundholders described themselves, or were described, as having 
considerable inîluence over the Practice of their fellow partners. This 
I will noi go mio further detail regarding tius particular lead fundholder as to do 
so may make it possible for the lead and the practice concerned io be identified The 
situation within that practice was rather unusual 
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was particularly evident in matters of keeping within the prescribing 
budget. “Our lead is very good, He always lets us know how things 
are going. So we h o w  what we can afford to buy and what we 
can’t’’. 
A lead fundholder described his role as follows: ‘We’ve taken 
away from partners worrying about anything to do about the 
money”. The partners only had to concern themselves with clinical 
decisions based on patients needs. However, the lead saw it as h s  
job to “point out to them certain areas where they might use 
resources better”. And, if he thought a treatment unusually 
expensive he would have a quiet word with the partner concerned 
“and just ask why?’ 
“Gentle manipulation” was one description of the role of the 
lead in guiding partners spending decisions. It reflected the general 
approach of all leads, bar the youngest one whose situation 1 have 
already described Partners appeared content to accept this influence 
over their clinical decision-making, even though it appeared quite an 
intrusion on their clinical autonomy. They were well aware that 
there were financial implications for the Practice if it went over 
budget, for example, in its prescribing costs. In the context of the 
Practice as a small business, clinical autonomy was less important 
than keeping within budget. 
329 
Influence of Political Climate 
The position of the GP who seemed to have a strong 
poIiticaUideological commitment to fundholding, was, exceptional. 
Nevertheless, for the majority of GPs, awareness of the political 
climate played some pari in the decision-making process. Indeed, 
three of the fundholders spoke of being “driven” into fundholding by 
their perception of political developments as they related to medicine 
in generai and community care in particular 
‘Fundholding was the way things were going and we are 
probably going to be doing it, so we might as well get on with it’ 
was how one fundholder, an enthusiastic one at that, expressed the 
way his partners had read their position. 
For the two reluctant fundholders among my interview group, 
pressures of the political climate played an even greater part in 
pushing them into taking the fundholding path. “It was made so 
uncomfortable to stick to your principles”, one of them said. 
“Pragmatically the decision was a good one, it was the way we had 
to go . . .  and that overrode our personal feelings” was how another 
summed up the thinking behind the decision. 
A majority, (8 of the 10) of the fundholding GPs expressed 
reservations as to the political thinking behind the scheme. Like the 
core interviewee, they saw it as “naughty” of government to divert 
attention away from its own responsibility for underfunding in the 
NHS by apparently passing funding decisions over to local GPs. 
Fundholding “was another ploy of [the] government. They thought 
330 
‘right, we’ll off-load all responsibility for the health service by 
making doctors fundholding and you can blame them when things 
aren’t going right. ”’ ‘Tundholding’s been a political expediency”. 
In the midst of all the changes, GPs were staying alert to the 
political situation as it affected their position, “keeping my nose in 
the air”, was how one put it. For that reason, a large number of the 
fundholders in one locality had handed together to form a local 
multi-fund. This move was, according to one interviewee who had 
recently joined the multi-fund, driven by an awareness of a possible 
change in the political climate. As he explained: ‘?Politically 
everybody expected that aggregation was going to be the way to go. 
The idea of multi-fund got in ahead of the election. Rather than 
people being told what to do they made a pre-emptive strike and 
started to aggregate”. 
Four of the interviewees pointed to local political manoeuvrings 
having played a part in pushing them into fundholding. There was 
considerable disapproval of the way the local health authority had 
performed on behalf of GPs, ‘We were unimpressed to say the 
least”. “We thought we could do better ourselves”. 
Influence of ManaQinQ the Budget 
One of the main areas of concern about managing the budget 
was the time it would take. Nine of the fundholders I interviewed 
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mentioned this as an issue. Within the partnerships it had been the 
most commonly raised objection to fundholding. 
Among fundholding Practices it had been an important issue, 
"Most [of the partners] were nervous that it would involve a lot 
more w o r k .  This concern led several of the lead fundholders to try 
and "make fundholding as invisible as possible". Four of the 
Practices kept a separate team just to look &er the fundholding side 
of things. In one small Practice on the other hand, the lines were 
blurred and crossed virtually all the time: "this is a small organisation 
and staff cut across both the core business and the fundholding side". 
In the remaining five Practices, the lead fundholders stepped aside 
from their medicai duties during a given period each week, a 
morning or afternoon, to focus on fundholding work. Thus,: "Every 
[Tuesday] morning i'm here but I'm not here. So my patients may 
see me in the building but they will be seen by one of my partners". 
"If you are well organised it only takes a few hours every week, one 
afternoon and everyone knows where I am and what I'm doing". 
Whether managing the fund was visible or invisible, it did take 
time away from direct patient care. Nonetheless, all the Practices 
considered this a worthwhile sacrifice, the benefits of managing their 
own fund far outweighed this drawback. 
Managing the budget brought a rigour into the Practice that was 
perceived to have been lacking before. This rigour was mentioned 
by eight of those interviewed as a significant reason for adopting 
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fundholding. The fact that “doctors are not intrinsically managers” 
was a weakness “we muddle through, there is no focus”. 
Fundholding “brought us up to scratch’; it was “a way of getting 
much needed skills in place” “We had to be in a position to know 
where we were going and how to get there”. “Managing within 
budgets is going to become the norm, having to apply best business 
practice to the provision of health care”. 
In one of the small partnerships it was because one partner failed 
to “perceive the weakness of our business position” that, in the view 
of his colleague, he was reluctant to take on fundholding. For the 
pro-fundholding partner, taking responsibility for the budget was the 
only way to ensure the survival of the Practice. Without that move 
he could see the Practice “going down” into bankruptcy. Another 
doctor with whom I raised this possibility denied that such a thing 
would be allowed to happen However. in the experience of the first 
doctor. health authorities in other areas had done just that, “let the 
whole thing go”. In his assessment of the Practice’s position, 
fbndholding had proved its salvation. 
The new responsibilities that managing the budget imposed was 
the single element that, in the view of one very pro-active 
fundholder, “frightened many GPs off. ..they don’t want to be 
responsible”. Of those prepared to take up the new responsibilities 
some saw it as a necessary evil. “A new game was being played and 
you either learnt the rules and got on with it or you stood on the 
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sidelines jeering but being left behind’ Others found the whole 
experience “refreshing” and even “exciting”. No matter the attitude 
with which they entered “the game”, all those prepared to accept the 
responsibility did so because they also saw the opportunities. 
Improving the Practice by updating equipment, adding new 
technology and expanding the premises was an obvious incentive. 
Even a very reluctant fundholder described one of the major benefits 
as “to the Practice itself in the sense that we’ve been able to update 
our technology and space”. All such improvements could be justified 
in terms of improving the quality of care offered to patients; a central 
tenet in medical ethics, but they also added value to the partners 
holdings, a significant factor in the ethos of GP practice. Thus, one 
interview was conducted in a splendid boardroom. The GP and I sat 
at one end of a large and rather handsome oak table. Here the 
partners met one afternoon every week to discuss matters of import. 
This room. along with a range of other refurbishments and additions 
to the building, was a direct result of the Practice becoming a 
fundholder 
All the fundholding GPs insisted that they were able to resist the 
temptation to save money by not using the secondary sector when it 
was in the patients best interests to do so, although they also all 
agreed that some of their colleagues might be less scrupulous and, 
indeed, the paradigm interviewee had noticed a tendency to under- 
prescribe in some areas due to the pressure on the drugs budget. 
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A fundholding GP with whom I raised the question of savings, 
responded by pointing out that their refurbishment had improved 
efficiency and effective delivery of care by bringing all the 
administration under one roof, thereby opening up "a lot more 
clinical space" for more doctors and more nurses. However, there 
was a degree of discomfort at my having raised the issue. "Is it 
wrong putting money into buildings or is it a question of who owns 
that building? I think the rub is there . . . .  it is difficult . . .  Not a lot of 
NHS money has gone into this improvement.. .This is a one off and 
it's actually very, very small and do I benefit personally? I suppose at 
the end of the day if I sell it off but most GP surgeries are running at 
negative equity". 
Later in our conversation, the same GP spoke with concern of a 
pian afoot to open a home for people with leaning difficulties that 
would have to be served by his Practice His concern was that as the 
Practice alreadv had such a home in its catchment area a second one 
would put considerable pressure on the budget. The partners were 
determined to resist this development and were engaged in trying to 
persuade neighbouring Practices to at least share the financial 
burden with them. 
There was, however, among those interviewed, one case of a 
fundholding Practice where they had decided to return their savings 
to the local health authority rather than use them to refurbish their 
building. In explaining their decision the lead fundholder told me: 
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“We didn’t feel morally comfortable to use fundholding savings to 
develop that which is owned by the partners” Even here, however, 
the action was probably not as selfless as it appeared Profit of 
another kind seem to have been a strong motivating factor, inasmuch 
as one of the partners had become actively involved in the politics of 
the profession and was anxious to avoid using the money saved in 
any way that could be interpreted in a negative light Nevertheless, 
that the partner involved saw the question of how savings were used 
as a potentially damaging issue suggested that using savings to 
improve buildings and the like was not quite as patient centred as 
most fundholders liked to insist However, the Practice did not 
return all the money it had saved, but used some of it to set up a 
counselling service for its patients 
Influence of Patients 
The influence of patients centred on the question of how 
fundholding would affect patient care 
None of the Practices had consulted patients about the 
fundholding decision Glennerster et u/ ( I  994), found the same lack 
of patient involvement in his study This was unsurprising, as in 
traditional medical thinking patients are passive recipients of care 
However, virtually all of the Practices, both fund and non- 
fundholders, stated that their decision was based on a desire to 
provide “the best service for the patients” Even though the majority 
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of fundholders 1 interviewed were, to a greater or lesser extent, 
conscious of the need to take their patients sensibilities into 
consideration this was very much an interpretation of what those 
sensibilities might be. There was no direct discussion with patients. 
This paternalistic approach reflects a central element of the 
traditional medical ethos where the expert doctor looks after patients 
who, in turn, are expected or required to do no more, and no less, 
than follow the doctor’s advice or “orders” (see footnote 14). 
However, one Practice, when tightening up on the drugs 
budget, decided to set out the aims of the Practice. Patients were 
given this information on the repeat prescription schedules held by 
individual patients. The Practice considered it very important that 
patients be given information and kept abreast of developments that 
directly affected them. In another Practice, the aim was to “lift a very 
poor generic prescribing rate . . .  to way above the local averages”. In 
order not to upset patients, the Practice moved gradually over a 
twelve month period toward its goal. They adopted what was 
described as a “bottom up approach’. “We took the patients with 
us”. The goal was achieved “without upsetting anyone”. 
Nevertheless, all but one of the GPs I interviewed saw patients 
in very passive terms. One GP thought his patients wanted nothing 
more than to be ‘Yaken by the hand and led through the system” until 
they came out of the other end with their health problem resolved. In 
the core interview the GP suggested that patients were satisfied as 
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long as they saw some sort of body language from the doctor that 
conveyed interest. 
A more active involvement by patients was not welcomed or 
tolerated. Patients who tried to be knowledgeable about their health 
needs enraged one GP He dismissed their efforts as “the classic 
Reader’s Digest Home Doctor’s Almanac”. Several of the 
fundholding GPs referred to the potential problem of patients asking 
for specific types of treatment. “You’re faced with someone saying 
they need aromatherapy or something, and asking us to pay just 
because they’d heard we’re fundholders”. None of the GPs were 
prepared to acquiesce to their patients wishes. All had “strategies” 
for fobbing off such requests. These basically involved telling 
patients a version of the truth to the effect that the Practice “was not 
allowed’ to purchase treatments for its patients that would not be 
available for all patients ‘We just cop out” as one GP put it. In one 
Practice the partners had made a point of explaining to any patient 
requesting unorthodox treatments, that they had made a ‘collective 
decision’ not to use their funds in that way. “We have the good of 
9000 patients to consider as against one”. 
In one of the many Practices where the decision had been made 
to support the local NHS provider, the GP recognised that patients 
may well have preferred to receive speedier treatment even if this 
meant going into the private sector, but they were not offered this 
option. However, in the same discussion the GP made clear that 
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their support of the NHS was conditional. If the private sector 
offered better value for money, the Practice would have no qualms 
about using it. Speedier private sector care could become available 
to patients, but only if and when it directly benefited the Practice 
budget. It was for doctors alone to make the decision. It was not 
an area over which patients would be invited to express a view. 
Only one fundholding GP positively welcomed active patient 
involvement, but then only up to a point. “I think you can involve 
people in the dialogue”. Indeed, he found it stimulating and learnt a 
great deal particularly when patients brought in information they had 
sought via the Internet. But as for inviting patients views on 
fundholding and the spending constraints it had imposed: “I don’t 
directly allude to it . . I  tend to dress it up in certain ways” 
Three of the fundholding GPs thought fundholding and the other 
related changes had altered patients attitudes toward their doctor. 
”The esteem in which GPs used to be held” was fast disappearing. 
There was much less trust and respect, and consequently people 
tended to visit the surgery, or even call the doctor out, for all sorts 
of trivial problems One GP was particularly resentful of this 
change. Where patients once appreciated what the doctor did for 
them and were grateful, now the trend was towards a more proactive 
patient demanding “their rights”. Although small in number, in his 
opinion, this unappreciative band, influenced by the Patients Charter, 
was growing. The negative attitude of patients had, in turn, affected 
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the attitude of GPs to the care of patient. Where once he and his 
partners eschewed all thought of working nine to five, now, simply in 
order to survive the “patient onslaught”, they along with many of 
their colleagues, were using a deputising service despite reservations 
as to the quality of care the service offered. 
Fundholding had made all the GPs very aware that treating 
patients cost money. Not only in terms of the obvious direct costs in 
pound and pence of any treatment but also of what economists call 
“opportunity costs” (Cole, 1995, p,S7). In other words, a decision 
to purchase one type of health care, involved not only the actual 
outlay of money but also the loss of the opportunity to spend that 
money elsewhere and thereby satisfy the needs or wants related to 
that alternative The cost of one hip replacement included not only 
the actual pounds but also the opportunity to purchase 20 cataract 
operations with all the utility that those operations would have 
brought to the many patients involved. Opportunity costs have 
always been part of the spending dilemma for the NHS, However, 
until fundholding, it was not part of the GPs job to take account of 
that factor. They could push the decision further down the line, 
leaving it, for example, to the consultants and their waiting lists. 
Fundholding gave GPs a “direct say in the rationing critena that 
would affect their patients” (Glennerster et al, 1994, p.49), and the 
incentive to make savings both by buying cheaper secondary care or 
even deciding not to send patients to the consultant in the first place. 
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Influence of Relationship with Other Professionals 
Interview material indicated GPs often felt undervalued by their 
professional colleagues and those in higher levels of management. 
Fundholding was a way of raising their profile and giving them the 
recognition and respect they felt their contribution to health care 
deserved. 
All the fundholders described the change in the relationship 
between GP and consultant that fundholding had wrought. Prior to 
fundholding, consultants had no need to take much notice of the GP. 
Consultants managed their waiting-lists as they saw fit and GPs and 
patients alike had to accept whatever standard of care was on offer, 
both in terms of the time a patient had to wait and the quality of the 
treatment provided when they eventually saw the consultant or, more 
often, one of his team. The GP could only wait alongside the patients 
who "basically trusted their doctor to do the best for them knowing 
that they couldn't always do what they would like". In that situation, 
GP advocacy was almost meaningless. In terms of the care offered 
by secondary providers, the judgement was that it could often have 
been better. GPs had no influence whatsoever, "none at all", on the 
quality of the service, "we just sort of struggled. Another 
fundholder described the helplessness of the GP as follows: "We had 
no say over what their care was or who should undertake that 
care . . .  There was no-one who could ring up the consultant and say 
341 
my patient's had a raw deal. In the old days that would have been 
entirely dismissed, to blame the consultant - you knew better". 
Theoretically, everyone, at least in a given area, was in the same 
position. The best the GP could do was apply a little extra pressure 
to move a patient up the list a bit if she or he judged that the need 
was particularly urgent. But the effectiveness of this approach often 
depended on how well the GP had cultivated the local consultants. 
Thus, sending the proverbial Christmas card was recognised as good 
practice on the GPs part A GP described how personal contacts 
would be used in order to push their particular patient ahead of 
others. "I ring the consultant and that deals with it" The friendship 
network, often established in medical school, could also be utilised: 
"I want you to go and see an old mate of mine in [another part of the 
country]". In those situations patients knew their GP had "tweaked' 
the system on their behalf, they were accordingly grateful and 
appreciative. 
The reality of that traditional situation showed up the notion of 
equal shares as Something of a delusion. One GP described the old 
system as "the doctor who shouted loudest got the money" the fancy 
"XY machine to do something or the other" even though he knew 
that left no funding for chiropodists. Another described two other 
traditional models for allocating resources in the pre-reform NHS: 
either the lions share went to the middle class articulate patients who 
knew how to make their voices heard, thus leaving little for the poor 
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and ill-educated, or there was the "its available for everyone until the 
money mns out after that nobody gets anything" approach, This 
latter was the closest the system came to equal shares. 
Prior to fundholding, GPs had little choice but to accept all these 
inequalities for their patients. Interestingly, a reluctant fundholder 
spoke fondly of the good old days when he could with just a 
telephone call arrange for a patient to be seen by a specialist in any 
part of the country, no matter how far away. Now as a fundholder 
he was restricted to sending his patients to those providers &om 
whom the Practice had contracted to purchase services. 
Significantly, he saw this as undermining his clinical autonomy. 
In the opinion of most fundholders (7 of the 10) the obsequious 
cultivating of the local consultants or telephone calls to distant 
mates, what one GP called "the old boy network", had a very limited 
effect. The new arrangement had changed that situation for the 
better Now the Practices could set down in a contract the standards 
of good practice, as "written down in all the journals"; they expected 
the consultant to offer to all their patients. Consultants, the Mr 
Bloggs as one GP called them, were no longer free to run the system 
as they saw fit; offering idiosyncratic care or allowing waiting lists to 
grow while they looked after their private Practices. "I personally 
didn't see why Mr Bloggs should benefit financially from a long 
waiting list when there were things which told me that Mr Bloggs 
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could pull his finger out a bit more at the NHS hospital Then his 
waiting lists might come down by running a more efficient service”. 
On the other hand, fundholders themselves were not impervious 
to the negative effects their new powers could have on long-term 
relationships, They knew, or were soon reminded of, the wisdom of 
not rocking the boat too much. This approach raised a number of 
ethical questions that did not seem to have figured in the decision- 
making although each decision was always justified as in the best 
interests of their patients. Setting their decisions in a wider context 
it became apparent that, once again, issues beyond considering the 
best interests of patients were involved. 
The freedom to buy better care was, according to ali the 
fundholders, a prime motivation for pursuing fundholding and the 
poor or poorer quality of the some of the local services was 
mentioned by several interviewees. In the core interview, the 
Practice found it was in a position to provide better secondary care 
for its patients by purchasing from outside its area However, they 
decided not to offer patients the better service because that would 
require travelling further afield “We didn’t feel that we wanted to 
move patients around horrendously”( 16). 
Yet, this justification does not stand up to scrutiny. The 
Practice’s patients had always been routinely required to travel 
“horrendous” distances for any number of treatments. Thus, most 
serious cardiac surgery and certain cancer treatments were, and are, 
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routinely provided in centres situated up to a hundred miles Erom 
patients’ homes. In the most rural locations even basic secondary 
care services required a journey of twenty or thirty miles. 
it was noticeable that the fundholders least wilting to challenge 
their local service provider were those closest to the huh of the 
small, close-knit medical community centred in the county town of a 
mainly rural area. Those doctors might easily meet their hospital 
based colleagues, such as consultants socially, so “good working 
relations” were particularly important. Thus, one GP, from a 
Practice in the centre of the main town in which the general hospital 
was located, spoke of the Practice’s decision to support their local 
service provider even though the service offered was so poor that it 
was ‘Yo the detriment of patients”. 
Conversely, fundholders with Practices set well away from the 
centre seemed far more ready to throw down the gauntlet and 
demand better secondary services even if this meant asking patients 
to travel further afield or using the private sector. They had no 
hesitation in threatening to withdraw their business from local but 
poor quality providers: “We’ve got the money now, they have to 
listen to us”. 
Another Practice outside the hub of the county’s medical 
community made it quite clear that although “in principle we’d like to 
support local NHS Trusts”, if the private sector offered cheaper but 
equally good care there would be no objection to using it. In this 
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context, a fundholder made an interesting observation: “We’re an 
independent Practice - GPs themselves are the private sector” 
However, for one two-partner Practice, fundholding was not 
about exercising power over consultants, “we’re too small”, but it 
was about increased control over the way the Practice itself was run 
It was an opportunity to revise, rebuild, and strengthen the internal 
structures so that they would stand up to outside scrutiny 
Ethics of ManaQement 
Any suggestion that fundholding was unethical and inimicai to 
the values of the NHS and good practice was firmly rejected by the 
majority of the fundholders I interviewed. Fundholding had taught 
the value of first-class management and the NHS needed just such 
management if it was to provide good patient care. Lack of “any 
recognisable management structure” was identified by one GP as the 
fundamental weakness not only of his Practice but of the NHS as a 
whole Effective management allowed you “to know where you 
were, know where you were going, know how to get there and be 
able to do it” 
Thus, the suggestion that patients would be better served if 
resources were taken from management and spent on direct patient 
care showed a misunderstanding of the place of good management to 
the service. Far from improving the service, reducing spending on 
management would take the service back to the position where it 
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didn’t know what it was doing or who was spending what and where 
“A publicly funded health care system, because it’s so short of 
money, has to be, to my mind, managed in a first-class way“ was 
how the core interviewee saw the situation 
To another of the GPs, the days of open ended budgets were a 
thing of the past ‘Managing within budget is going to be the norm - 
not just fundholding but everything” He described this emphasis on 
effective management as “an ethic that has not pervaded a lot of the 
health service until recently” In his view, the new ethics was a 
change for the better Without it, the NHS could not survive 
For fundholding GPs it seemed that a more overt acceptance of 
the utilitarian ethics of the common good, already noted in this study 
as a core value of health care management, had replaced the 
traditional professional emphasis on the primacy of the individual 
patient 
Non-Fundholders 
Did the approach and attitude of the four non-fundholders I 
interviewed contrast with that of the fundholders’ Did those who 
rejected fundholding do so because their practice was guided by the 
principles of modern medical ethics, principles lacking from the 
decision making of their fundholding colleagues? 
Whilst those opposed to fundholding were more inclined to 
express their opposition in moral terms describing fundholding as 
unethical, immoral, and wrong, nevertheless as they discussed the 
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factors that actually played the greatest part in their own decision, 
just as in the case of their fundholding colleagues, the issues they 
raised were directly linked not so much to the principles of medical 
ethics but the ethos of the medical profession as it translated into the 
experience of the GP. The interviews with the four non-fundholders 
showed that whilst direct references to ethics was more prominent 
among this group, the factors that most influenced their decisions 
were those allied to the profession’s ethos. The emphasis on 
stability, and a disinclination to upset the established order of things, 
is another aspect of the profession’s sense of its own dignity and 
status. 
Influence of partners 
Like their fundholding colleagues, the non-fundholders decision 
had also been a joint venture Here again, however, the impression I 
gained fiom the interviewees, particularly from the strength of 
feeling with which they spoke, was that each of them seemed to 
have been the dominant voice influencing the course taken by the 
Practice as a whole One partner described the decision-making 
process there had been some division between partners but once a 
majority view became clear no dissent or argument was expected OT 
encouraged Furthermore, although each year presented the 
opportunity to enter the fundholding scheme, none of the four non- 
holders I interviewed made a practice of raking the issue on an 
annual basis The subject had been aired, the decision made and, 
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unless circumstances changed dramatically, it was not considered 
necessary to discuss it again. 
Influence of Political Climate 
National 
Even the most determined non-fundholders admitted that they 
would become fundholders if the political climate made it impossible 
to stay out of the scheme Three of those I interviewed made the 
point that there was a feeling that, as fundholding was the 
government’s preferred option, in time, steps would be taken to 
pressurise non-fundholders into the scheme by slowly starving them 
of resources Despite this commonly expressed view, those who had 
held out against fundholding did not think they had suffered any lack 
of resources 
Non-fundholders wanted to leave the HA in charge of 
negotiating with service providers This was, in their view, a morally 
superior position to that taken by fundholders The consensus was 
that the HA had done a reasonable job and non-fundholders were 
happy to work within that arrangement Only the HA was in a 
position to know the health care needs of the whole community and 
to make funding decisions accordingly While each Practice, whether 
fundholding or non-fundholding, could only know in detail the needs 
of their particular patient population at least the non-fundholders 
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were, in their own view, concerned for that wider community. 
Fundholders, on the other hand, only looked at the needs within their 
own particular Practices. 
One of the non-fundholders made the point very graphically. In 
his view under the control of the HA, savings made in one area 
would be used to meet a need somewhere else in the community 
Fundholding had broken up that system by allowing fundholders to 
keep within the Practice any savings made. Then they were free to 
spend them on something as trivial “stapling some fat women’s 
stomach while one of my patients can’t have his hip replacement and 
is in agony”. That, in his view, was morally reprehensible. 
influence of Mananinn the Budnet 
One non-fundholder drew a distinction between the two 
partners in the Practice who had objected to fundholding on “ethical 
grounds”, seeing the whole scheme as inherently ‘wong’, and the 
remaining three partners, the majority, who had been opposed on 
grounds of the time managing the fund would take up. This latter 
objection, however, proved to be a common concern among the 
non-fundholders. For the majority of partners it was a significant 
factor in their decision not to take up fundholding and some saw it as 
an ethical issue. They were “daunted by the administrative task 
involved. One made it his first objection to fundholding, referring to 
“the burden of administrative and managerial tasks”. A third spoke 
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of the doctors “vocational ethics” being “for patient care not 
running a business”. Fundholding required that time be given over 
to managing the budget and this would diminish the care that could 
be given to their patients. 
How fundholders made and used savings from their budget was 
the issue raised by all the non-fundholders 1 interviewed. They saw 
fundholders using funds to add value to partners holdings by 
refurbishing their buildings instead of putting any savings back into 
the general pot for the good of all patients in the area. In their 
assessment, those who had pursued fundholding were mainly 
motivated, not by concern for their patients, but, by personal greed. 
One infiuential non-fundholder claimed that fundholders were 
“laundering” resources and feathering their own nests. 
Money provided for primary care should not, in the view of all 
the non-fundholders, be held by individual Practices. Rather savings 
should be a common resource and any used to improve care for the 
generality of patients, not “tarting up” Practice premises. This point 
links to the concerns expressed by one of the other non-fundholders 
regarding the value of staying under the control of HAS. 
Even when fundholders used savings to purchase “new services” 
for their patients these were dismissed by the non-fundholders as 
merely “cosmetic” and of no real value to patients. To use funds to 
buy in a counselling service was as much a misuse of funds as using 
the money to improve partners buildings. In the opinion of the non- 
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fundholders the whole issue of savings raised “an ethical dilemma” 
that fundholders were reluctant to address 
Influence of Patients 
The paternalistic ethics was as much in evidence among non- 
fundholders. Like their fundholding colleagues, none of the non- 
fundholders had consulted their patients about the fundholding 
decision. Although one Practice had surveyed its patients on the 
question of whether or not to move to an appointment system4’ it 
had not considered using a similar approach when deciding on the 
fundholding issue. 
All four non-fundholders were convinced that the principles of 
fundholding undermined good patient care. It broke the trust 
patients had in their doctor. According to one non-fundholder, the 
reason why patients of fundholders were more demanding, was 
because “they feel you are not giving them what they want because 
you want to save money Whereas we don’t have that, I mean it is 
something that comes between you and the patient whereas with us, 
money doesn’t come into it”. 
On the other hand, they also objected to fundholding because it 
encouraged “the participants to purchase short term advantages for 
Most Practices with more than one partner nowadays operate an appointment 
qstem, patients telephone and make an appointment to see a doctor This Pracuce, 
however, maintained the old system where patients simply turned up and m a t e d  to 
be seen and the doctors would work through their waiting room 
4- 
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their patients at a very, very [original emphasis] local level" without 
consideration of the needs of the wider local patient community, 
Another non-fundholder spoke in terms of the GPs role as 
advocate: "I don't see myself in the business of rationing. 1 don't see 
how you can on the one hand, be a patient's advocate and on the 
other hand say you can't have that". But then, the same GP took 
great exception to fundholders because they advocated too strongly 
on behalf of their patients: "It's morally wrong to grab the best for 
your own patients . . .  If your patients get more, then somebody else's 
patients get less and it seems to me that it's all about equal shares, 
everyone getting a bite of the cherry". 
Among the four non-fundholders there was some difference of 
opinion as to the extent of any negative impact of fundhoiding on 
their own patients. One was quite definite in his view that his 
patients had not suffered to any real extent by the Practice 
maintaining its non-fundholding position. Health care outcomes 
were not better for patients of fundholders compared to those of 
non-fundhoiders. However, two of the others saw the situation very 
differently. Thus, from one: "Our patients were being greatly 
disadvantaged". And from the other "It was obviously a two-tier 
system". In both instances, the partners had chosen to join the 
developing commissioning groups, becoming members of the 
National Association of Commissioning General practitioners and 
this they felt, had given them new powers in dealing with secondary 
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care providers Thus, their patients were no longer in a 
disadvantaged position. 
The impact of fundholding on direct patient care had clearly 
stirred up a hornets’ nest but as can be seen from the views quoted, 
much of the opposition was expressed in muddled and somewhat 
contradictory terms 
Influence of Relationship with Other Professionals 
Non-fundholders objected very strongly to the attitude of 
fundholders toward local hospital trusts and the Health Authority 
One spoke with great anger of the bullying tactics fundholders 
employed when negotiating with service providers; threatening the 
hospital with losing the business of fundholding Practices’ if it did 
not come up with deals for cheaper secondary care. It was 
particularly distressing to non-fundholders to see the hard-nosed 
negotiators driving around in “fancy new cars”. The motive for 
pushing down prices was assessed as purely selfish. 
The non-fundholders were even more distressed by the 
fundholders approach to professional colleagues It was described as 
“essentially competitive” setting doctor against doctor, GP against 
GP in a “very confrontational way”. There were, according to 
another interviewee, ”big differences in the approach of the two 
groups. Not least in the relationship between GP and consultant. 
Non-fundholders found it very difficult to come to terms with this 
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aspect of fundholding. Consultants were being directly employed by 
GPs to provide services to patients in the surgery, Although the 
arrangement was ‘more convenient’ for patients and “patients like to 
have a cosy chat with a consultant in the surgery”, this was dismissed 
as offering only “cosmetic benefits” to the patients concerned. 
The important issue to the GP, was that it undermined the 
traditional way of providing health care, giving an unfair advantage 
to some patients and extra money in the pockets for the consultants. 
One non-fundholder summed up her response to the situation as 
follows: “I feel it would be better if everybody worked under the 
same rules and, of course, you do your best for your patients within 
those rules”. Operating within those established rules allowed her “if 
I’ve got a problem” to ”ring the consultant and that deals with it”. 
However, she also recognised that GPs %ho haven’t been here so 
long can’t use that route”. Such inequalities were disappointing but 
had to be accepted as part of playing by the rules 
Nevertheless, despite all their reservations, the non-fundholder 
had come to see that “not everything about fundholding has been 
bad in every case”. One acknowledged that some of the doctors 
were “very committed to the care of their patients and that there 
had been instances of “good innovations” by fundholders. Beyond 
that, another accepted that the old system within which he still 
operated was inefficient. 
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Even concerns about the relationship between community and 
hospital had modified over time to the point where three of the four 
non-fundholders inteniewed, agreed that fundholding had changed 
things for the better across the whole primary care community All 
Practices had benefited from the more aggressive stance taken by 
fundholders. “The hospital certainly listens to what we [non- 
fundholders] say now, how we want to manage things” “Consultants 
have bad to work harder and more efficiently” 
Ethics of Manaaement 
In the view of ali four non-fundholders, the fundholders 
excessive cost-awareness had a major and a negative impact on the 
doctor-patient relationship. Non-fundholders asserted that they 
alone were standing firm on behalf of patients best interests; 
providing care without considerations of cost and profit. They 
pointed an accusing finger at fundholding colleagues portraying their 
cost awareness in the most negative terms, while at the same time 
presenting as virtuous their own refusal to take any responsibility for, 
or account of, the costs their treatment decisions incurred, although 
they knew full well that somewhere along the line, someone had to 
take account of those costs Only one of the non-fundholders was 
prepared to acknowledge that fact. “I’m not a fundholder, I push for 
all eight people to get their hips, do or die, and someone else’s bill is 
going to have to do it. That’s the sort of comfortable ethical 
356 
position.. there’s a sori of comfort k n o t  having to take those sort 
of decisions ... the decision will then be taken by someone else”. 
This was a view common to all non-fundholders, to the extent 
that everyone of them used the example of hip replacement to make 
their argument. “‘We’ve got patients waiting for hip replacements ... I 
never choose who’s deserving and who isn’t. I just do the best for 
each person who comes through the door”. When I mentioned the 
fundholders argument that someone somewhere has to make the 
difficult choice, one of the non-fundholders simply said: ‘’I’m just not 
particularly good at that sort of thing and so 1 don’t particularly want 
to do it”. 
However, the non-fundholders opposition revealed some 
confusion around their basic ethical position On the one hand, as 
above, they saw themselves as upholding the traditional medicai 
ethics of the primacy of the patient against the Ymethicai” 
fundholders who took account of costs when considering the needs 
of individual patients. But then they themselves appeared to adopt a 
utilitarian stance by contrasting their own position - “The GPs job is 
to look &er the whole community not just the individual patient” - 
with that of fundholding colleagues who used their resources to 
meet the needs of their own patients without considering the needs 
of the wider patient population. ‘We’re not here just to look after 
our own 6000 patients. We have to remember the 35,000 patients in 
this area”. Management principles appeared to have moved all 
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involved in providing health care toward a more overt utilitarian 
position. 
Summarv 
The hypothesis presented in this thesis contends that, behind the 
overt acceptance of the principles of modern medical ethics, the 
medical profession endorses and applies a set of principles and values 
arising from, and informed by its underlying moral sentiments, its 
ethos. These focus around professional status. Thus, autonomy, 
both for the individual practitioner and the profession as a whole, 
along with a paternalistic attitude toward patients, have for long 
been key principles in the profession's implicit ethics of practice. 
The theory would lead us to expect to see these values, rather than 
those of modem medical ethics, exerting the strongest influence on 
the thinking of GPs as they contemplated the fundholding option. 
The interview data confirms that expectation. 
Fundholding roused strong feelings in the whole medical 
None of the GPs I interviewed were neutral in their 
Some spoke of pragmatism; some spoke of 
community 
views on the matter. 
conviction; but all spoke with passion. 
One partner in a Practice that had very reluctantly indeed opted 
for fundholding, talked with great feeling about the changes 
fundholding had wrought. The convivial, collegiate nature of former 
practice was gone; now everyone, including patients, had moved into 
what he called "contract mode", where the emphasis was on getting 
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the most for yourself at least cost, no matter what burdens it placed 
on others. Despite all the reservations, including the "feeling inside 
that what we were doing was not right" pragmatism dictated that the 
Practice became fundholders. Once that decision was made there 
was no point in dwelling on the rights and wrongs, flagellating 
oneself or wearing a hair shirt; the pragmatic approach was to accept 
the new situation and get on with the job. Having said that, 
however, the GP admitted that if he could find another job that paid 
the same money he would "take it tomorrow". 
This despair was exceptional It was countered by an equally 
powerful expression of approval from a fundholder, the youngest of 
the male GPs, who had entered into the new arrangement with great 
enthusiasm. He spoke of his surgery as a prison, "we even have bars" 
he said, pointing to the windows of his ground-floor consulting 
room, In this prison he was isolated from the outside world for 
hours every day In his experience. fundholding had opened the 
prison, introduced new ideas; fresh ways of dealing not only with 
the business side of the Practice, but even the way the Practice 
provided its general medical services. This had been liberating and 
even though he saw more changes on the horizon, and not ail of 
them to his liking, he was positive and enthusiastic about the future. 
Most of the GPs sat between these two poles. Fundholding had 
not been their preferred modits operand but once it was there they 
recognised it as an opportunity that they could not afford to miss 
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both for the benefits it would bring to the Practice and to the quality 
of care; or level of service, they could offer their patients. Ail were 
pleased with the outcome of their decision for now they had "clout"; 
"power"; "control"; "a voice". And some were positively delighted 
seeing the potential for their influence to spread right into the heart 
of hospital services, putting consultants in their rightful place as 
technicians doing a job for the GP, "how and when" the GP wanted 
it. 
Even if all these advantages were eventually lost, or had to be 
given up, due to the new local or national political pressures, 
fundholding was still seen to have been worthwhile, not least for the 
financial and business benefit it had brought to the Practices 
involved. 
Thus. looking back to the core interview, when that Practice 
first considered becoming fundholders. they did so with the idea that 
it would probably be for a very limited period: five vears was the 
estimated life-span of their involvement. The decision to pursue this 
medium term project appeared to have been in some part financial. 
They would support the scheme for as long as they could make 
savings but once the budget was tightened up to the point where 
savings were difficult or impossible to find, then it would be time to 
"drop it". 
The Practice was considering entering the fundholding scheme 
at the very earliest opportunity, as first wavers. According to the 
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GP, their major concern was to change attitudes so as to deliver 
long-term improvements in primary care. Yet from the outset 
improving patient care was not the only consideration in the mind of 
this and other potential fundholders, they were also focused on the 
financial benefits to the Practice. Savings were the incentive; no 
savings, no fundholding (33) (34). 
At that very early stage of the whole fundholding scheme, there 
were no alternatives such as have been devised and developed in 
recent years (1997-1999). As far as the partners knew “dropping it” 
would in all probability mean going back to the status quo and losing 
all the benefits that had been gained for their patients. It would also 
mean losing the new freedoms and increased power that fundholding 
offered. 
On the other hand, fundholding offered the possibility of a 
permanent, or at least long-term. benefit in the form of value added 
to the partnership through, for instance, improvements to the 
building they owned. As a small business run by independent 
contractors, these factors would of necessity weigh in the decision. 
Thus‘ from a business perspective, although “dropping it” would 
leave GPs themselves with the some loss of power and patients with 
a lower quality of care this would he outweighed by the long term 
financial gain to the partnership. 
Fundholding had given GPs new opportunities to achieve their 
“clear and unambiguous survival goal or primay purpose.. .sufficient 
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fees to pay all of the bills and make enough profit to pay the partners 
according to their expectations" (Hadley & Foster, 1993, p. 140, 
emphasis added). 
However, a natural conservatism surrounds much of medical 
practice and informs the views of practitioners. Many GPs would, 
therefore, have found themselves uncomfortable with, even 
threatened by, this new entrepreneurial spirit. This came through in 
the interviews as the attitude that informed the thinking of those who 
rejected the fundholding option. The action of fundholders was 
described as unethical, but the real resentment was for the way 
fundholding had turned the whole GP world upside down. 
"Divisive" was the one word used by ail non-fundholders when 
describing the fundholding project. Fundholding had upset the 
established structures and undermined traditional relationships; 
destabilised the familiar order and called into question long held 
values and modes of operation. It had thereby forced ail doctors to 
face issues they would rather have left unexamined and to take on 
responsibilities they were disinclined to accept. Thus, by brealung 
ranks, fundholders had shown up the flaws in the system and placed 
all GPs, whether fundholders or not, under a pressure to be more 
aggressive on behalf of their patients, less servile in their dealings 
with consultants and the HA, and finally more aware of the cost 
implications of their treatment decisions. Many would clearly have 
preferred to continue under the old rules and the "more comfortable 
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ethical position” that allowed GPs to order treatment, or refer to the 
secondary sector, without direct consideration of the quality of care 
on offer or any impact on the resources available. 
Many GPs of the old school preferred to continue with the 
system they had grown up with, “a very static environment”, in 
which they had operated for thirty years or more. A fundholder 
spoke of the new arrangement as one that called for “a totally 
different dynamic”, and “an attitude that until recently had not 
pervaded a lot of health care”, it had “put the cat among the 
pigeons”. Another fundholder castigated much of traditional medical 
practice as “a theocracy” characterised by “weird” doctors whose 
modus opermdi was “top down paternalistic medicine” and for 
whom “clinical autonomy was a right they demanded not a privilege 
they eamed’ In his view such doctors were a dying breed. 
In all the i 5 interviews, whether with the 11 fundholders or the 
4 non-îundholders. there was an undoubted concern for the care of 
their patients but it was not the paramount consideration when 
deciding on the fundholding issue. Relationships with colleagues; 
establishing or reinforcing status; independence including the 
freedom to pursue sound business practice; an attachment to the 
stutus quo; all these stood out, either singly or in combination, as 
central elements in the decision of the GPs concerned. 
The theory propounded and tested in this thesis argues that all 
of these concerns reflect attitudes, beliefs, and values inherent in the 
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ethos, the fundamental moral sentiments, of the profession. They are 
not signs of unethical thinking, but rather are the ethical values 
arising from and endorsed by that ethos. The relative importance that 
each Practice, or each GP within the Practice, attached to  those key 
ethos-based values determined whether the Practice took the 
fundholding or non-fundhoiding path. 
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Chapter 9 
Discussion 
“Why do you have two handkerchiefs. Daddy!” 
asked the little daughter. 
”Well. this one:’ replied her father. pointing to  che 
fine silk item in his breast pocker. “is for show. Bur 
this one.” pulling om a crumpled cotton version 
from his trouser pocket “is for blow”. 
Childhood conversation recalled by a friend 
In his study of the ethical climate within a variety of 
organisations Cullen (1990), concluded that whilst “îirms are 
developing codes of ethics, using moral character as a selection 
criterion, monitoring the ethical judgements of managers, and 
training managers in ethical decision making” (p 93), it was the 
underlying moral climate within an organisation, that which I have 
identified in this thesis as the ethos, that most often determined the 
type of decisions made. This results in a very different set of 
operating values In other words, although a firm will in its code of 
conduct, its formal explicit ethics, espouse one type of behaviour, the 
ethos of the organisation, its moral atmosphere, may well produce a 
markedly different outcome in the everyday implicit ethics of 
practice 
That moral atmosphere is created by those who have influence 
Yeager (1990), found that “managers’ within the organisation 
perceptions of the behaviors (sic) or beliefs of significant others in 
their organization (sic) were predictive of the managers’ own 
tendency to commit unethical acts [such] as concealing errors” 
Jackal1 in hjs study of the “moral terrain’’ of management in America 
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summed it up thus: 
above you wants from you” (1986, p.6). 
“morality in the corporation is what the guy 
Valance (1995), identified a recent trend by organisations and 
companies to formulate codes of ethical practice. She assessed the 
reason for this move as an attempt to restore confidence following 
adverse reaction from the public to various business scandals of the 
late 1980s. In her view, “ethical commitment can be a central part of 
the business vision’’ and “an overt ethical position” has become “a 
strategic imperative” giving to the business “a direct competitive 
edge” (p.184). Business and management are learning what 
professions such as medicine have known for a long time, namely, 
the importance of a formal, explicit statement of ethical policy. 
But the overt ethical position is only one element in the 
behaviour of professionals. What Cullen, Yeager, Jackall and others 
have recently observed within the world of business and management 
has, again. long been the case within the professions. While the 
overt statements of ethics meets the public ideal of professional 
conduct, the everyday behaviour, the implicit ethics of practice, is 
informed by the ethos of the profession. Furthermore, the influence 
of the ethos is felt differently by different groups within the 
profession. 
Manaaement and the Medical Ethos 
In his study of medical talk Atkinson (i998), identified not one 
medical voice but different voices within the one medicai domain. 
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He noted that this “raised the intriguing possibility that those 
different voices might themselves be in conflict”. That conflict, he 
suggested arose from their “contrasting orientations to medical 
work. ..and modalities of medical knowledge” (p. 137). Those 
contrasting orientations will also affect the way different sections 
respond to the influence of the profession’s ethos. 
The voice heard in the interviews is the voice of the GP. It is 
not always a united voice. Arising as it does, however, from the GPs 
own orientation to medical work and modality of knowledge, it is a 
voice distinctly different from that of the hospital-based doctor, 
particularly the elite consultant group. Despite the widespread 
opposition of the profession, including the representatives of general 
practice to fundholding, that distinct perspective led many GPs to 
take a different view. A significant number took up the fundholding 
option to the extent that by the end of the scheme half the patient 
population was registered with fundholding Practices The 
motivation for both those who took up the option and those who 
rejected it‘ was to protect values absorbed from the profession’s 
ethos but applied by GPs to their distinctly different working 
situation. 
The medical ethos, the profession’s distinctive sense of its own 
nobility and finely developed awareness of its importance and value, 
has provided the foundation for all its thinking and actions. It has 
for long been the moral backdrop for both the profession as a whole 
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and its individual practitioners However, as this study has shown, 
that ethos of nobility lead certain “elite” branches of the profession to 
look with some disdain on their general practice colleagues These, 
in turn, having themselves absorbed that ethos, on the one hand felt 
keenly the lack of respect and prestige hospital-based colleagues 
accorded their activities and, on the other, focused on and valued 
their status as independent practitioners In this context, the decision 
of GPs to the take up the fundholding option was as much of a piece 
with the values informed by the profession’s ethos as was the 
decision of those who rejected the option. 
The decision on whether or not to become fundholders 
depended, as in the case of 19th century GPs facing change, on how 
each Practice balanced the “in-built conservatism that tended to 
preserve the stufus quo” against responding to “changing 
professional opportunities by achieving stronger Practice 
organization (sici. exploiting new technologies, or adopting more 
effective time management” (Digby, 1999, p. 126). 
The GPs in their Practices, those small, independent businesses, 
‘the private sector at the heart of the NHS’, acted according to how 
each thought their independence would be best protected and their 
status enhanced. Some saw advantage in having management 
responsibility for their own budgets, controlling costs of care 
provided to patients by use of contracts and the like, with the 
opportunity to make savings and even enhance the value of the 
368 
Practice. Even the most reluctant fundholders found that having 
their hands ‘on the money’ changed their whole situation. It gave 
them a voice, and real control. 
Others eschewed such direct management preferring the status 
quo of “inherited methods of working” (Digby, 1999, p.  126) and so 
resisted what they saw as the imposition of more red tape, and new 
forms of outside interference. Thus, the GP, who described with 
some satisfaction, the practice within which she was a senior partner 
as “old-fashioned’, did not “particularly want” to spend “hours and 
hours” deciding how to manage resources. She was much happier 
with “someone else” taking on that role From her perspective, 
protecting the freedom to practice was best achieved by staying 
outside the fundholding scheme. 
Although one of the GPs I interviewed described the 
management culture as “quite alien to me” he also recognised that it 
is part of the medical culture for doctors to want to be in control. In 
his assessment of the profession to which he belonged “doctors have 
always got this sense of their own self-importance,” and fundholding 
was welcomed by many because it gave them a new control, namely, 
direct control over the money. Many of them took to this additional 
responsibility like the proverbial duck to water. “A lot of us have 
moved into that world and there are a lot of fundholders who think it 
is their right to decide these things and feed their egos”. 
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That rather cynical view was a minority opinion. Many of those 
interviewed thought it essential not only for the well-being of their 
own Practice but also for the well-being of the whole NHS that all 
whose decisions had a cost implication should apply the principles of 
good management to their decision-making. To be unaware of those 
costs or to refuse to take responsibility for them was the unethical 
position. 
Thus, the interview data in conjunction with the broader analysis 
presented in the earlier chapters of this study supports the conclusion 
that business and management values do not sit uncomfortably within 
the ethos of medicine and the conduct sanctioned by that ethos. 
From the time the provision of medical care became a commodity to 
be bought and sold its practitioners have been at “home in the world 
of status and money”, to quote one of the fundholders I interviewed. 
For long years doctors not able to turn their Practices into successful 
businesses went out of business. The same rules applied to medical 
practice as to businesses in general (Digby, 1994,1999) Even under 
the NHS that same business orientation is still evident among doctors 
in general and GPs in particular. The latter “had always seen 
themselves as small shopkeepers, running their own business, with a 
keen sense of how to wring the most money out of the Government” 
(Klein, 1995, p.200). 
The interview material showed up two opposing points of view, 
two voices within the GP group. Both, however, were informed by 
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the values of the medicai ethos The opposition of each group to 
the position of the other was based on their different perceptions of 
how best to protect their professional interests 
Beyond GPs, the wider profession had its own response to the 
management reforms Analysing the historical data shows that while 
there were expressions of concern for the welfare of patients the reai 
clash was with values arising from the profession's ethos rather than 
objections arising from the principles of modem medicai ethics 
A clash of ethos' 
The historical accounts show that the profession's Royal 
Colleges, its leaders, objected to having the new structures imposed 
on them from outside Long used to sitting at the top table, being at 
the heart of national decision-making in matters relating to health, for 
the profession to find itself marginalised at such a significant time in 
the development of the NHS was deeply distressing It was not used 
to being treated in such a way 
The leaders of the profession expected to be consulted by 
government ministers and to advise on the appropriate action. As 
Professor George Alberti, President of The Royal College of 
Physicians, noted in an interview he gave to the editor of Ihe Lancet 
"We talk to government , When government listens it's quite useful" 
(cf. Lee-Potter, 1997, p.113; Klein, 199, p ,  lS5fF) In simdar vein Sir 
Alexander Macara, Chairman of the BMA, described the regular 
meetings he had with the Secretary of State where, over a rather 
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good lunch, this section of the profession could raise issues of 
concern Until the reforms of the 1980s ministers “had tickled the 
doctors ” (Timmins, 1996, p.414) by respecting these usual channels 
of communication. However, in the case of these widespread 
reforms, government broke with this traditional approach. 
Announcements were made unilaterally and the profession reacted 
with fury In order to protect its long-term interests it had to raise 
objections. 
At the local level doctors objected to being managed. I have 
already noted the speaker who candidly admitted at the 
aforementioned BAMM conference “doctors are not good team 
members unless they are leading the team”. Allen (1997a) found 
widespread dissatisfaction among all grades of doctors with the new 
management which they saw as “aggressive and intrusive”. They 
“expressed hostility to the increasing demands made on them by 
managers with clipboards” (p 70 
Yet it has been noted that when doctors themselves take on a 
direct management role, the attitudes inherent in the medical mind- 
set “translate into an authoritative style” and a scepticism about the 
value of so-called “people skills” such as good communication 
(Hadley & Forster, 1993, pp.l62,14,15). There is thus, on the one 
hand, an arrogance that balks at any external management of the 
doctors’ own practice and, on the other hand, an autocratic style 
when it comes to doctors themselves exercising management 
372 
responsibilities. These attitudes are consistent with the overall 
medicai ethos. 
Hospital doctors also found it difficult to cope with what they 
saw as a lack of respect on the part of managers toward the 
consultants. One junior doctor commented with some dismay on the 
changed attitude toward consultants “they’re becoming more and 
more used like technical monkeys by hospital managers” (Allen, 
1997a, p.7). This comment reflected an observation by one of the 
fundholders I interviewed but with one significant difference: the GP 
spoke with considerable approval of the changed attitude toward 
consultants. No longer deferred to, consultants were rightly, in his 
opinion, increasingly seen by GPs - now in position to ‘call the shots’ 
- as no more than technicians. 
This contrasting view reflects the long-established divide 
between hospital and community based doctors. Whereas the junior 
hospital doctor would hope in time to become a consultant with all 
the status and respect that position traditionally merited, the GP had 
no such ambitions, instead viewing the prestige expected by and 
given to consultants as out of proportion to the contribution this 
overly-revered group made to the care of patients. 
Those differences aside, the views expressed by the junior 
doctors add weight to the argument that the negative attitude the 
profession expressed towards management was not based so much 
on widely accepted ethical concerns but rather arose from the ethos 
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of the profession which holds its traditional elevated status and 
autonomy very dear. Unsurprising, therefore, that its senior 
members, the consultants, did not take kindly to being asked by lay 
managers to account for their actions. 
Digby (1999, p.95), observed another aspect of the medical 
ethos resulting in a contradictory attitude toward “business 
sentiments”. Within the ethos of the profession “elevated medical 
ideals were seen as respectable aims, but mercenary realities as 
shameful, even dishonourable objectives.. Thus, direct involvement 
with management went against the grain. The profession’s inclination 
was to present itself as above those matters commonly associated 
with the new management such as the so-called “bottom line” of 
money and profit. This concern was reflected in the comments of 
the non-fundholders interviewed for this study One spoke of the 
breakdown of trust when cash entered “the doctor patient nexus” 
and the patient knew that their doctor was keeping an eye on costs. 
Another believed that patients were going into “contract” mode and 
demanding more and more because they thought the doctor wasn’t 
giving them the best treatment, just the cheapest. 
Doctors may have for long been involved in behind the scenes 
and covert management of resources (Hamson, 1988), but for the 
profession to accept changes requiring doctors to be seen openly 
considering the cost of a treatment alongside, if not before, the 
clinical need, undermined an important element of the medical myth, 
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namely that medicine was practised without any link to financial 
consideration, to money (Klein, 1995, p.195). For that reason overt 
involvement in management was anathema. Having over the years 
skilfully built up a high degree of public confidence and support 
focused around its oft-stated ethical principie of the primacy of the 
patient, the profession would be understandably cautious about 
endorsing any change that might jeopardise that patient trust so vital 
to the profession’s own well-being (Harrison et al, 1992, p.102). 
The profession well understands that: 
As long as doctors retain the re spect.. lo p i t y . .  and... 
deference. .of the public they will continue to possess 
considerable power to contain countervailing forces [such a 
pressure from the new managers] and to redirect them or divert 
their impact (Hunter, 1992, p.565). 
Nevertheless, whilst it may have thought it expedient to hide 
them from public view’ business sentiments have always been 
important to the profession. Thus, once the reforms were in 
operation the profession recognised that to “protect and even further 
its own interests” it had no choice but to embrace the arrangements 
and become openly involved in the new management (Harrison et al, 
1992, p.104). Far from demonstrating a rejection of fundamental 
professional values, this pragmatic decision was wholly in keeping 
with the established ethos of their profession. It was the justification 
offered by some fundholders for their decision. Hunter quotes the 
reason many hospital doctors give for entering management: 
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“Doctors must play a bigger part in managing the health service in 
order to protect their clinical freedom”. He goes on to observe that 
doctors came to appreciate that if they continued to hold back from 
taking on management roles: 
it would not be long before the medical profession sufîered 
loss of status and control over the system . . .  Doctors as 
managers, then, become a stratagem for ensuring that no 
fundamental challenge is posed to their prevailing view of the 
world ... far from being shaped by the new managerialism 
doctors will, as they become more involved in management, 
shape the management agenda (Hunter, 1992, ~ ~ 3 9 , 5 6 5 ) .  
One ethos, two ethics? 
Medicine is seen as an ethically based profession with doctors 
bound by and to a particular set of ethical values As Ruddick 
(1998) points out, traditional medical oaths and codes typically 
portray ideal physicians as devoted to the welfare of patients, 
responding compassionately to the suffering of patients, humbly 
mindful of the limits of their curative powers and the harms they may 
unintentionally cause The Hippocratic injunction “Strive to help, 
but above ail, do no harm” is the ruling maxim Restated as 
beneficence and non-maleficence, it sits along with autonomy and 
distributive justice to form the elements that now comprise the 
canonical principles of modern medical ethics to which I have drawn 
attention throughout this study. 
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In the GMC’s own guidance to doctors the opening statement 
tells them that “the care of your patients is your first duty”. In all the 
interviews I conducted with GPs, both fund- and non-fundholding, 
the interviewees showed an underlying concern for the care of their 
patients, apparently reflecting the doctors’ primary duty and 
suggesting a core ethical principle guiding their thinking. But 
“patient care” is, as Ailmark (1995) points out, no more than 
ethically neutral. What makes care “good”, what gives it an ethical 
dimension, is when that care is expressed in the right way (cf, 
Rhodes, 1995, pp.444-5). 
This is not to deny that persons may, indeed have often, become 
doctors for well understood and widely acknowledged ethical 
reasons, but the care of patients in itself does not make medicine or 
the practitioner ethical. Notwithstanding the GPs genuine 
expressions of care for their patients, the data from the interviews I 
conducted showed other concerns were just as. if not more. 
important as they contemplated the fundholding option. 
The interview data confirmed that which was evident from the 
historical record. Alongside, some would suggest ahead of, concern 
for patients, the profession has always had a concern for its own 
interests, including its place in whatever market it has had to operate. 
Thus, responding to her own question “did medicine have ethical 
components which differentiated it from other occupations?’ Digby 
answers: “Rather than being concerned with safeguarding vulnerable 
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patients the thrust of the principal Georgian professional discussion 
of ethics was revealingly about regulating 'trade' within a bustling 
medical market" (Digby, 1994, p.59). These same attitudes governed 
the profession's response to the creation of the N H S  and, some four 
decades later, its reform They also governed the thinking of the 
individual GPs as they decided whether or not to take up 
fundholding. 
The idea that doctors thought, or think, along such, apparently, 
self-serving iines or make judgements based on such considerations 
might surprise, and even shock, those outside the profession. But 
that reaction is due to a lack of understanding of the ethos of the 
medical profession, and particularly the very specific concerns and 
interests of the small business general practitioner. Such a 
misunderstanding is, however, unsurprising. There is a reluctance to 
accept this aspect of the medical profession's thinking. The 
preferred image. in both the professional and Iav world. is of 
practice based on what Shock calls "the ancient virtues distilled over 
time" (Shock, 1994; Allen, 1997, ~ . 3 ) ' ~  above considerations of self- 
interest (cf. Loudon, 1986, p.272@. 
This effort to set medical values within an ancient tradition IS reminiscent of the 
words used @ the physicians in the 19th cenhq defending their supremacy over 
their professional colleagues, the surgeons and apothecaries. They described the 
established structure as "the ancient. the true, the English arrangement". (quoted bl 
Loudon. 1986, p.190) 
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Doctors inhabit a very distinct world with its own highly 
developed ethos that produces a distinctive and characteristic way of 
thinking around ethical issues Through historical data the thesis has 
traced the development of this ethos as the profession established 
itself in the elite society of earlier centuries Where once the values 
and ideals that both inform and arise from that ethos would have 
been widely accepted and understood, today they appear to find 
little resonance in the community the modem medicai profession is 
expected to serve Thus, whilst doctors and non-doctors seem to be 
talking about the same thing when they use the language of modem 
medical ethics they are not, in fact, sharing a common language at 
ali Each party is viewing the subject from within their very different 
frameworks, speaking from their own agenda, one that conforms to 
their ethos and habit of mind What to the common mind, or 
“normal perception” looks callous, indifferent, and unethical, to the 
medical mind constitutes the properlv detached, professional 
approach Or that which is perceived by the lay person as “a cover- 
up” will, within the profession, be understood as due loyalty owed by 
colleagues who alone understand the pressures bom by fellow 
practitioners 
The medical ethos and the conduct it sanctions has been 
developing over centuries, the modem principalist medical ethics, on 
the other hand and notwithstanding its elements of ancient wisdom in 
the Hippocratic injunction, has only been developed in the latter half 
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of this century Prior to the 1960s, such as concepts as informed 
consent and patient autonomy had no place in medical decision- 
making, and very little in the lay mind. 
Furthermore, the driving force for the principles of modem 
medical ethics has come from outside the profession, from patient 
groups rather than doctors themselves. de Cerîeau (1984, p.19), 
argues that when a group has imposed upon it a set of values to 
which it does not fully subscribe then even while it may appear to be 
accepting those outside values, the group is in fact “sabotaging” 
them; reshaping them to fit more closely into its own existing value 
system. The medical profession’s response to the principalist 
modem medical ethics imposed on it from the non-medical world 
(Nicholas, 1999 p.S08), has included such sabotaging. it has led to 
the profession translating the principles of the explicit formal ethics 
into an ‘implicit ethics of practice” arising from the values endorsed 
by its old ethos 
Thus, when doctors and patients talk about informed consent, 
the patient understands that the doctor will provide and discuss all 
the information necessary to enable the patient to decide whether to 
proceed with a proposed procedure. However, informed consent is 
interpreted by the doctor through another prism, another habit of 
thinking, one that considers less than open discussion as a positive 
good, “in the patients best interests”. A paternalistic perspective that 
justifies deciding how much information a patient will be given and in 
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what form it will be passed on. A similar situation arises in the 
context of the notion of autonomy. Patients may see this as closely 
allied to the principle of informed consent inasmuch as it accepts the 
patients right to make decisions regarding their own health care. 
However, such a notion is at variance with the ethos of the medical 
profession. Traditionally it has taught practitioners to think of 
autonomy in terms of clinical freedom rather than patient based 
decision-making. 
Doctors may be told that they must show respect and sensitivity 
to their patients. And yet these principles cannot easily fit into an 
environment where any indication of emotion is seen as 
unprofessional (Davies, 1996a, p.6). Doctors are expected by their 
peers and superiors to display a certain professional distance when 
dealing with what to most people would be profoundly distressing 
and shocking situations Thus, informed by its ethos, the profession 
passes down what it considers professional, and hence, “right” 
conduct. This will dictate both the practitioner’s and the 
profession’s response to ethics imposed from the outside. 
Although in some medicai schools much work has been done in 
very recent years to raise awareness of the application of modern 
medical ethics to medical practice, the focus is on so-called “ethical 
dilemas” and as Nicholas has observed: 
We are so busy wanting students to be capable of moral 
reflection that we pay IMle attention to the values that underlie 
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the conceptual and social frameworks with which they and we 
are worhg (Nicholas, 1999, p.509). 
Weatherall (1997, p.11) also points out that medical students are 
taught virtually no history of their profession. These gaps in the 
medical education curricula mean not only that medical students have 
no knowledge of the way the profession as a whole has developed 
but, more significantly, no understanding of the development of its 
ethos - its underlying moral character or tone. Without this 
understanding, there is the danger that young doctors simply become 
immersed in the world of medicine without recognising the way in 
which the profession’s ethos provide the values that inîluence their 
understanding of ethics, their ideas of what constitutes the good and 
bad of everyday practice, and the resulting dichotomy between the 
expectations of ethical practice arising from its formal overt codes of 
ethics and actual practice arising from its ethos. 
This dichotomy operates right at the heart of the profession as 
witnessed in the disciplinary actions of the GMC. A survey 
undertaken by a consumer organisation led to the conclusion that the 
GMC’s system is not working in the best interests of patients. Thus, 
it found that only 2.5% of cases (6 out of 264) taken to the GMC 
resulted in “concrete action being taken against a doctor”. 
According to the researchers: “Again and again we heard the same 
story, that the GMC appeared to favour doctors over patients”. 
They concluded “there’s a lot the GMC needs to do to bring the 
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quality of its basic customer care up to an acceptable standard’ 
(Which On-line, 1999). 
Several years ago Jean Robinson (1988, p.31), as a lay 
representative on those GMC hearings, expressed her dismay at the 
difference between the profession’s rhetoric of protecting patients 
interests reflecting its public stated ethics, and the reality of the 
GMC’s decisions in dealing with doctors’ misconduct guided by its 
private ethos. Over a decade later the situation appears not to have 
changed at all. The rhetoric is the same and so is the rather different 
practice 
In his study of the profession of medicine Freidson “attempted 
to evaluate” the profession’s claim to expertise and, what he calls, 
“ethicality”. He concluded that both claims are illusions (Freidson, 
1970, p.377f) Following my research I would not accept that 
medicine’s claim to ethical practice is an illusion or a mere 
epiphenomenon Rather, my focus on the role of the ethos on 
thinking and practice shows the profession as “differently ethical’. 
Ethical principles are at the heart of the profession but they are either 
principles arising directly from the profession’s traditional view of 
right as informed by its own ethos or, in the case of the four 
principles of moderns medical ethics, interpreted and applied in light 
of that ethos. It is this that has led to misunderstanding, 
disappointment, anger and accusations of unethical conduct. It is 
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now an approach to which the non-professional world appears 
increasingly unsympathetic. 
A Chanainq Ethos? 
Despite the persistence of the traditional ethos, the profession is 
under pressure to change. This pressure comes, in large measure, 
from outside itself in the wider social, cultural, and political 
e n ~ i r o n m e n t . ~ ~  The ethos of the profession reflects a different set of 
underlying moral values and beliefs to those of the lay community 
The myths and values that lie at the heart of the medical ethos, and 
inform its application of ethical principles, find little resonance 
outside of the profession. The result is that the profession has come 
under increasingly severe scrutiny from a public that no longer trusts 
its ethical instincts. The finely developed sense of professional worth 
and dignity, the moral atmosphere or ethos, that informs medical 
thinking and practice, its implicit ethics of practice, no longer 
connects to the public perceptions of the ethtcal and is not seen to 
meet the needs of its client-groups. In this circumstance that ethos 
and its ethics has no valid justification. Change, albeit reluctant, is 
unavoidable (Jonas, 1983, p.45. Freidson, 1970, p.350). 
The younger doctors interviewed by Allen (1997) also 
highlighted this changing attitude. They recognised, and even 
encouraged, from their patients a more questioning, less deferential, 
"See also editor's comment on public perceptions of the GMC's disciplinaq' 
procedures (Smith. 1998) 
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attitude. Added to that, they showed an increasing awareness of the 
complexities of modem scientific medicine and of the fact that many 
of its procedures may do as much harm as good (cf. Lupton, 1994, 
p 66). In such a changing environment they were less inclined to 
present themselves as the infallible expert who alone knew what was 
in the patients’ best interests and who must, therefore, be trusted to 
represent those interest at all times (Allen, 1997, p.5). This was in 
contrast to the attitude and beliefs of older doctors. 
Interviews I conducted confirmed this perception. Several of 
my respondents spoke of “a totally different attitude” on the part of 
doctors entering general practice They saw the old sense of 
vocation fast disappearing; the patrician doctor dying out and 
moving toward retirement with young doctors, “totally different 
animals”, bringing a new set of attitudes into the profession These 
more closely reflected those prevalent in the wider cross-section of 
societv from which they are drawn. Increasingly these young 
doctors preferred the security of a salaried service to the traditional 
GPs emphasis on the sacrosanct independent practitioner, had 
abandoned the patrician style and were prepared to enter into “a 
much more balanced dialogue” with their patients. Where older 
doctors would have classified “clued up” patients as “difficult” the 
new breed welcomed their involvement and respected their interest 
and knowledge. However, their different understanding of 
“vocationalism” meant they were not prepared to accept the 
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workload that many of their older colleagues took on as a matter 
routine. Hence they saw nothing wrong in establishing a private life 
beyond the surgery where patient demands would not be allowed to 
intrude, for that reason the use of deputising services had become 
much more widespread. 
Allen’s research also showed that younger doctors wanted more 
of a private and social life with their families, something older 
doctors appeared to equate with a lack of commitment. On the other 
hand, older doctors were seen by the younger generation of doctors 
to have a greater interest in private practice, committee membership, 
and leisure activities and were, therefore, not “as committed to 
medicine on a daily basis” (Allen, 1997, p.10). It should be noted, in 
passing, that “commitment” is, according to the leaders of the 
profession, one of its “core values”. 
Women now make up a majoritv of those entering medical 
school and. despite the difficulties they face in moving up through 
the profession. their presence in increasing numbers will, albeit 
graduallv, make an impact on the ethos of the profession. Although 
the two women 1 interviewed showed no great divergence of views 
from those expressed by the male  interviewee^^^ interview data 
gathered by other researchers confirms a difference in attitude. Allen 
’O Though the style of the interview was noticeably different. The women GPs 
seemed more inclined to engage in a conversation, albeit a directed one. rather than 
launch into the lengthy ‘speeches‘ that characterised the answers of the male 
interviewees. 
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quotes a women consultant who described the difference in style 
between the patrician male consultant and herself as a women 
consultant. “I’m there a lot - I’m in my greens.’l I’ll go and kneel 
down at someone’s bed and talk to the relatives and they don’t thmk 
that’s a consultant. But when they see my colleague coming in his 
pin-stripe suit and his entourage, they think that’s a consultant. But 
on the other hand we get a lot of people saying they’re very 
surprised at bow much they’ve been told. They’ve been fully 
informed and involved and even if the outcome is bad, they 
appreciate that” (Allen, i 997a, p,6). This approach suggests that 
women are more comfortable with partnership in patient care and as 
such are unlikely to endorse the “doctors orders” sty-le of medicine 
practised by their predominantly male predecessors. 
Patients too are less willing to give doctors curte bluriche in 
decisions affecting their health. Instead they want, expect, and even 
demand, more openness and greater accountability from the 
profession The government, for reasons as much to do with its own 
changed agenda toward expensive doctor-centred medicine as 
responsiveness to public opinion, is moving toward closer regulation 
of the profession. 
The Education Committee of the GMC, as discussed above, has 
called for traditional attitudes within the medical profession to be 
The gown and trousers worn in the operating theatre. 51 
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replaced by those more appropriate to the changing patterns of 
patient care. It urged that this should be done “not simply as an 
expedient but because education should reflect the realities of 
modem medicine” (para. 45) In offering this ‘’warning” the 
committee pointed to the danger of changing the rhetoric without 
addressing what I have identified as the underlying ethos. 
Ail these factors appear to be bringing about a change in the 
medical ethos. However, many of the changes the profession is 
prepared to accept seem more designed to protect the ethos and its 
core values, particularly the freedom of the profession to regulate 
itself, than to challenge it. Whatever positive change is currently 
under way, it will take some considerable time for new attitudes to 
filter through to Jonsen’s “old boys” of medicine who still lead in 
many areas of the profession. The traditional attitudes fostered by 
the ethos remain a powerful influence at the highest levels of medical 
practice 
Hunter (2000), argues that despite all the management changes 
wrought over recent years within the NHS, the old attitudes that 
characterise the medical profession remain unchanged: 
For the most part, doctors continue to see the NHS as a supply 
of resources which exist for them to access to achieve their 
professional and personal goals. Managers exist to provide 
them with these resources, not to challenge their clinical 
practice @77). 
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Furthermore, he is not convinced that the younger generation of 
doctors will significantly alter this situation The attitudes that in this 
thesis I have argued arise from and are reinforced by the old ethos 
are‘ in Hunter’s opinion, safely entrenched for many years to come. 
“The stereotype remains very much alive and well” (p.77). 
The reported attitude of a consultant appears to codinn this 
assessment. He was attending an “equal opportunity“‘ training 
session in November 1998 to encourage fairer job selection and is 
reported to have given the following reason for attending the session: 
“I’m not having any f...ing women in my department or any f... ing 
Indians either I just want to learn how to break the law” (Hammond 
& Mosley, 1999, p. 6 )  Another consultant spoke with dismay of the 
changing attitudes he detected among patients. “The main 
psychological blow of the past few years came with the patient’s 
charter. The majority of patients . . .  had regarded NHS health care as 
a privilege. By and large they accepted the limitations of the service 
as long as their carers actually cared. Overnight health care became a 
right. With rights come expectations and intolerance” (Sandmann, 
1999). 
As Digby noted of another era “it took time for new cohorts to 
(Digby, 1994, replace those trained earlier in a traditional mould” 
p.99). 
The attitude of doctors toward outside scrutiny of their practice 
similarly reflects a determination to maintain clinical autonomy. The 
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experience of the audit manager described earlier in this study shows 
how ingrained is the profession’s adherence to this largely outmoded 
principle. Practitioners continue actively to resist moves to identify 
and foster best practice if it means opening up their own mode of 
practice to question. Among the doctors I interviewed only one had 
no difficulty accepting, even asking for, outside guidance on 
prescribing and overall best practice: “If they can suggest a better 
way, I’m all for it”. He was also the doctor who appeared least 
threatened by knowledgeable patients. Among my small sample his 
attitude was exceptional and the experience of the audit manager 
indicates that his views were uncommon in the wider GP population. 
Two factors may account for this difference. Firstly, his age. He 
was the youngest of the male doctors. Secondly, he had not been 
bom and brought up in the social strata that has for long provided 
the majority of medical practitioners. He had not come through the 
system I have identified as the breeding ground of the values at the 
heart of the traditional medical ethos. 
Wider social changes suggest that over time the exceptions will 
become the norm as the traditional ethos faces more and more 
challenges. Enough challenges to make, in due course, a significant 
impact on ethical conduct in the practice of medicine leading to a 
convergence between the conduct which the modem prhcipalist 
medical ethics leads patients to expect and that which doctors 
actually deliver. 
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However, if the profession is to feel comfortable with a more 
open and honest presentation of the range of values that inform 
medicai practice, there must be an equal willingness on the part of 
patients to take a more mature view of the motives that inspire 
orthodox medicine and its practitioners. The natural fear of disease 
and death encourages the mythologising of those who would save us 
from these “evils”. This blinds us to what George Bernard Shaw 
observed of “the honour and conscience of doctors”, namely, that 
“they have as much as any other class of men, no more and no less” 
(Quoted by Ailsop, 1995, p. 331, from Preface to Doctors 
i~ilernma). Likewise, doctors are not above the ordinary desires and 
motivations of the rest of the population. The self-interest that 
Adam Smith (p. i 3), identified as the central impulsion for so much 
human activity is not, and can never be, absent from the modem 
medic.al profession. To resist this reality and insist on a mythologised 
version of medical practice is to encourage the worst aspects of the 
medical ethos, namely the arrogance and secrecy that have given rise 
to the judgements and actions now ofìen condemned in the lay world 
as unethical. 
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Conclusion 
The Research Proiect 
The research began by focusing on the possibility of a contlict 
between the medical profession and the new public management 
introduced by government in the late 1980s The four principles of 
modern medical ethics suggested the values espoused by the medical 
profession would be in conflict with the business orientated values 
underpinning the management reforms Exploring this apparent 
contlict brought in to focus a distinction relating to ethics, namely, 
that between a profession’s ethos and its formal explicit code of 
ethics 
The hypothesis this thesis set out to test is that doctors’ 
decision-making and practice has always been intluenced by the 
ethos, the fundamental moral spirit or atmosphere, permeating the 
profession It is from its ethos, the conviction of itself as a noble and 
superior profession, that the medical profession derives its everyday 
implicit ethics of practice Furthermore, the ethical principles and 
values commonly assumed to guide the medical practitioner, the 
explicit formal code based around the concept of “patients’ best 
interests” and the “four principles”, are interpreted and understand 
within the profession through that ethos Thus, their application in 
medical thinking and practice will not always accord with the 
understanding those outside the profession have of those principles 
This, in turn, can lead to a perception of ‘bnethical” behaviour. 
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If a profession is obliged, often for reasons of public 
acceptability, to base its code of ethics on values and beliefs that are 
out of harmony with its fundamental moral spirit, its ethos, then that 
code will be adhered to in word but not in deed. In other words, the 
formal explicit code of ethics will bear only a superficial relationship 
to the implicit ethics of practice. Understanding the role that ethos 
plays in the application and interpretation of ethics can make a 
valuable contribution to our understanding of how a profession sees 
its formal code and, more importantly, to the construction of future 
codes of ethics practice. 
i began by tracing the relationship of the profession to modem 
medical ethics. A study of the history of the profession explained 
why an explicit formal code of ethics became so important to the 
profession and highlighted the myths that were incorporated into that 
ethics. At the same time it showed up values and beliefs that pre- 
dated the ethics and lay at the profession’s hean. Ansing from, and 
intimately connected to its ethos were values emphasising the 
authority of medicine, loyalty, professional autonomy and clinical 
freedom. 
I then sought to explore the impact OF that ethos on the 
profession’s thinking and decisionmaking in major policy areas, as 
well as in everyday practice. This I did by looking at the response of 
the profession, firstly to the creation and development of the NHS 
and then to the management reforms introduced from the mid 1980s 
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onwards What values had the greater influence on the profession’s 
response to these major movements in the provision of publicly 
funded health care? Those directly arising from publicly espoused 
modem principalist medical ethics or those informed by the 
profession’s ethos? In the case of the introduction of the NHS the 
question was answered by looking at the historical data. In the later 
development the focus was particularly on GPs facing the decision of 
whether or not to take up fundholding responsibilities and the 
question was answered by analysing data gathered from direct 
interviewing of GPs. 
The historical data showed that whilst a concern for patients was 
apparent in the medical profession’s response to the creation of the 
NHS, and particularly so in its public pronouncements, behind the 
scenes, in its negotiations with government the main concern was 
for the interests of the profession itself. Over the course of those 
negotiations the opposition of the consultants was bought off but the 
general practice arm of the profession fought to the end to protect 
the status of practitioners as independent small business men and 
women 
Once the service was operating the profession gradually came 
round to giving it more than mere grudging support Guided by an 
ethos that placed the greatest emphasis on professional autonomy, 
the leadership of the profession sought to set its own hands on the 
levers that controlled the service. More than that, individual 
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consultants felt it their right to manipulate as far as they could the 
system to protect, and wherever possible, enhance their own 
professional standing. This approach often worked against the best 
interests of the most vulnerable patients or patient groups. 
The 1980 reforms challenged the profession’s position of control 
both at the national and local level. The overall goal of the reforms 
was to give management more direct control over the NHS whereas 
at the heart of the medical ethos lies the principle of autonomy; self- 
regulation. The profession’s mixed response to this challenge was 
analysed by reference to the historical record hut also by interviewing 
a particular group of doctors for whom the challenge offered a very 
particular choice. This primary and secondary data provided a case 
study that enabled me to test the theory. 
Within the hospital the emphasis on control by general managers 
clashed directly with the established order in which consultants had 
the main voice Within the communitv, however. were the 
independent-minded GPs who tended to see themselves as the poor 
relations in the medical hierarchy, lacking the prestige of the 
hospital-based doctor. GPs were invited to take on the management 
of their own practice budget and they were offered a number of 
incentives to accept the invitation, Not least of these incentives was 
greater freedom in their own Practice, a greater voice in the standard 
of secondary services provided by consultants, and the opportunity 
to use savings from their budget to benefit their Practice, including 
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refurbishing buildings and updating equipment, In other words, 
while the reforms were perceived as a threat to the consultants status 
many GPs saw opportunities for their own status to be enhanced. 
This presented GPs with a dilemma: on the one hand there were a 
number of attractive incentives to encourage Practices to take up the 
option on the other hand, fundholding upset the status quo and was 
met with widespread opposition from fellow professionals and the 
wider public. The interviews sought to identify the values and beliefs 
that had the most influence on GPs in making their decision. 
The interview data showed that concern for patients did figure in 
their thinking. But, there were other concerns linked to the 
traditional values and beliefs of the profession, particularly as they 
related to the position of the GP, and these carried moral weight in 
the decision. Overall, the data did not support the notion of an 
ethical conflict between medicine and management 
I lnderstanding the ail-pervading influence and moral force of 
these other values offered an insight into a real conflict. In relation 
to the direct care of patients the medicai ethos endorses a 
paternalistic attitude thereby encouraging a very particular view of 
ethical conduct. That view does not always chime in with the values 
and principles of the lay world it serves Thus, concepts such as 
patients best interests, patient autonomy, and informed consent will 
often not mean the same to the professional, particularly the older 
professional, as they do to the lay-person. Offering patients choices, 
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giving them information, discussing the problematic nature of 
treatments, and waiting on them to decide is an approach that, within 
the context of the traditional ethos, is in itself unethical. The doctors 
trained to think of their role in terms of a wise parent protecting 
and caring for a sick and vulnerable child will be hard pressed to see 
it in any other way. 
A profession or organisation’s ethos creates a form of virtue 
ethics that I have called the “implicit ethics of practice”. However, 
professions and organisations that have to attract clients or users 
from the lay community also recognise the need for an explicit ethics 
that meets the concerns and interests of the lay community. Hence 
the construction of what constitutes ethics for public consumption. 
The differences between the two faces of professional ethics creates 
the potential for conflict. Such conflicts cannot be resolved by 
merely tightening the regulations governing the profession or 
organisation A successful resolution must involve identifying and 
understanding what is going on behind the scenes in the hinterland of 
professional ethics, the interplay between the profession’s ethos, its 
‘implicit ethics of practice, and its explicit, formal ethics of public 
thinking and action. 
Strengths 
Goldberg (1993, pp 3,4), argues that academics working in the 
field of professional ethics need to grasp the character and history of 
the profession under study if they are to make an informed 
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contribution The particular strength of this study is that in focusing 
on the medical ethos, it has drawn attention to an aspect of the 
medical character and history that has not been given the attention it 
merits Although there continues to be considerable and growing 
interest in identifiing and resolving ethical dilemmas, both in the 
fields of medicine and management, there has been little if any in- 
depth analysis of the impact of ethos on the construction of an 
appropriate code of ethics Yet, as this research has shown, it is 
from its ethos that a profession or organisation finds its sense of 
what is right and wrong practice, its everyday implicit ethics of 
practice as against the formal, explicit ethics of public discussion and 
action informed by public expectations of ethical practice (Imine, 
2001) Ignoring the influence of ethos on ethics creates 
misunderstandings between the profession and lay public that 
ultimately breaks down trust between the two groups The recent 
spate of enquiries into established medical practice suggest that such 
an outcome is increasingly evident 
Furthermore, the research allows us to hear the voice of a 
particular group of doctors, namely, general practitioners, at a 
significant and unique moment in their history Their views on 
fundholding, their reasons for accepting or rejecting the new scheme, 
and their experiences of operating within a rapidly changing NHS, 
offer an valuable insight into the thinking of the GP around an issue 
that raised fundamental questions regarding the public provision of 
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health care within the üK Their experience well illustrated the 
operation of the medical ethos on the thinking and actions of a 
particular group of practitioners. 
Weaknesses 
The project would have greatly benefited from hearing the Views 
from a range of younger doctors. Ail hut one of the GPs I 
interviewed were in their late forties or older. I would also l ike to 
have heard the views of those entering medical school, those 
responsible for imparting the medicai mind to students, and those 
charged with safeguarding the standards of the profession in the 
Royal Colleges and the GMC. 
Having established a distinct place for ethos 1 would like to have 
had the time and space to look in much more detail, at the other 
factors that work with ethos in order to create a code of ethics. In 
this study I chose to focus on the one factor that the literature 
showed to have been largely overlooked. Whilst I have demonstrated 
that the role of ethos merits far greater recognition, I am fully aware 
that it is not the only influential factor. 
A profession’s ethics arise from an interplay of factors. A 
complex system of influence and counter influence combine to create 
or interpret a code of ethics. Personal belief systems and public 
expectations play their part Two other significant factors are the 
culture, that is to say “the body of learned behaviors (sic) that shape 
behaviour (sic) and consciousness”, and ideology, “the local systems 
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of knowledge embedded in particular institutions” (Lindenbaum & 
Lock 1993, p.80). It would be an interesting exercise to develop 
these interconnections hut such was not possible within the confines 
of this thesis Notwithstanding the importance of recognising this 
interrelationship, a broader discussion of medical ideology or medical 
culture would not have drawn out the subtle but essential moral 
element that makes the concept of a medical ethos distinctive and 
gives it its potency. 
These areas of suggested weakness do not seriously undermine 
the overall argument and the conclusions which I have drawn. 
Nevertheless, at the end of this project I am all too aware that this 
has been very much an initial exploration of a field that merits a great 
deal more work. 
Further Research 
Having established a background for further research there are 
several directions in which it could proceed. The next stage that 
directly links to this project should involve following a cohort of 
medical students through their training to hear and see first hand the 
way the profession’s ethos is being assimilated and its impact on their 
moral reasoning This group should c.omprise a representative mix: 
white, male, middle class, public school, female, working class, and 
from an ethnic minority group, in order to begin to see what impact 
social background has on assimilation of the established medical 
ethos. Interviews would take place at the outset of their training in 
order to assess the attitude of the group toward elements identified in 
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this research as characteristic and defining of the traditional medical 
ethos Further interviews, with individuais and the group, would 
occur at significant points throughout the training. The research 
should also include interviews with class-room lecturers and 
consultants responsible for on-ward training as well as participant 
and non-participant observation of a range of learning situations in 
both formal, such as class room and ward, and informal social 
settings. 
In reporting on her experience at the GMC Robinson offered the 
observation that “’there have been many changes in the profession’s 
code over the years” She commented that a study of those changes 
“would make an interesting PhD thesis” (1988, p.3 I). I entirely agree 
hut would suggest that setting such a study in the context of the 
research presented in this thesis, drawing out the contrast between an 
ethics that has to change in response to the demands of public taste 
and the long-standing beliefs and values I have identified as 
characteristic ofthe profession, in other words its ethos, would make 
it an even more exciting and worthwhile project. 
The relationship between ethos and ethics is also relevant to 
other health care professions. Thus, the initial research suggests that 
nursing has much to gain from tracing the development of its ethos 
and the impact it has had on the nurses code of ethics. This could 
assist the profession to take its present code beyond what has been 
seen as sincere but meaningless rhetoric (Edgar, 1994, p. 161). 
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Limentani (1999), notes a move toward a common code of 
ethics for all health care professionals. The findings of my research 
strongly suggest that if such a move is to succeed, it will be 
necessary to begin by clearly identifjmg the underlying motivating 
moral spirit and disposition, the ethos, of all the professions involved, 
Without that understanding, there is the very real possibility that the 
resulting common code will either be so general as to be meaningless 
or structured in such a way as to favour the ethos and interests of the 
dominant profession over those of the other professions, for example 
medicine over nursing. 
Questions raised by Nicholas (1999) on the role of those who 
teach medical ethics suggest there is room to begin exploring the 
ethos and ethics of that profession. Medical ethics educators play an 
important part in helping medical students structure their view of the 
world . ‘We contribute to maintaining or transforming the status 
quo” (pp 507:508) And yet, she notes, the focus of medical ethics 
education is always on strategies of ethics teaching and an 
assessment of various methodologies but there is no questioning of 
the intent of such education. “The intent of medical ethics education 
is generally described in terms acceptable to the medical 
discourse.. .Silence on this matter leaves educators open to the 
accusation that we are agents for indoctrinating students into the 
norms of medical practice, and are avoiding the difficult questions 
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about our own position and in the changing and politicised world of 
medicine” (p.509, bold type original). 
What is the underlying character and disposition of this relatively 
young profession? Is it so anxious to maintain its standing with the 
“socially powerful participants in health care”, namely, the medical 
profession, that it is constrained from questioning the fundamentals 
of how that senior profession provides health care? If the role of the 
ethicists is seen as no more than that of providing moral justifications 
for anything and everything the medical profession does or seeks to 
do then its own credibility is seriously undermined. Seedhouse 
(1995) has suggested that the symbiotic relationship between 
medicine and bioethics is too close for bioethics to be of any real 
value. Analysing the ethos of the profession will help our 
understanding of the nature of that relationship and how it might be 
enhanced to the long-term benefit of educators and educated 
Outside the field of health care, the work has application in areas 
of business and private sector management. Research can help 
companies and organisations understand the import of the 
relationship between ethos and ethics and incorporate the insights 
gained from this understanding into their own search for ethical 
practice. In so doing it may help stem the trend not only toward a 
highly reductionist but a shallow and ineffective role for ethics in 
public life that is evident in the traditional yet flawed path of 
Pincoff s “quandary ethics” as well as the plethora of “anodyne” and 
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even “unethical” codes of conduct (She& & West, 1995, p. 203; 
Pattison, 2001, p.9). 
Summarv 
Long before medical ethics became a curriculum subject, 
medical students learnt the ethics of their profession from the ethos 
of their profession. And they still do. The debates and questions 
about how “medical ethics” should be taught to medical students 
overlook that significant point. Many of the publicly expressed 
concerns about unethical practice arise from a misunderstanding of 
this reality The ethics that inform and guide medical practice and 
decision-making, from major to everyday issues, are those which 
arise out of its ethos - the belief in itself as a noble and superior 
profession, one of special dignity and worth. This was seen to be the 
so in the case study material presented in the second part of the 
study 
Principies and beliefs that do not have their roots in the 
profession’s ethos will not have the same impact on the everyday 
world of medicine. No matter how those principles are taught they 
ivill remain the ethics for show, to be brought out and deiiberated 
over in formal learning situations or when responding to issues that 
have become public concern. This is the point at which conflict can 
arise as the values the profession appears to espouse are perceived to 
stand at odds with important aspects of actual practice. 
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However, as the ethos, the pervasive moral atmosphere of the 
profession, changes so will its everyday and implicit ethics of 
practice. In every profession and organisation it is ethos, that which 
comes before, or precedes, its ethics, that should be the focus of 
questions and debates by those concerned with the ethics of 
professional thinking and practice. If overt ethical statements or 
codes are to be more than fine sounding words, the first step must be 
to identifi and understand the particular “moral nature; the 
characteristic ‘spirit’ or ‘tone”’ (Merriam-Websters, 2000), the ethos 
of the profession. 
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Appendix A 
Letter sent out to practice managers: 
Addres7,for reply 
ïelephorie nzimher 
Ema;l 
Date 
Practice d r e s s  
Dear (nume or title) 
I am undertaking doctoral research with the Open University into the 
attitude of general practitioners to fundholding 
As yours is a fundholding/non-fundholding (one deleted us uppropriute) 
Practice, I am interested to hear the views of your GPs, and would 
be most grateful if one (or more) of the Partners could spare some 
time for an interview 
Should the Partners need more information before deciding whether 
to grant me an interview, please feel fiee to contact me 
Yours sincerely. 
(sipiutztre) 
Christine R E, H Descombes BA; MA 
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APPENDIX B 
Topic Schedule for Interview with Fundholders 
Reassurance of confidentiality and anonymity. 
How long in Practice? Responsibilities relating to 
fundholding? 
Describe Practice profile? (size and type of population etc.) 
How long FH? 
Why became FH? 
Personal qualms? Practice concerns? 
Significant differences from previous (non-FH) status? 
Benefits? Drawbacks? 
Ethical dilemmas? Define, describe. How resolved? 
Constraints? Impact on own practice? 
Relationship between values of managing budget and those 
relating to professional practice? 
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APPENDIX C 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR NON-FH 
I )  How long in practice? 
2) Practice profile 
3) Re FH Views within partnership Any benefits Basis for 
deciding against FH 
Impact on patients of decision not to become FH 4) 
5) Relationship with FHs 
6 )  Circumstances that would lead to reconsidering decision 
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APPENDIX D 
GP Practice Profiles 
Ten Fundholders: 
Practice of five doctors serving a town centre population. Third 
wave, Interviewee: male, white, middle-age, lead fundholder. 
Seven doctor Practice serving established section of major town 
Third wave. Interviewee: male, white, middle-age, not lead 
fundholder. 
Six doctor small town Practice sharing with a neighbouring 
Practice the immediate and surrounding village population. Third 
wave. Interviewee. male, white, middle-age, lead fundholder. 
Four doctor Practice covering a small town 
Interviewee: male, white, middle-age, lead fundholder. 
First wave. 
Two doctor Practice in small but rapidly expanding town. Fifth 
wave. Interviewee male, white, not from UK, youngest of ail male 
interviewees, lead fundholder. 
Five doctor small town and rural Practice, Third wave. 
Inteniewee: male, white, middle-age, lead fundholder. 
Four doctor Practice serving a medium size town and rural 
population also serving small local hospital. Third wave. 
Interviewee: female, white, youngest of all GPs 1 interviewed, lead 
fundholder though in close conjunction with the senior partner of the 
Practice 
Three doctor Practice in small town quite remote from other 
Second wave, Interviewee: male, white, major population sites. 
middle-age, lead fundholder. 
Three doctor Practice in growing estate on outskirts of medium 
size town. Third wave, Interviewee: male, white, middle-aged, lead 
fundholder. 
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Five doctor Practice based in large village and covering 
surrounding rural population. Firth wave. Interviewee: male, white, 
middle-aged, lead fundholder 
Four Non-fundholders: 
Four doctor Practice in the largest town of the area. Patient 
population described as “mainly blue collar”, Interviewee: female, 
white, middle-age. 
Five doctor Practice, the only one in a small town covering the 
immediate population and more than 20 surrounding villages. 
Interviewee: male, white, middle-age, senior partner. 
Two doctor small town Practice. Interviewee: male, white, 
middle-age, senior partner. 
Four doctor Practice in new development area of major town. 
Interviewee: male, white, middle-age. 
****il**** 
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